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This dissertation critically examines representations of the jury in Victorian 
novels.  I argue that studying the jury, as a concept and in practice, offers a unique 
window to both the social and literary vision of Victorian novelists.  The second half of 
the nineteenth century saw a decline in the use and cultural perception of the jury, and the 
controversy surrounding the jury’s competency to administer justice implicated broad 
social questions of education and class that shaped the formation of British identity.  The 
Victorian debate over the future of the jury was a public conversation occurring in legal 
treatises, the press, and in literature.  By engaging in the debate over the future of the 
institution of the jury, Victorian novelists forge their own “juryman’s guidebook” to 
educate the readers, the potential jurors of England.  In addition to social questions, I 
examine how the novel uses features of the jury—the jury’s role as a “finder of fact” and 
the jury’s narrative silence—as narrative techniques.  Novelists explore the jury’s role as 
a “finder of fact” while negotiating their own role as “finder of fact” by balancing legal 
realism with legal imagination in fictional legal narratives.  Additionally, examining the 
jury’s narrative silence is essential to understanding each author’s legal imagination.  By 
analyzing the narrative techniques and descriptive strategies surrounding the jury in the 
 vi 
works of Anthony Trollope, Charles Dickens, Wilkie Collins, M.E. Braddon and Henry 
Rider Haggard, this project demonstrates how the Victorian cultural anxiety over the 
future of the jury is captured in literature across genres.  The responses of these authors to 
the jury debate range from ambivalence to concrete visions for legal reform; however, 
each of these authors, through serious engagement with a legal controversy, writes the 
law.  
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Chapter One 
The History of the Jury and its Place in the Victorian Cultural Imagination 
 
It is impossible to either appreciate the subtleties of the jury as depicted in the 
works of Anthony Trollope, Charles Dickens, Mary Elizabeth Braddon, Wilkie Collins, 
and Henry Rider Haggard or recognize the larger cultural significance of these authors’ 
depictions of the jury without an understanding of the unsettled and hotly disputed 
cultural and legal status of the Victorian jury.  At the time of the novels considered in this 
dissertation, English trial practice was converging around a system in which a jury 
comprised of men was charged with evaluating evidence and deciding questions of fact 
as presented through witness testimony, lawyers and the judges’ instructions to the jury 
and arriving at a unanimous verdict.  William Blackstone, writing in the eighteenth 
century when government oppression under the Stuarts had not faded from the cultural 
memory, heralded the jury as “the palladium of English liberty” for its “protection against 
the violence and partiality of judges appointed by the Crown” (qtd. in Devlin 159).  
Indeed, juries were an important safeguard against the government in the seditious libel 
trials of the late eighteenth century.  By the Victorian period, optimism had risen 
regarding the beneficent nature of the government, leaving the jury’s future uncertain.  
Juries had always been the subject of jesting, but by the nineteenth century, juries did not 
enjoy broad cultural approval and the jury system as an institution was under attack.  
Questioning the future of the jury was part of the reform sentiment of the nineteenth 
century and the debates surrounding the jury provide a unique lens for examining 
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tensions over class and public faith in democracy.  Issues such as juror qualifications, 
feeding jurors, and unanimity requirements, that seem like long-resolved technicalities to 
modern scholars, implicated broad questions of, inter alia, national character and the 
cultural memory of older systems of justice.  The Victorian debate over what a jury 
should be and what it should do was carried forth by a broad stratum of cultural 
participants, including legal commentators, newspaper editorialists, satirists, and 
novelists.  This chapter sets forth the many threads of the Victorian-era debate over the 
proper form and role of the jury, which, as discussed in the following chapters are 
reflected and developed further by Victorian novelists.  
 “THE PALLADIUM OF ENGLISH LIBERTY” 
The origin of trial by jury is the subject of debate.  What can be confirmed is that 
the jury emerged from common law tradition rather than positive law or legislation.  
Before and after 1066, the "frank-pledge" operated as a communal police system under 
which each man was a pledge for the good behavior of every other man in his “tithing,” 
originally comprised of a group of ten of his peers.  Every free man of age had to be in a 
tithing.  Legal historians that place the origins of the jury as the Grand Assize, cite an oft-
quoted translated passage from Glanvill, author of the first legal treatise not written 
before 1187:  
The Grand Assize is a royal favour, granted to the people by the goodness 
of the king, with the advice of the nobles.  It so well cares for the life and 
condition of men that every one may keep his rightful freehold and yet 
avoid the doubtful chance of the duel, and escape that last penalty, an 
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unexpected and untimely death, or, at least, the shame of enduring infamy 
in uttering the hateful and shameful word [“Craven”] which comes from 
the mouth of the conquered party with so much disgrace, as the 
consequence of his defeat.  This institution springs from the greatest 
equity, Justice, which after delays many and long, is scarcely ever found 
in the duel, is more easily and quickly reached by this proceeding.  The 
assize does not allow so many essoins as the duel; thus labor is saved and 
the expenses of the poor reduced.  Moreover, by as much as the testimony 
of several credible witnesses outweighs in courts that of a single one, by 
so much is this process more equitable than the duel. For while the duel 
goes upon the testimony of one sworn person, this institution requires the 
oaths of at least twelve lawful men. (qtd. in Thayer 42)  
The difference between the jury described by Glanvill and the Victorian jury hinges upon 
the transmission of knowledge; Anglo-Saxon tribunals used their members’ own 
knowledge and jurymen acted as witnesses, whereas Victorian juries judge evidence to 
decide questions of fact.  Victorian legal historians seized upon this distinction in roles to 
question the institution’s age.  For example, in History of Trial by Jury (1852), William 
Forsyth disputes the connection between the nineteenth-century trial by jury and the 
Norman tribunal system; he sees the distinction between modern juries as judging 
evidence and early juries as acting as witnesses to be controlling (153).  In A History of 
English Law (1903), William Holdsworth takes issue with seventeenth century 
conceptions of the thirty-ninth clause of the Magna Carta representing the principles of 
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trial by jury, for the jury was “as yet in its infancy” (214).  He does argue that the thirty-
ninth clause in the Magna Carta exists as a thirteenth-century effort to express the values 
of a free trial.  The difference between the early juries and the modern Victorian system 
was viewed as so vast that "it might be deemed at first sight the result of violent 
revolution rather than natural development, but it is all the more natural for this very 
reason" (318).   Yet, as evidenced by an 1859 article from The Law Magazine and Law 
Review, the evolution of the jury system inspired "real national affection" and made it 
"thoroughly English" (“Trial by Jury” 318).  
Englishness in the eighteenth century was connected to success in war, but by the 
mid-nineteenth century a sense of cultural belonging was developing based on a vision of 
England as a modern state (Connors and MacDonald 2).  The importance of the law to 
national character has been traced to the legal treatises on common law of Sir Edward 
Coke in the early seventeenth century (Mandler 12).  According to Peter Mandler, at the 
time of Coke’s writing, the law would have still been viewed as tool of punishment not 
an emblem of a nation’s investment in collective decision-making.  Nonetheless, Coke’s 
technical treatises on the common law were instrumental to the process of developing the 
law’s centrality to English identity.   As compared to statutes, common law as an 
uncodified law made by judges could be viewed as reflecting the values and customs of 
the people.  Coke’s work positioned the law “as a principal support of the very idea of an 
English national character, as well as supplying some of its chief ingredients" (12).   
If the law was central to British identity, then trial by jury, despite a decline in the 
public’s estimation, remained an important part of the British trial system in the Victorian 
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period.  Coroners’ inquests required the largest number of juries; however, the number of 
criminal trials with juries was also high: in 1880, there were 26,588 coroners’ inquests 
and 14,770 criminal trials.  In civil trials, juries remained popular in tort cases and 
composed 23% of all jury trials in England and Wales (Lobban “The Strange Life” 192).  
Described as "one of England's most important invisible exports,” (Mandler 10) the jury 
system was embraced throughout Europe in France, Prussia, Belgium, Greece, and 
Portugal during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.    
In keeping with the premise that "the whole establishment of King, Lords, and 
Commons and all the laws and statutes of the realm, have only one great object, and that 
is, to bring twelve men into a jury-box,” (Forsyth 375) the trial by jury in the nineteenth 
century was not only providing a service for the litigants but also serving a wider 
constitutional purpose. Tocqueville believed that the jury system made every citizen look 
outside of his or her self to serve the community and in this way prevented undue self-
interest.  G. Rochfort Clarke, in Unanimity in Trial by Jury (1859), supports Tocqueville, 
and details the valuable lessons the juryman receives: "he is learning to fix his attention; 
to weigh evidence; to exercise calm and impartial judgment; he is obtaining valuable 
hints for his own guidance; and preparing to become a more active and intelligent 
defender of the law" (11).  For Clarke, the educational benefits of a jury trial not only 
reach the individual jurors but also the people who attend a trial.  Clarke says that even an 
attempt to understand a completed legal argument is an educational experience, and since 
the spectators enjoy the performances of the attorneys, the experience “is more ennobling 
than a pantomime and quite as amusing” (11).  As I argue in Chapter 5, Haggard’s 
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representation of a juryless trial in Mr. Meeson’s Will emphasizes the empowerment of 
the audience in the courtroom.    
The jury earned its reputation as “the palladium of English liberty” through 
exercising political power against government oppression.  Since the ruling in Bushell’s 
Case (1670), juries had been protected from a judge’s coercion of the acceptance of a 
predetermined verdict; however, the rights of juries remained vague beyond this standard, 
and the common law developed based on popular opinion and political need.  For 
example, the question of whether juries were able to decide both questions of fact and 
law was a major point of debate during the seditious libel trials of the late eighteenth 
century.  In seditious libel cases, the determination of whether a publication was libelous 
or not was a question of law; therefore, juries were instructed to issue guilty verdicts after 
answering the question of fact—whether the defendant was the author of the publication 
in question (Oldham 28). Joseph Towers argues that juries should decide questions of fact 
and law in libel cases.  Towers reads the Magna Carta’s provision that no man should be 
punished without “the lawful judgment of his peers” to mean that the jury has the power 
to judge both fact and law (11).  Juries already decide questions of law in murder trials; a 
jury guide from 1682 states that “all that the judges do is but advise, though in matter of 
law, and it is the jury only that judges one guilty, or not guilty of murder” (12).  
According to Towers, the judge instructs the jury rather than dictates the outcome and 
this tradition should stand in libel cases. It is a matter of fact whether a book is false, 
scandalous, malicious, or seditious. The jury should not be satisfied with the judge telling 
them that a book or paper is seditious or malicious libel; rather, they should be convinced 
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of it themselves (24).  Some juries in eighteenth century trials for seditious libel refused 
to return guilty verdicts even after determining that the defendant was the author of the 
publication in question; “With apparently comfortable consciences, these jurors took the 
law  into their own hands” (Oldham 29).  In this way, the jury is implicated in an issue 
central to British identity—freedom of the press.  As Towers suggests, “How ridiculous 
is it to pretend that the people of England have the liberty of the press, if it be admitted, 
that the judges can pronounce any book a libel that they think proper?” (Towers 28).  If 
juries were required for the benefit of the parties to the lawsuit, then this necessity was 
exemplified by the politics of eighteenth-century seditious libel prosecutions. 
Despite far-reaching complaints about the ability of the jury to achieve proper 
verdicts, high-profile cases existed in the nineteenth wherein the jury lived up to 
Blackstone’s ideal of the jury as the “palladium of English liberty.”  For an example of 
public celebration over the jury’s power as a check against government, one can look to 
the proceedings of the coroner’s inquest on Robert Culley.  A policeman, Culley was 
killed during the Coldbath Fields Riot of 1833.   Workers had met in Coldbath Fields to 
peacefully discuss their grievances, only to be met by brutal force from the police.  
During the riot, Culley was fatally stabbed and the Government pressured the coroner’s 
jury to return a verdict of “guilty” against the accused, George Fursey, of murder.  
Instead, the famous jury, known to history as the “memorable Calthorpe Street Jury” 
issued a verdict of “justifiable homicide” (Greene 5).  The jury realized the high degree 
of responsibility involved in the coroner’s investigation; according to Charles Greene, 
"The jury, most of whom took notes of the whole proceedings, appeared to take a more 
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lively interest in the investigation than is usually evinced by persons in their situations" 
(28).  The gravity of the case is also witnessed through the jury’s inability to reach a 
unanimous verdict.  The jury began deliberations at seven o’clock, and after thirty 
minutes reported that sixteen of the seventeen jurymen had agreed to a verdict of 
justifiable homicide.  After eight o’clock the coroner was informed that the jury could not 
achieve unanimity, prompting the coroner to respond that they would agree when they 
became a little hungrier.  Finally, after nine o’clock the jury returned a united verdict of 
justifiable homicide (Greene 52).  Following the verdict, the coroner repeatedly badgered 
the jury to change its decision, calling the verdict poor and unfair and refusing to accept 
it.  The jury stood firm, as evidenced by the transcript: “There was much murmuring 
among the jury, and cries of ‘Dismiss us.’  One juryman said—‘So help me God, I am 
ready to faint—I have fasted from ten o’clock this morning.  I have had nothing but a 
glass of water.  It is a shame to treat us this way.  If you will not have our verdict, dismiss 
us; for if you keep me here for a year, I cannot, with respect to my oath, alter that 
verdict’” (Greene 52).  The editor of the Morning Advertiser summarizes the public 
reaction to the verdict: "The feeling of admiration and gratitude towards the immortal 
jury, that, in defence of the people's rights, brought in a verdict of Justifiable Homicide in 
the case of the slain policeman Culley, exceeds all that we believed it to be.  From all 
quarters of the country, to which intelligence of the verdict had reached, from Whigs, 
from Tories, from Radicals, of everywhere and every complexion, the same feeling 
prevails" (Greene 7).  Demonstrations of public feeling made by the people in honor of 
the "Calthorpe-street Jury" included engraved silver cups, a banner with each juror's 
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name and a large portrait of the foreman, Mr. S. Stockton.  George Fursey was also 
acquitted by the jury at trial, after which the coroner’s jury and their families were invited 
for a celebratory sail on the Thames with much fanfare.   
 “HARDLY AN ASSIZE WHICH WOULD NOT FURNISH A CHAPTER FOR ‘PUNCH’”1 
In the nineteenth century a tension existed between Blackstone’s vision of the jury 
as “the palladium of English liberty” and the sense that jury verdicts existed as fodder for 
ridicule by the Victorian press.  Debates over the future of the jury raised a host of social 
and political questions.  For example, tensions over class, education and the merits of 
civic virtue collide in the question of threshold qualifications to serve on a jury in 
Victorian period.  Victorians grappled with how to create a standard for serving on a jury 
that both allowed jurymen to receive education from serving on a jury, but also ensure the 
jury have a level of intelligence so as not to bring absurd verdicts betraying 
incompetency.  In addition, the standards for serving on a jury had to be measured against 
the fact that gentlemen typically wanted to escape jury service.    
 Legislating standards for jury duty raises a crucial question: what is the measure 
of judicial wisdom?  The Juries Act of 1825 expanded the jury qualifications to include 
£10 freeholders and £20 leaseholders.  This relaxed monetary requirement allowed 
uneducated men to serve as jurors, while many educated men such as clergy, lawyers, 
doctors, and military officers were exempt from jury service.  By the mid-nineteenth 
century, discussions by the Common Law Commissioners focused on stiffening jury 
service standards to restore a more exclusive jury pool.  For example, Alexander Pulling 
                                                 
1 Joseph Brown, The Dark Side of Trial by Jury (London: William Maxwell, 1859) 29. 
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testified on behalf of the Law Amendment Society on Juries committee at Lord Enfield’s 
select committee on juries in the House of Commons in 1867.  Pulling believed that to 
remedy the issue of unrepresentative juries, it was necessary to end exemptions for 
clergymen, army officers, and lawyers, rather than open jury service to more citizens.  
Pulling cited the fact that if the previous standards remained in place, a juryman would 
need to personal property of £1500 or £150 per annum from landed property (Lobban 
198).  Pressure to reform the jury system continued through the 1870s; one piece of 
legislation mandated the occupation of property with a rateable value of £30, or £50 in 
towns with populations above 20,000 to perform jury services.  The fear remained that 
raising standards would unduly limit the jury pool; therefore, the 1825 standards were 
preserved through the twentieth century.  Of course, raising the property requirements for 
serving on a jury is only one way to try to achieve a more competent jury.  Another way, 
undertaken in legal treatises and Victorian novels, is to educate the current pool of jurors.   
Rather than a polemic for or against the jury, George Stephen’s The Juryman’s 
Guide (1845) is written as a guidebook “accessible to the class from which jurymen are 
usually taken” (3).  Stephen posits a standard of “judicial wisdom” for jurors; he argues 
that “unless jurymen are conscientious and intelligent, our ‘Trial by Jury’ is worse than 
an empty boast” (4).  Stephen’s definition of judicial wisdom also emphasizes moral 
integrity and common sense, demonstrating how the authors of legal treatises’ hopes for 
the jury align with the goals Victorian novelists have for their readers.  What better way 
to learn moral integrity than to read Victorian novels? Trollope outlines this goal for 
novelists in An Autobiography: 
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The writer of stories must please, or he will be nothing. And he must teach 
whether he wish to teach or not. How shall he teach lessons of virtue and 
at the same time make himself a delight to his readers? That sermons are 
not in themselves often thought to be agreeable we all know. Nor are 
disquisitions on moral philosophy supposed to be pleasant reading for our 
idle hours. But the novelist, if he have a conscience, must preach his 
sermons with the same purpose as the clergyman, and must have his own 
system of ethics. (70) 
Stephen speaks of “the judicial mind” as “an abstracted and quasi disembodied 
existence.”  Time in the jury-box is often marked by confusion and excitement; therefore, 
jurors often give a verdict opposed to what they would give in quiet contemplation.  This 
quality of the juror’s experience of being outside the realm of everyday life intrigues me, 
as it does Victorian authors.  There is a way in which the silences surrounding the jury 
deliberations in fictional legal narratives are more than simply legal realism modeled 
after the secrecy of actual trial jury proceedings.  As I argue in Chapter 4, Dickens’s 
silences when narrating the jury frustrate the reader’s hopes for realism.  Indeed, abrupt 
shifts from closing arguments to the verdict invite readers to narrate these deliberations 
themselves; in these silences, Dickens is summoning his readers to assume judicial 
minds.  Of course, there is a connection between characterization in a narrative and idea 
of a juryman as being disembodied—we don’t think of literary characters as flesh and 
blood. 
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The Juryman’s Guide emphasizes the subtleties that the juryman must be in tune 
with: “a juryman is bound to discriminate between the direct and the collateral evidence 
supplied by a document; it may entirely fail as regards the former, and yet be of extreme 
importance as regards the latter” (G. Stephen 51).  Stephen suggests that neither lawyers 
nor judges elucidate the facts for the jurors: “jurymen are left to ferret out for themselves, 
through a cloud of law-jargon and in a haze of foreign mystification, the real point in 
issue, with little other help than their own natural shrewdness” (56). In Chapter 3, I argue 
that Trollope’s The Eustace Diamonds (1871) requires this type of active ferreting out of 
facts from its readers.  Nuanced representations of the controversies surrounding the jury 
in Victorian novels bolster the argument that authors use their fictional legal narratives as 
a platform for educating readers, the potential jurors of Victorian England.  If we look to 
depictions of the jury in novels and find awareness of the factors tarnishing faith in the 
juries during the Victorian period, then it follows that novels can be read alongside of 
Stephen’s guide for jurymen as advocating judicial wisdom. 
In The Dark Side of the Trial by Jury (1859), Joseph Brown begins by invoking 
Blackstone’s praise of the jury only to describe the guilt he feels from contradicting such 
a legal giant.  Brown emphasizes the contrast between conducting everyday life and 
composing a jury; one hires a surgeon or lawyer to fix a problem but must place trust in 
trial to men who have never decided questions more important than “the quarrels of his 
children, or the discussions of the pothouse” (8). If proponents of the jury system have 
heralded its use of the common man, Brown emphasizes the jurors’ commonness as a 
negative attribute, in that jurors “march straight from the weighing of candles to the 
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weighing of testimony: - from the measuring of tape to the measuring out of fate; - from 
dealing in bacon and cheese to dealing with the lives properties and liberties of men” (9).   
Brown’s writing reflects the apparent confusion over what constitutes sufficient 
intelligence to serve on a jury; Brown is of the opinion that “The English seriously 
believe that judicial wisdom springs forth mature from every tradesman’s head.  This is a 
fit article of faith for a nation of shopkeepers” (10). What is the measure of “judicial 
wisdom” expected for a common law juror? Interestingly, Brown notes that the problem 
with juries is that they aren’t the intellectual equals of the lawyers at the trial (11).  Are 
they supposed to be the intellectual equals of the lawyers?  The relationship between the 
wisdom of juries and the wisdom of lawyers is one that is afforded serious treatment by 
Trollope, connecting back to this question of the measure of judicial wisdom. 
Both juries and novelists judge guilt and innocence; however, the novelist 
provides a text to justify the outcome while the jury is expected to act as the sole judge of 
all the facts without recording those facts.  Historically, the lack of note taking emerged 
from a lack of education among the jury.  The facts wash over the jury and a general 
impression forms; a critical question of this project will be to consider how this method 
of decision making relates to theories of knowledge during the Victorian period.  For 
example, the standards for jury decision making mirrored the contemporary philosophical 
thought.  Both philosophy and legal treatises discussed the concept of beyond reasonable 
doubt.  Jurors were instructed to decide on “moral certainty” or certainty without doubt 
when no absolute certainty is obtainable in the empirical realm (Shapiro 40). The 
Victorians wanted things quantified, measured and explained; the jury process lacks this 
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transparency.  The Juryman’s Guide (1845) suggests writing down the facts and never 
being satisfied without hearing every word from the witness’s mouth; “even a slight 
difference of emphasis may attach a very different meaning to the same words; nor is it 
infrequently the case that the witness himself, when he observes the attention with which 
his evidence is received by the jury, is recalled to accuracy and precision” (G. Stephen 
58).  In other words, the words of the witness are open to interpretation and the witness 
responds to the jury’s attentiveness.  In this way, the jury typifies the anxiety over 
uncertainty and the unexplained, as well as the anxiety of authorship – of the evidence in 
a literary text being misread.   
Another important consideration of the debate about the future of the jury is that 
those most likely to engage in debate had no personal experience with the institution.  As 
discussed in Chapter 4, Dickens served on a jury; therefore, his writings on the juries 
occupy an important space outside of the narrative of the jury as written by barristers 
authoring legal treatises.  Needless to say, the audience for legal treatises differs from the 
audience of the Victorian novel.  The majority of legal treatises written about the jury 
were not written for the eyes of jurymen, whereas Victorian novelists would reach this 
population.  Still the standard in the 1825 Juries Act meant that the great majority of adult 
males were excluded from jury service.  The limited portion of the population providing 
members of the common jury is crucial to understanding the ways in which Victorian 
authors question these limits.  In Chapter 5, I discuss how both Haggard and Braddon use 
the limitedness of the jury to forge their own expansive visions of the composition of a 
jury.  
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It is impossible to discuss the narrow social composition of the common jury 
without raising the issue of the special jury.  Another reason for disillusionment with the 
jury system came from the corruption of special juries.  Since the thirteenth century, the 
principles of a special jury system were in place; for example, in London, juries of cooks 
and fishmongers were summoned when the accusation was one of selling spoiled food 
(Thayer 95).  In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the popularity of special 
juries rose, especially in commercial cases.  Any defendant willing to foot the bill could 
request a special jury, but special juries were most often impaneled for libel cases and 
marital cases.  Special juries were not immune to the problems the Victorian public found 
with common juries.  For example, Chief Justice William Erle, “decried the 
transformation of the special jury into an adjunct of the class system” (Oldham 165).  
Nicolas Gedye, writing in Observations on Law Reform (1867) agrees, arguing that it 
creates great inequality for a common jury to cost twelve shillings while a special jury 
costs twelve guineas; thus, special juries should be terminated (16).  Additionally, 
requests for special juries were used by defendants to postpone trials.  Bentham protested 
against the practice of jury packing, wherein a rotating group of special jurors were 
impaneled for cases and engaged in guinea trade—each special juryman received a 
guinea per case (166).   Jury packing was not a new phenomenon; in 1285, the practice of 
filling the jury with ill, impoverished men in order to spare the rich from jury duty was 
corrected by statute (Thayer 90).  Yet the problem of jury-packing grew in the nineteenth 
century, and the legislation responded to their concerns. 
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Under the Juries Act of 1825, special juries were to be selected from “persons of 
higher degree when the causes were of too great a nicety for the discussion of ordinary 
freeholders” (Blackstone qtd. in Devlin 19).  In concrete terms, this class of persons 
included merchants, bankers, and persons with the title of esquire.  Of principal 
freeholders, forty-eight names were chosen from the Sheriff’s book; both the plaintiff’s 
attorney and the defendant’s attorney eliminated twelve names from the list.  Of the 
twenty-four names left, the first twelve called were empanelled as the jury.   These 
streamlining procedures did not end jury-packing, or solve the class problem of special 
juries; however, both of these issues were addressed by the Juries Act of 1870.   By 
requiring that special jurors could only serve once a year, the Juries Act of 1870 curbed 
jury-packing.  In addition, the Act broadened the eligibility to be a special juror to 
include persons occupying a dwelling house rated at one hundred pounds or more in large 
towns and cities, or fifty pounds elsewhere, any person occupying a farm rated at three 
hundred pounds or more, or any person occupying nonfarm premises rated at one 
hundred pounds or more (Devlin 172).   
The attack on the institution of the jury was not limited to common and special 
juries; the future of the grand jury was also part of the debate in the nineteenth century.  
The grand jury is charged with reviewing the proceedings of the magistrate to whom the 
prisoner’s bill of indictment came before.  W. Campbell Sleigh summarizes the problems 
of the grand jury: “the Grand Jury system—as worked out in the metropolitan district—is 
fraught with mischief, whether in the prosecution of the guilty, or the emancipation of the 
innocent: that while it acts as a protection and a shield to the former, it is a terror, and an 
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instrument of extortion, as regards the latter” (6).  Once again, the argument for 
abolishing the grand jury centers on the modernity of the Victorian age; in past centuries 
the grand jury was needed to safeguard against the influence of biased or incompetent 
magistrates.  The Victorian press and the higher standards for education and 
professionalism provide all the protection necessary (Sleigh 7).  The major complaint 
about the operation of the grand jury is the possibility for corruption--it allows the guilty 
a means of escaping punishment while the innocent can be extorted by witnesses.  
Additionally, if an indictment is thrown out before a grand jury, those who are innocent 
never experience the triumph of a public acquittal (Sleigh 9). Since the grand jury 
proceedings are private, the sense is that the witness may have paid off the witnesses 
(Sleigh 25).  A May 16, 1857 article in Household Words expresses the opinion that 
grand jury deliberations should take place always in the presence of reporters (“Grand 
Jury Powers” 458).  Even jurors on grand juries testified as to the grand jury’s 
uselessness.  In a presentment made by the Grand Jury, at the Middlesex Sessions in June 
1846, the foreman “felt the performance of their duties to be little better than a waste of 
time, and an idle mockery” (Sleigh 30).  The treatises arguing to abolish grand juries use 
as consolation that the trial by jury will remain; however, the points raised in the 
discussion against grand juries also casts doubt on the capabilities of common jurors.   
A cultural anxiety over what goes on behind closed doors is a feature of both 
grand and common juries.  Showell Rogers, in "The Ethics of Advocacy," invokes the 
attaint to emphasize the lack of responsibility each juryman has in the nineteenth century:  
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In the olden days the writ of Attincta lay against a jury for giving a false or           
perverse verdict, and grievous were the penalties attached to conviction of 
this  crime-the liberty, property, and all legal rights of the false juryman 
were forfeited forever, but this contrivance for preventing or punishing 
perjury having been long obsolete, and being now abolished, each 
member, with his nominal one-twelfth of responsibility to bear, is 
practically free, and when the foreman declares (as one did lately in the 
sheriff's court) that they found "magnanimously" for the plaintiff-it may be 
inferred that such is the verdict of some at least out of the twelve, but also 
that some have taken the responsibility of saying so, and the rest of 
allowing them so to say. (265) 
Through the fifteenth century, the power of the jury was checked by the attaint, during 
which a second jury of knights and more eminent individuals heard the same case.  If the 
second jury found differently from the first jury then the first jury was condemned for 
perjury and the verdict reversed (Thayer 149).  Even with the attaint, problems with 
bribery and delays were offered as incentives to refine the parameters of jury 
qualification and heighten the consequences of perjury.  Gradually, it became clear that in 
their role as triers of fact, the jury exercised its discretion so as to make the attaint 
untenable (Thayer 151).  Blackstone observed very few examples of attaint after the 
sixteenth century; Thayer explains this condition as an outcome of the end of the jury’s 
reliance on personal knowledge.  As the jury began to rely on witnesses, the attaint 
became overly draconian and the judge instead ordered a new trial.  Following the 
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abolishment of attaint, the punishment jurors receive is one of public exposure; jury lists 
are published and annotated to reflect erroneous verdicts (Thayer 170). 
Here, Rogers is referring to a highly publicized blunder in which the foreman 
reports “We are magnanimous for the plaintiff. Not guilty, but we hope she won’t do it 
again.” Since the Victorian public was not privy to a transcript of the jury's deliberations, 
the correctness of the jury’s language served as a barometer of the jury's intelligence.  
This example of the confusion of “magnanimously” with “unanimously” comes up in 
more than one treatise.  It feels like a desperate attempt to read the transcript of a jury’s 
deliberations, using one word.  This one word in effect becomes the jury’s narrative, as it 
is not part of the law of a proceeding.  In fact, transcript of trials show the foreman trying 
to elaborate on a verdict, as the judge protests saying all that is allowed is guilty or not 
guilty.  In this way, the distinctions between a legal transcript as law and a fictional legal 
narrative are blurred, for legal transcripts contain fiction, the unlawful explanations of a 
jury’s verdict, while The Eustace Diamonds contain law, Mr. Dove’s opinion written by 
the attorney Merriweather.   Again, this anxiety over the undiscoverable nature of the 
jury's deliberations is voiced through Victorian fiction's legal narratives, namely through 
the meticulous reconstruction of the judges’ actions in contrast to the unknowable nature 
of the jury.  
 When discussing jury incompetency, it is also necessary to consider instances 
when the impartiality of a jury is called into question. This problem of impartiality is 
identified not only with wealthy defendants in the railways and life insurance policy 
cases, but also extending to the bills of doctors and lawyers, and gentleman contesting the 
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charges of a merchant. Again, the principles of a jury system are highly connected to 
questions of national identity; for example, "in part of Wales, a Welsh jury can hardly be 
got to do justice to an Englishman against a Welshman" (Rogers 278).  This issue of 
impartiality is expressed in the public opinion. In a letter to the editor in The London 
Times dated January 11, 1860, a foreign magistrate reports on his observations of the 
English trial by jury system. He witnesses three prisoners, one a gentleman, charged with 
stealing property.  The gentleman, following testimony to his good character, is acquitted, 
while the other two prisoners are promptly sentenced.  The foreign magistrate's 
conclusion is that "the much vaunted system of trial by jury has its defects, one of which 
seems to be a failure of justice when a ‘gentleman’ is concerned" (“Letter” London Times 
11 Jan. 1860, 2). What is interesting is that the foreign magistrate erroneously designated 
the gentleman prisoner as the master of the diocesan training school and after the actual 
master complained in a letter to the paper, the magistrate issued an apology.  Once again, 
popular culture reminds us that “the law” exists in multiple forms. 
 The rhetoric surrounding the jury draws upon the contrast between the illustrious 
history of the institution and the ways in which society has declined since its inception. 
At this time, articles abound in the Victorian press covering the high-profile blunders by 
the jury, as troubling snippets of the incompetency operating behind closed doors. For 
example, an article from September 20, 1856 in The London Times introduces the 
illustrious history of the jury before pillorying it:   
If one institution is dearer than another to the Englishman it is trial by 
jury; he treasures it as the most precious heirloom which he has received 
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from antiquity; it is associated in his mind with the national genius and 
greatness, it reminds him of our Anglo-Saxon ancestry, and carries him 
back to the first foundation of the British Constitution and the earliest 
dawn of British liberty.  Yet there is no institution in the country which 
has been more prolific of jokes than trial by jury.  Wherever we go we 
hear some ridiculous anecdote about a jury, some absurd mistake which a 
jury has made, which tried the gravity of the judge and the whole bar. 
("Trial by Jury" London Times, 8). 
This piece compares the jury to the parish clerk, in that ecclesiastical society delights in 
laughing at the blunders of this servant of the church in much the same way the public 
revels in the mishaps of a jury trial.  In fact, the jury is described as standing "like the 
eternal hills, and you could no more shake it by any amount of joking than you could 
shake the geological basis of the earth by the same process."  The suggestion is that it is 
harmless to attack the jury because its permanency is inevitable.  As in other places, this 
blasé attitude toward a check upon an oppressive government is a mark of Victorian 
optimism.  It is astonishing that Victorians felt confident that the British government 
would never become corrupt and require the check of the people’s voice, as those 
prepared to abolish the jury suggested.  But it is equally baffling that at a time of 
momentous legal reform, with changes in marriage, evidence, and criminal responsibility 
to only name a few, Victorians could feel assured of the jury’s permanency.   
After leading with the idea that the jury provides excellent fodder for jokes, the 
article outlines the incompetency of not one but two juries hearing the case of a colliery 
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accident.  The facts proved that the accident was caused by the willful carelessness of the 
"butty," who ignored the warnings of his coworkers and brought lighted coals into the pit, 
which then exploded killing a man.  The first jury brought a verdict of accidental death, 
ignoring the defendant's carelessness, while the second jury brought a verdict of willful 
murder, suggesting that he intended to injure himself and others.  An exchange between 
the coroner and the foreman followed, in which the foreman defends the jury's sense that 
by ignoring the warnings of his coworkers and bringing the live coals into the pit, the 
butty maliciously intended to injure himself and the other men.  After long deliberation, 
the jury returns and amends their ruling to one where he "wilfully did it; we can't say that 
he did it maliciously.”  The coroner takes this as a verdict of manslaughter; the piece 
emphasizes this is the coroner's verdict not the jury’s, therefore "the law thus luckily 
provides an official midwife for the labours of our juries, to help judicial truth to its birth; 
otherwise, our English oracle of justice would often deliver very ambiguous responses" 
(“Trial by Jury” 8).  In this case, the relationship between the coroner and the foreman is 
paternalistic and characterized by handholding.  To what extent is Victorian faith in the 
jury artificial, if the ultimate hope is that a coroner or judge will intervene to fix bad 
verdicts?   Juries had legal protection from being coerced into a judge’s predetermined 
verdict; however, the specific rights of juries in trials remained unclear.  Since each of the 
authors in the following chapters narrates the power dynamic between the presiding 
authority, whether it be a judge or a coroner, and the jury, each participates in writing the 
law in this area of ambiguity. 
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FOCAL POINTS OF VICTORIAN DEBATE: THE ETHICS OF ADVOCACY 
 Painting the jury as a damaged institution is more than harmless jesting, for the 
rise of a certain type of advocate is premised on the very depiction of the jury as gullible, 
uninformed and susceptible to sensationalist rhetoric. For this reason, it is impossible to 
discuss the Victorian jury system without also discussing the debates surrounding the 
ethics of advocacy for lawyers. Rogers details the ways in which the jury system fosters 
the creation of a class of lawyers that is "vulgar and claptrap in address and language, but 
practised in the congenial task of talking down to a common jury, and with a natural 
capacity for blustering, bullying, browbeating, humbugging, and the use of those cunning 
arts calculated to mislead an ignorant body of men in a position novel to them, but which 
are threadbare and transparent to those who, like the judge and counsel, are condemned 
now to be perpetually witnessing these contemptible tricks of the trade” (277).  Rogers 
argues that because of this contemptible group of lawyers, the rest of the profession is 
abased by having to cater arguments to an uneducated jury.  The chapters that follow 
provide analyses of the representations of attorneys in the novels under discussion.  Law 
and literature scholarship tends to ask the question of whether or not a character in a 
fictional legal narrative is a good lawyer.  My discussion of lawyers in the novels will 
focus on how a lawyer’s behavior reflects the debate on the future of the jury.  In 
addition, I argue that by portraying legal professionals as weak, Victorian novelists carve 
out space for asserting literary authority.  
A series of high profile cases gained considerable attention from the Victorian 
press, shining a light on questions of the ethics of advocacy.  One such case is Charles 
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Phillips’ defense of the murderer Courvoisier, a Swiss valet who was ultimately 
convicted of murdering his master, Lord William Russell.  In this 1840 trial, Phillips 
represented Courvoisier in court for eight hours.  Then, his client confessed his guilt 
privately to his attorney.  Phillips inquired whether his client would plead guilty, but his 
client declined and requested a full defense.  Rogers suggests that if Phillips had 
abandoned his client at this point "he would have usurped the function of the judge and 
jury, have invested himself with powers of life and death over his own client, and 
inevitably have sent him to the gallows” (277).  Phillips later had to defend himself from 
charges of misconduct in the defense proceedings; he argued “I had no right to throw up 
my brief, and turn traitor to the wretch – wretch though he was – who had confided in 
me" (Rogers 277).  In fact, Chief Justice Tindal and Baron Parke heard the case, and 
when Phillips consulted Baron Parke about the changed circumstances, the judge 
affirmed Phillips' sense of duty to continue the case. The Courvoisier case sets precedent 
for the prosecution being responsible for building its case, while the defense counsel is 
under no obligation to assist the prosecution in achieving justice.  According to Rogers, 
to suggest otherwise “is not only wholly to misconceive the function of an advocate, but 
to advance a theory that is not likely to find support outside the jurisdiction of the courts 
of Utopia" (278).  The public outrage following the Courvoisier trial is crucial to 
understanding Trollope’s representation of lawyers, especially of Chaffanbrass in The 
Three Clerks (1857), Orley Farm (1861) and Phineas Redux (1874).  Trollope has been 
accused by modern literary critics of misunderstanding the function of an advocate, and 
while Chapter 2 counters this line of argument through exploring the afterlife of Orley 
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Farm in the legal community as tool for teaching legal ethics, it can be argued that 
Trollope’s depictions of lawyers point to the lack of a unified Bar on the subject of the 
ethics of advocacy.  
FOCAL POINTS OF VICTORIAN DEBATE: JURY REFORM   
New models for the jury were proposed during the nineteenth century.  Brown 
urges that trial by jury has no place in the complicated, industrial world and needs to be 
terminated, as was trial by ordeal.  Indeed, systematic problems with the jury such as 
jurors’ lack of education and responsibility were viewed as “organic diseases which can 
only be cured by death” (Brown 32).  According to Brown, by putting an end to juries, 
the judge would decide both questions of fact and law and “the criminal will no longer 
find refuge in the sophistry of counsel or the weakness of juries” (33).  Forsyth disputes 
this view, arguing that judges get more respect when people participate in trial through 
jury; judges aren't criticized because they are merely expounding the law not deciding the 
facts.  The suggestion is that if judges decided both questions of fact and law the 
possibility for corrupt verdicts would be greater, as would the public backlash to 
unpopular verdicts (379).  Forsyth, like Brown, believes legal reform is needed: "the 
machinery of our law is too complicated, and its working too expensive, to suit the wants 
of the present busy age; and it must be effectually amended, or it will run the risk of 
being rudely overthrown" (Forsyth 374). While each of the novelists I treat in this project 
engage with the deep cultural anxiety over the competency of the jury, Trollope 
elucidates a vision for reform. 
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Some Victorians see a distinction between the necessity of a jury in criminal and 
civil trials.  The argument was that criminal trial by jury protected against political 
persecution and guaranteed equal protection under the law, but in civil cases, it was only 
“productive of much positive evil” (G. Stephen 66).  Noting that continental Europe has 
not adopted the jury system for civil trials, Forsyth discusses the difficulties inherent in 
the civil trial jury as tri-fold— the cases are too complex, too various, and do not have 
enough at stake.  Conor Hanly attributes the decline of the civil British jury in the second 
half of the nineteenth-century to three factors: the establishment of judicial independence, 
the self-confidence of the legal profession, and a county court model for non-jury trials in 
1846.   As with the arguments surrounding the call to abolish the grand juries, there is a 
sense that England is no longer in danger of being ruled by an oppressive government, 
rather, government officials are viewed as competent, impartial and immune to 
corruption.  As far as the self-confidence of the legal profession, a rise of professionalism 
with heightened standards for attorneys, including a rigorous examination occurred in the 
second half of the nineteenth century.  This professionalism of the Bar created tension 
with the perceived amateurism of jurors, leading to arguments questioning the jury’s 
intelligence and competency.  The County Courts Act of 1846 standardized local courts, 
hearing cases with a jurisdictional limit of £20 in personal and contractual causes.  The 
Act made juries in local courts optional, but most litigants chose bench trials, a fact 
which impacted the debate on the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854, which made jury 
trials optional in superior courts.  (Hanly 255).   
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Returning to public opinion, in a letter to the editor from The London Times on 
March 24, 1853, the author argues that a judge is better suited to try some causes than a 
jury. He appeals to an instinct of the community to doubt the average jurymen, stating 
that "every person must have felt this who has seen the trial of what is called a heavy 
cause" (“Letter” London Times 24 Mar. 1853, 3).  The author observes the jury to be 
embarrassed by the complexity of some civil trials and finds it problematic that judges 
themselves doubt their ability to decide both questions of fact and law. Although the jury 
acts as a check on the judge, it is the judge that the public puts its trust in.    
In addition to reducing the number of civil jury trials, Victorian debate on jury 
reform focused on the number of men on a jury and the requirement of the unanimous 
verdict.  The trial by jury took several forms before the number of jurymen became 
standard; juries in the thirteenth century contained anywhere from nine to forty persons. 
Sir Edward Coke offers an explanation for the significance of the twelve men:  
That the law delighteth herself in the number of twelve, for there must not 
only be twelve jurors for the trial of matters of fact, but twelve judges of 
ancient time for trial of matter of law. Also for matters of state there were 
in ancient time twelve counselors of state.  And that number of twelve is 
much respected in holy writ, as twelve Apostles, twelve stones, twelve 
tribes. (qtd. in Forsyth 199)  
Twelve was the number used under Anglo-Saxon law; a common expression was that a 
man freed himself from a charge with the twelfth hand, referring to twelve compurgators.  
Forsyth explains the rationale behind twelve men as being determined by the state of 
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society and the amount of intelligence amongst the jurors; in the assize during Henry II's 
rule, the jurors acted as witnesses, so it was necessary to have several testimonies to 
arrive at a safe conclusion (198).  The rule of unanimity took some time to solidify; trials 
ranged from accepting a majority to all but one in the early years, but by the late 
fourteenth century it was established that all trial procedures needed the agreement of 
twelve men (Thayer 89).  Brown argues that the use of twelve men allows all to shirk 
responsibility and let others in the group bear the weight of analyzing the case. Forsyth 
agrees with the danger of collective thinking when requiring a unanimous verdict: 
A more lax view of the individual obligation of each is adopted on account 
of the mischief which results from a final disagreement.  But the man who 
has taken an oath that he will judge fairly between man and man, and who 
joins in a verdict which is opposed to his own view of the effect of 
evidence in the case, commits a grievous sin, for which he will assuredly 
have one day to answer. (Forsyth 198)  
Jeremy Bentham, in the Art of Packing as applied to Special Juries (1821) discusses the 
reasonableness of the unanimity rule: 
If the work of forming verdicts, had been the work of calm reflection 
working by the light of experience, in a comparatively mature and 
enlightened age, some number, certain of affording majority on one side, 
viz., an odd number, would on this, as on other occasions, have been 
provided; and to the decision of that preponderating number would of 
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course have been given the effect of the conjunct decision of the whole. 
(qtd. in Forsyth 197)  
In other words, unanimity was logical when the jury was using its own knowledge as 
testimony; in that case, the evidence of twelve men was deemed the amount necessary to 
be conclusive.  After the attaint was removed, jurors had no incentive to get it right as 
there were no legal percussions, just a new trial (Brown 20).  
 Beyond legal treatises, the unanimity requirement for jury verdicts was a favorite 
issue of the Victorian press, captivating the public’s imagination.  For example, in "Trial 
by Jury; Or, How It's Done!" (1877), Punch dramatizes the perils of collective thinking 
for its readers: 
  The Jury then retired to consider their verdict. 
Foreman. Well, Gentlemen, what shall it be? For the Defendant or the 
Plaintiff? I say for the Plaintiff--damages 1000. 
Number Two. Nonsense! you mean the Defendant. He was in the right, 
and nothing shall make me give in if I stay here all night. 
  Number Three. Don't say that. Because I have a dinner-party at seven! 
  Number Four. And I promised my wife to be back by six. 
 
Number Five. I say ditto to Mr. Foreman. Only make it a farthing 
damages. Nothing shall move me from that! 
  Number Six. Which was the Plaintiff? 
  Number Seven. Why, the one who refused to pay the bill, don't you know. 
 
  Number Eight. Lor' bless me, I thought he was the Defendant! 
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Number Nine. Come, Gentlemen, it's getting late. Make up your minds. I 
don't care which you give it for; in fact I thought both sides in the wrong. 
  Number Ten. Did you? I thought both sides in the right. 
 
Number Eleven. It's no use talking. I tell you I mean to stick to the 
Defendant. 
 
Number Twelve. And I to the Plaintiff. Damages 1000. Not a penny less, 
mind you, not a penny less!                     
Foreman. I see, Gentlemen, we must decide it in the usual way. I will toss 
the shilling, if you will be good enough to cry Heads or Tails.                                                  
The jury returned after a few minutes' absence. Verdict for the Plaintiff --
damages forty shillings. (193) 
An article in The London Times dated March 25, 1847, on the unanimity requirement for 
juries, seeks to "dispel the superstitious halo that surrounds our jury system" (7). Using a 
tree metaphor to describe the jury as "an important branch that might be lopped off, and 
still the tree would flourish," with the aim being to "prune it with a vigorous hand," this 
article argues the most important reason to end the unanimity requirement is because the 
public has lost confidence in it. As evidence of the public's disillusionment with the jury, 
the article cites outrage over recent cases, such as the case of Ann Scuffum at Stafford, 
who was acquitted of the murder of her own child on the ground of insanity, in the 
absence of all legal proof of that malady, and in the wake of her own confession that she 
had pushed the child under water because she could afford to keep only one child.  The 
paper suggests a universality to this epidemic of unjust verdicts: "we appeal, in short, to 
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the records of almost all trials as they appear in our columns, and which it is impossible 
to read without perceiving an increasing disregard on the part of juries to the evidence, or 
the Judge, or their own oaths" (“Unanimity for Juries” 7).   
This pressure upon individual jurors to achieve unanimity is compounded by the 
allowance of extensive deliberation periods.  An 1830 Commissioners report 
recommended that the jury should not deliberate longer than twelve hours unless at the 
end of that period they unanimously agree to apply for additional time (Forsyth 209).  
This recommendation was supported by some of the most distinguished lawyers of the 
time but not carried into effect.  An article in the London Times dated March 31, 1859 
discusses the failure of a bill to end the unanimity requirement for jurors following six 
hours of deliberation. The paper argues that the "sacred" institution needs to focus on just 
pay for juror services and end the withholding of food and drink, thereby making 
alterations to the system unnecessary.  A similar position is expressed in a London Times 
article dated December 21, 1858.  The opinion of the paper is steeped in the cultural 
memory of justice system:  
We are accustomed to look back with wonder at the barbarous expedients 
of past times, but it can hardly be said that even the pressing to death of 
prisoners who would not plead was more absurd in theory than the 
depriving twelve jurymen of food for more than 24 hours, to force them to 
form a righteous judgment on a disputed point. If Lord Campbell had, like 
his predecessors in the old days, ordered the jury to be carted to the 
borders of Middlesex, and there shot out into a ditch, it would have added 
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little to the absurdity of the proceeding. ("Trial by Jury," London Times 21 
Dec. 1858, 6) 
Again, the Times appeals to the jury's contentious past to indicate the current system's 
antiquation.  In this case, the jury came to a standstill on an action against a railway 
company where a passenger alleged the negligence of the company caused him injury. 
The jury's finding smacked of incompetence; it found for the plaintiff and set the award 
for his grave injury at one farthing. The failure of the system stemmed not from stupidity 
but an inability to compromise under the pressures of unanimity. In this way, the rhetoric 
on the jury seized upon its colorful yet questionable history to argue for pushing it 
forward into modernity.     
If Victorian historians questioned the nineteenth-century jury’s medieval roots, 
then it is also important to consider how competing trial systems co-existed with the trial 
by jury and lingered in the cultural memory.   In A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at 
the Common law (1898), James Bradley Thayer details the trial systems in place 
alongside the trial by jury.  Trial by witnesses co-existed with trial by jury; trial by 
witnesses involved a group of community witnesses chosen by the king’s officials.  
Another early form of trial was the trial by oath; through a practice called compurgation, 
an acquittal could be achieved if persons swore to the veracity of a defendant’s oath 
without any knowledge of the case itself (Thayer 24).  Although Henry III ends the right 
to compurgation, its popularity in villages and popular courts suggests how it resonates 
throughout the Victorian cultural imagination.  Palgrave, a Victorian commentator, 
highlights the tension between the old and new law: “it is out of use, but not out of force; 
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and it may, perhaps, continue as a part of the theory of the law until some adventurous 
individual shall again astonish the court by obtaining his privilege and by thus informing 
the legislature of its existence, insure its abolition” (qtd. in Thayer 34).  Here we have an 
interesting overlap in systems of community justice.  As I argue in Chapter 3, Trollope 
becomes Palgrave’s “adventurous individual” by evoking compurgation in The Eustace 
Diamonds.  By calling to mind compurgation as an alternative to trial by jury, Victorian 
fictional legal narratives encourage readers to consider the jury’s place in the British 
cultural memory.  Referring to an archetype of community justice allows Victorian 
authors to destabilize trial by jury.   
THE “LAW” OF LITERATURE 
Before I can continue with an examination of how the history of the jury resonates 
in literature, it is necessary to define “law” as it is used in this dissertation.   “Law” 
certainly includes legal treatises, court transcripts, published decisions of cases, and 
statutes, as these are the materials Victorian lawyers most frequently consult to learn the 
principles applicable to specific legal issues. However, a case can be made for a broader 
definition of the law to include the “law” of fictional legal narratives, as the lines between 
law and literature are blurred during the Victorian period.  Reading law in tandem with 
literature allows for the realization that both legal treatises and fictional legal narratives 
are rooted in narrative.  Indeed, the authors of Victorian legal treatises used examples 
from literature to support their arguments.  For example, in the introduction to A Treatise 
on Facts as Subjects of Inquiry by a Jury (1861), James Ram offers an expansive, 
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technical definition of what constitutes fact in a trial and then illustrates his point with 
examples: Wordsworth’s “Lucy Gray” and Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet (2).   
 Another way to conceptualize literature’s influence on law is through the lens of 
legal education.  In The Advocate: His Training, Practice, Rights, and Duties (1852), 
Edward W. Cox discusses the power of literature to shape the mind of the attorney.  
According to Cox, "Languages and Polite Literature, which have the twofold object of 
extending the range of ideas and cultivating the power of expression, besides giving a 
peculiar refinement and grace which nothing else will impart, require only a careful 
choice of the best words of the best authors, and reading twice or thrice to impress them 
upon the memory” (88).  If Victorian lawyers are advised to read literature, then it is 
difficult to argue that Victorian law is not influenced by literature.  Indeed, Wigmore 
recognized the relationship between the two disciplines: “no man can truly apportion the 
meed of influence between [Charles Dickens and Charles Reade] and the lawyer-
legislators – Mackintosh, Romilly, Brougham, Denman, Campbell.  But it is certain that 
the former sunned and watered what the latter sowed and reaped” (577). 
Beyond the blurred lines between law and literature as sources of guidance for 
lawyers, the case for treating fictional legal narratives as within the broad universe of 
writings that may be termed “law” draws further support from the debate over the future 
of the jury.  The jury originated from the common law tradition, not statutes.  Common 
law is based on custom, and the legal practices that follow from a standard set out in a 
legal opinion are shaped by public opinion.    Fictional legal narratives write the “law” in 
areas where the law is vague, such as the jury’s degree of independence from the judge in 
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issuing verdicts.  Trial by jury is not an abstract legal issue, but a popular one that has 
widespread social significance.  Indeed, the legal treatises emphasize natural law 
philosophies over positive law.  For example, George Stephen’s The Juryman’s Guide 
(1845) states as its purpose, a consideration of “the moral qualifications which are 
requisite for the due discharge of [a jury’s] duty” (2).  Unlike other Victorian treatises on 
trial practice, such as treatises on the laws of evidence written for an audience of lawyers, 
legal treatises on the jury expressly indicate that they are for non-lawyers and the public 
at large.  Here, I am not only referring to The Juryman’s Guide, which identifies its 
audience as the potential juries of England, but also Trial by Jury: The Birth-right of the 
People of England (1865), which includes this opening declaration: 
So persuaded am I of the paramount importance of arousing the attention 
of the lay portion of my countrymen and countrywomen to a subject which 
immediately concerns their nearest and dearest interests in common with 
my own….I would fain hope also that my paper may induce those to 
undertake the task who are more competent to discharge it, and whose 
experience of life, and especially of judicial proceedings, has taught them 
to hold with our illustrious Commentator, that “this is a species of 
knowledge most absolutely necessary for every man in the kingdom, as 
well because he may be frequently called upon to determine the rights of 
others, his fellow-subjects, as because his own property, his liberty, and 
his life depend upon maintaining in its legal force the constitutional trial 
by jury” (6). 
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The anonymous author of this legal treatise cites Blackstone, but is also legitimizing the 
authority of the common people to spread their “law”—their experiences with trial by 
jury.  It is in this tradition that fictional legal narratives follow; Victorian authors are 
answering a call to contribute to the popular “law” on the jury.  For these reasons, this 
dissertation reads fictional legal narratives as more than professionally-minded high-brow 
entertainment; legal fiction engages with contemporary legal debates and produces its 
own “law.” 
In Trial by Jury, Patrick Devlin concludes that, “trial by jury is more than an 
instrument of justice and more than one wheel of the constitution: it is the lamp that 
shows that freedom lives” (164).  What the jury is and stands for is in constant flux and 
hinges on principles that constitute the English identity--faith in the common man, faith 
in communal processes, faith in democracy itself.  Representations of the jury in 
literature are significant as they raise questions about class tensions and identity 
formation; in this respect, Victorian authors create their own juryman’s guidebook to 
educate the readers, the potential jurors of England.  Part of the challenge of writing on 
the English jury is its existence as a “black-box”; juries are not allowed to give reasons 
for their decisions and this silence is replicated in literary representations of the jury.  But 
from a narrative standpoint, these silences in the literature are significant.  This 
dissertation explores representations of juries because they are more than just reflecting 
tensions in Victorian society about class, democracy and identity formation; 
representations of the jury offer an important and unconsidered perspective on Victorian 
novelists’ literary vision.  
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Chapter 2 considers representations of the jury in The Three Clerks (1858) and 
Orley Farm (1862) to argue for a conflicted, modern Trollope.  For example, Trollope’s 
advocacy for the abolishment of the unanimity requirement in The Three Clerks is 
evidence of his modernity.  An examination of the afterlife of Orley Farm in the legal 
community complicates my assessment of Trollope as a “finder of fact,” balancing legal 
realism with literary authority in his fictional legal narratives.  Chapter 3 extends my 
analysis of Trollope’s role as “finder of fact” in The Eustace Diamonds (1871) and 
Phineas Redux (1873) to the legal profession, as Trollope’s depictions of lawyers 
elucidates a similar tension between reliance on legal precedent and reliance on legal 
rhetoric.    
In Chapter 4, I argue that Dickens’s representation of the British jury shifts from 
ambivalence in The Pickwick Papers (1836-7) to a positive representation in A Tale of 
Two Cities (1859).  One explanation for this shift is the debate over the future of the jury, 
reaching a high point in The Common Law Procedure Act of 1854.  Like Trollope, 
Dickens negotiated the balance between legal realism and legal imagination in his 
fictional legal narratives, and the afterlife of Dickens in the legal community sheds light 
not only on his role as “finder of fact” but also on the rhetoric of law and literature.  
Finally, Chapter 5 examines the ambiguous verdicts in Collins’s The Law and the Lady 
(1875) and Braddon’s An Open Verdict (1878), as well as the juryless trial of Haggard’s 
Mr. Meeson’s Will (1888).   Looking beyond the jury, Collins, Braddon and Haggard use 
extralegal approaches and literary strategies to solve legal problems. 
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Chapter Two 
A Trollopian Vision of Community Justice: The Three Clerks (1858) and Orley Farm 
(1862) 
 
Until recently, the works of Trollope have been considered by critics to be a step 
below those of the great Victorianists like Dickens and Thackeray.  In 1883, Henry James 
summed up the "genius" of Trollope: "With Trollope we were always safe; there were 
sure to be no new experiments.  His great, his inestimable merit was a complete 
appreciation of the usual” (525).  If Trollope documents the usual, he does so in a way 
that encourages deeper study.  Twentieth-century critics continued to dismiss Trollope; 
Terry Eagleton labeled Trollope's work as "an anemic, naively representational 'realism’, 
which is merely a reflex of commonplace bourgeois empiricism” (qtd. in Markwick and 
Morse 1).  Trollope's oft-quoted musings on the writing process must be partially to 
blame for these accusations of depthlessness.  In An Autobiography (1853), he states that 
"I was once told that the surest aid to the writing of a book was a piece of cobbler's wax 
on my chair. I certainly believe in the cobbler's wax much more than the inspiration” 
(121).  If Trollope is an artist who credits his own stamina more than any genius, then it 
follows that his craft is in danger of being classified as mechanical.  Rather than a 
mechanical realism reflecting popular sentiments, Trollope's work reflects great 
ambivalence over traditions in flux, particularly with regard to the legal debates of the 
Victorian period.  As Margaret Markwick and Deborah Morse suggest, current critical 
work has "discovered a conflicted Trollope, a Trollope who does not so much mirror the 
times he wrote in, as undermine the given view" (5). It is this conflicted Trollope, 
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grappling with the repercussions of modernity in drawing his vision of community justice 
that I wish to discuss. 
Although Trollope’s work has been viewed as capturing the ordinary, his legal 
realism has been questioned.  A nineteenth-century critic faulted Trollope for always 
getting the law wrong, despite the “unremitting zeal” with which he “cannot bear a 
lawyer” (“Mr. Trollope and the Lawyers” 156).  Later critics like R.D. McMaster have 
wondered whether Trollope misunderstood the role of an advocate (8).  This chapter 
challenges the idea that Trollope’s engagement with the law is characterized by its 
inaccuracy.  Trollope’s treatment of the jury shows his awareness of the current 
controversies surrounding the future of the jury as documented in legal treatises and by 
the Victorian press.  Since his work reveals this understanding of the nuances of the 
issues plaguing Victorian juries, one can read Trollope’s representations of the jury as 
inviting reader participation, similar to a juryman’s guide. Trollope’s vision of 
community justice exhibits a deep anxiety over the future of the jury.  Trollope’s novels 
include expressions of doubt of the intelligence of individual jurors and simultaneously 
champion majority verdicts to promote independent thought.  That he does this not only 
betrays Trollope’s ambivalence as to the future of the jury but also demonstrates how 
closely these contradictory attitudes are wrapped up with the formation of British 
identity.  As I will argue, Trollope’s narration objecting to the unanimity requirement for 
the jury works against tradition and demonstrates his modernity.  Trollope’s willingness 
to question an institution as sacred as the jury shows Trollope considering how past 
standards must evolve to meet the challenges of the modern world.  Additionally, 
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Trollope’s treatment of aspects of the jury such as its role as “finder of fact” and its 
narrative silence are an essential component of his literary vision.   
Trollope’s modernity has been a subject of interest for recent scholars.  David 
Skilton finds Trollope’s modernity to lie in his characters’ self-definition through the 
community (qtd in Lewis 59).  For Monica C. Lewis, Trollope’s engagement with 
modernity is best demonstrated through the authorial interruptions in his novels (143).  
Amanda Anderson identifies Trollope’s modernity in his novels’ complex ideological 
critique.  According to Anderson, "There is a genuine tension between his liberalism and 
his persistent valuing of traditional forms of life in the face of what for him are the 
negative dimensions of modernity” (510).  Indeed, Trollope’s response to the 
disenchantments of modernity is revealed in the tension between traditional ways of life 
and innovative thought in his novels.  In An Autobiography, Trollope sets forth his 
definitions of the liberal and the conservative.  The conservative sees inequalities in 
society, "and being surely convinced that such inequalities are of divine origin, tells 
himself that it is his duty to preserve them" (292).  The liberal is also aware of these 
inequalities in society being of divine origin, "but he is alive to the fact that these 
distances are day by day becoming less, and he regards this continual diminution as a 
series of steps towards that human millennium of which he dreams" (292). Trollope calls 
himself an "advanced Conservative-Liberal," in that he supports Liberal progress at a 
gradual pace which tolerates Conservative pushback (293).  Trollope’s representations of 
the jury give us another lens with which to read his political and social vision.  
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Shifting legal frameworks regarding the power and purpose of juries are reflected 
in Trollope's texts and lead to broader questions about English national identity and civic 
culture. In The Three Clerks, the legal entanglements emerge towards the end of the 
novel; however, Trollope spends a great deal of time earlier in the novel considering the 
principles of community justice.  By "community justice," I am referring not only to the 
way in which the jury system places the fate of a member of the community in the 
community's hands, thereby provoking discussions about the education and judicial 
wisdom required to serve on a jury, but also the sense that prior systems of justice linger 
in the cultural memory and shape current modes of thought.  
DEFINING COMMUNITY AND JUDICIAL WISDOM IN THE THREE CLERKS 
 Even before setting forth the legal plot, Trollope’s The Three Clerks presents a 
juryman’s guidebook to his readers, the potential jurors of England, as much of the 
narrative revolves around meditations on democracy.  For example, when the Woodward 
family visits Bushey Park, one of the royal parks at Hampton Court, each family member 
comments on the use of public space by the "thronged multitude of men, women and 
children” (54).  Uncle Bat is "a bit of a democrat," and is delighted by the crowd of 
Londoners who all come down to the park to eat dinners in the open air (54).  Harry and 
Alaric agree with him, and it is the women that show less enthusiasm, declaring the Park 
was spoiled by the dirty bits of greasy paper which were left about on all sides.  In 
addition, the central focus of the first half of the novel—debates over competition in the 
workplace—takes place within the domestic settings of the narrative.  Gertrude says 
having competitive exams would encourage young men to be ambitious, while her 
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mother, Mrs. Woodward, believes "the world will soon be like a fishpond, very full of 
fish, but with very little food for them" (142).  In the context of the fictional legal 
narrative, Trollope's discussion of community instills faith in communal processes, 
regardless of class distinctions.  The competitive exam system assists his readers in 
imagining the features of an ideal jury—educated and community-minded.  In this way, 
the novel’s reflections on democracy and the education of its citizenry build to the 
courtroom scene at the core of the narrative.   
In An Autobiography, Trollope criticizes his father for taking up farming without 
any special education or apprenticeship (7). This criticism reflects Trollope's complex 
position on the British educational system, which manifests itself throughout The Three 
Clerks and is directly connected to the qualifications of the common juryman.  Trollope's 
account of the meteoric rise of Alaric Tudor includes a discussion of his educational 
background.  We learn that Alaric believes himself to be "superior to the men who 
worked round him in his office. He was made of a more plastic clay than they, and 
despite the inferiority of his education, he knew himself to be fit for higher work than 
they could do" (88).  Embracing a philosophy that "education is nothing – mind, mind, is 
everything, mind and the will," Alaric nonetheless gets misled to bad dealings by the 
Honourable Undecimus Scott (90).  If Alaric lacks a moral education, then in History of 
Trial by Jury (1852), William Forsyth advocates for the moral education of juries: 
If common jurors are sometimes found deficient in intelligence, the true 
remedy is not to abolish the system, but to improve it by educating the 
people so as to make them more fit to discharge the duties which it 
 43 
imposes.  The more we train and discipline their minds, and above all, the 
more we teach them to act upon Christian principles, so that they may 
undertake the office under a deep and solemn sense of responsibility, and 
with a conscientious reverence for their oaths, the more excellent an 
instrument for the ends of justice will the jury become.  And the converse 
of this is equally true.  Where the mental capacity of a nation is mean, or 
the standard of public morality is low, and the obligation of an oath is 
lightly felt, no worse machinery could be devised for judicial 
investigations. It is invidious to specify instances, but it is easy to see that 
there are countries where trial by jury, even in criminal cases, must be a 
doubtful experiment, and in civil, at present, beyond all question a 
failure." (380)  
The goals Forsyth mentions are also Trollope’s self-professed aims for a novelist.  In An 
Autobiography, Trollope talks about giving readers an education in morality in a way that 
is enjoyable to them.  I would argue the courtroom scenes function in the novel to create 
this enjoyment of moral instruction; the narrative style invites the reader’s participation in 
deliberation, as a potential juror of England.  In The Three Clerks, Trollope notes that 
“The spirit of the age raises, from year to year, to a higher level the standard of education. 
The prodigy of 1857, who is now destroying all the hopes of the man who was well 
enough in 1855, will be a dunce to the tyro of 1860” (72). Trollope's evolving ideas over 
education and apprenticeship can be seen as creatively registering the discussions over 
standards of intelligence necessary to serve on the jury.       
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In The Three Clerks, discussions of moral codes of conduct relate to Trollope's 
education of the imagined juror.  For example, Sir Gregory tells Alaric "that his own 
interests should always be kept in subservience to those of the public service" (177). 
Alaric wonders whose conduct he should follow: "Was it that Sir Gregory's opinions 
were such as should control the outward conduct, and Undy's those which should rule the 
inner man?" (177).  This discrepancy between outward conduct and the inner man fuels 
the Victorian public's anxiety over the decision-making jurors perform behind closed 
doors.  If the Victorian debate over the future of the jury hinges on questions of civic 
duty, then civil servants like Alaric who put themselves before the public are acting out 
this responsibility. Alaric's meditations on honesty connect to principles of 
community justice.  He debates whether men "really endeavoured to be honest, or 
endeavoured only to seem so.  Honesty was preached to him on every side; but did he, in 
his intercourse with the world, find men to be honest? Or did it behove him, a practical 
man like him, a man so determined to battle with the world as he had determined, did it 
behove such a one as he to be more honest than his neighbors?" (325). The concept of 
measuring one’s own honesty in comparison to one's neighbors is at the heart of the 
debate over the jury’s unanimity requirement.  As discussed in Chapter 1, one argument 
against requiring unanimous verdicts in jury trials is that forcing unanimity encourages 
collective thinking and allows for a lax view of individual obligation.  In this way, 
Trollope’s discussions of judicial wisdom educate his readers early in the novel so as to 
be prepared to receive his vision for legal reform—his authorial aside decrying the 
unanimity requirement during Alaric’s trial for embezzlement.  In this way, realist 
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novelists such as Trollope use legal narratives as a platform for educating readers, the 
potential jurors of Victorian England, and writing the “law.” 
Community justice supersedes the force of statutory law in The Three Clerks, as 
Trollope considers the tension between natural law and positive law.  Natural law is what 
we believe to be just based on moral values of right and wrong while positive law is 
statutory law or other law, deriving its authority from its existence as “law.”  When 
Alaric begins to take money from a trust he is managing for Clementina, he considers his 
fraudulent acts as his being at the mercy of a new law: "What if he should wake some 
morning and find himself in the grip of some Newgate myrmidon? A terrible new law 
had just been passed for the protection of trust property; a law in which he had not felt the 
slightest interest when he had first seen in the daily newspapers some tedious account of 
the passing of the various clauses, but which was now terrible to his innermost 
thoughts"(462).  The "terrible new law" Trollope is seemingly referring to is positive law, 
the Trustee Act of 1850.  According to Chantal Stebbings, in The Private Trustee in 
Victorian England, the legislature had little control over which individuals became 
trustees.  The principle difficulty in legislating the administration of a trust is similar to 
that of operating a jury system: how can one measure honesty and trustworthiness? The 
sole hurdle to becoming a trustee was legal capacity; the legislature "could not legislate 
for intelligence, objectivity or integrity” (Stebbings 51).  Indeed, the legislature's inability 
to set standards for the level of intelligence of the trustee presents a parallel anxiety to the 
capabilities of the juror.  The Trustee Act of 1850 provided the court with a general 
statutory power to appoint new trustees.  The purpose of the Act was to aid in efficiency, 
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although this took the process out of the hands of the private individual.  In The Three 
Clerks, there is a sense that private policing of a trustee's actions is sufficient, as Mrs. Val 
wishes to replace Alaric as Clementina's trustee when she finds he is thinking of a seat in 
Parliament.  Stories surrounding the trustee process aren't far from Dickens' depiction of 
Chancery in Bleak House (1853). For example, an 1847 case with an undisputed, dead 
trustee required an application to the court for three years and cost a third of the trust's 
income over the period (52).  In debates surrounding the Trustee Act of 1850, the main 
issue was the extent to which courts should be involved in what the public saw as the 
private relationship between the trustee and trustor.  Trollope harnesses this sentiment in 
his depiction of Alaric's unraveling.  As a fraudulent lawyer, Alaric is concerned that the 
"new terrible law" will be his undoing; however, it is the community’s judgment, based 
on the natural law principles of morality, which leads to his downfall.  When Mrs. Val 
tells Alaric’s wife Gertrude "what all the world is saying," it becomes clear that this will 
be the true threat to Alaric's fraudulent practices, not the enactment of a new law.  It is 
Gertrude's vindication of Alaric that hastens his arrest; Mrs. Val argues that she said 
nothing about lost confidence in Alaric but Gertrude takes offense and says "who has 
dared to suspect him of anything not honest or upright?" (477).  The community's 
suspicion—not the law—is the key to Alaric’s downfall.  Indeed, in the first reports of his 
arrest, Alaric is defined through his role in the community: "Alaric, their own Gertrude's 
own husband, their son-in-law and brother-in-law, the proud, the high, the successful, the 
towering man of the world" (510).   
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WRITING THE “LAW” OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: TROLLOPE’S LAWYERS BEFORE 
THE JURY 
 
Upon Alaric’s arrest for the embezzlement of Clementina’s trust, the narrative 
shifts from a consideration of the values of community justice, such as judicial wisdom, 
in the abstract, to a conventional legal plot, complete with a defendant, a judge, and of 
course, lawyers.  A recurrent theme in law and literature scholarship is the significance of 
legal narratives as a means of uncovering the private lives of legal professionals.   
According to M.M. Bakhtin, "The significance of legal-criminal categories in the novel, 
and the various ways they are used—as specific forms for uncovering and making private 
life public—is an interesting and important problem in the history of the novel” (qtd. in 
Dolin 21).  Richard Weisberg devotes a chapter to Dickens’s lawyers in his seminal study 
Poethics (1992), where he claims that “fiction about law continues to uncover better than 
any other medium the private lives of lawyers….and compels us to recognize that 
lawyers’ private lives directly affect their public performances” (18).  Like Dickens, 
Trollope’s lawyers have richly drawn personal and professional lives; indeed, Jaggers in 
Great Expectations (1860) is the subject of much scholarship.  An important distinction 
between the ways Trollope and Dickens depict attorneys is Trollope’s use of recurring 
characters that appear in multiple novels, allowing for evolution.  For example, the 
Chaffanbrass introduced in The Three Clerks is different from the Chaffanbrass 
representing Phineas in Phineas Redux (1874).   Trollope spends a lot of time 
illuminating the advocacy strategies of a host of different classes of attorneys.  Evidence 
of Trollope’s uniqueness in this area comes from a consideration of the ways in which 
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Trollope is used as a tool for teaching legal ethics.  Indeed, Trollope’s characterization of 
Chaffanbrass and the other attorneys is essential to our understanding of the author’s 
vision of community justice.  Once attorneys were given the ability to address the jury 
directly under the Prisoners’ Counsel Act (1836), the ethics of advocacy became 
inextricably connected to the debate over the future of the jury.  In fact, much of the rise 
of sensational rhetoric from attorneys is said to have been a direct product of their 
increased role in the courtroom, and increased access to influencing the jury.  Juries 
cannot be analyzed in a vacuum; it is necessary to consider juries through their 
relationships with attorneys and judges.     
 Among Trollope scholars, The Three Clerks is well-known as the entrance of 
Chaffanbrass.  At seventy-seven, Chaffanbrass is described as having endless capacity for 
work.  At Alaric's trial, Chaffanbrass enters the courtroom late, carrying a huge old blue 
bag and "wearing a wig that apparently had not been dressed for the last ten years, made 
his way in among the barristers, caring little on whose toes he trod, whose papers he 
upset, or whom he elbowed on his road" (540).  Chaffanbrass' inattention to his personal 
appearance emphasizes the separation between work and the domestic; it is as if there is 
no space for his humanity at work.  Like Dickens' portrayal of Jaggers, Trollope 
emphasizes the mannerisms of Chaffanbrass in the courtroom as part of an elaborate 
performance; the barrister is profuse with snuff, very generous with his handkerchief, and 
always at work on his teeth.  A general shabbiness prevails as his linens are never clean, 
his hands are never washed, and his clothes are never new.  In narrating the private life of 
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the professional, Trollope emphasizes how “the lawyer” is a role being performed, 
separate from the individual: 
and those who only know him in public life can hardly believe that at 
home he is one of the most easy, good-tempered, amiable old gentlemen 
that ever was pooh-poohed by his grown-up daughters, and occasionally 
told to keep himself quiet in a corner….chooses to be ruled by his own 
children. But in his own way he is fond of hospitality; he delights in a cosy 
glass of old port with an old friend in whose company he may be allowed 
to sit in his old coat and old slippers. He delights also in his books, in his 
daughters' music, and in three or four live pet dogs, and birds, and 
squirrels, whom morning and night he feeds with his own hands.  He is 
charitable, too, and subscribes largely to hospitals founded for the relief of 
the suffering poor (545). 
Descriptions of the personal lives of attorneys do more than merely provide 
realism.  In the nineteenth century, the increased role for attorneys in the courtroom 
ignited a curiosity about the lives of attorneys; yet, until there was a rise in the 
professionalism of the Bar, standards for who lawyers should be remained murky.  When 
rules of professional conduct for lawyers became standardized in the mid-nineteenth 
century, these rules included ideas about how the lawyer should conduct himself in his 
personal life.  Thus, fictional legal narratives write the “law,” filling in a space in legal 
culture lacking in narration.  Trollope’s descriptive strategies and narrative techniques 
allow him not only to write the “law” but also to assert his literary authority over the 
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fictional legal plot.  For example, Trollope’s facetious naming of lawyers is a descriptive 
strategy Trollope uses to challenge the legal profession.  Reaching an apex in The Three 
Clerks, (Clark 17) facetious names include Alaric's junior counsel Younglad, who is only 
young compared to Chaffanbrass; yet, as a lawyer in his forties his friends only hope that 
"at some distant future" he will make a living out of his profession.  Younglad has been 
"sitting, and walking and listening, let alone talking occasionally, in criminal courts, for 
the last twenty years" (540).  Trollope's satirization of the stalled career of the attorney in 
the hierarchical structure of the legal profession allows the legal satire to operate as a 
competition between the professions, for Trollope as a novelist was able to write with 
great efficiency from the beginning of his independent career.   
Critics often position the legal narratives of Victorian novelists as in competition 
with the law.  As Jonathan Grossman argues, Dickens in The Pickwick Papers uses the 
law to create his authority as a novelist (85).  In An Autobiography, Trollope argues that 
he needs to live with each of his characters day and night to make them real, but the Old 
Bailey is not a character in his novel, the way the court of Chancery is alive in Dickens' 
Bleak House.   Dickens and Thackeray attended trials at the Old Bailey; Trollope resists 
association with the place.  Instead, Trollope employs paralipsis in his depiction of the 
Old Bailey; he explains that Alaric was to be tried at the Old Bailey, but "as I have never 
seen the place, and as so many others have seen it, I will not attempt to describe it" (551).  
By neglecting to describe the Old Bailey, a symbol of the criminal court, Trollope’s 
fictional legal narrative resists physical classification, thereby carving out its own space 
as a competing version of the law.  Similarly, Trollope’s use of paralipsis in his 
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representation of Chaffanbrass creates a sense of competition between the law and 
literature.  Trollope frames his discussion of Chaffanbrass with an authorial intrusion: 
"There are not now too many pages left to us for the completion of our tale; but, 
nevertheless, we must say a few words about Mr. Chaffanbrass" (557).  His profundity 
and commitment to detail as a novelist was a source of pride, so Trollope’s reference to a 
page limit seems arbitrary.  The self-consciousness with which Trollope confronts the 
barrister in his narrative allows him a position of power with which to assert his literary 
authority over the fictional legal plot.  Furthermore, Trollope departs from his usual plain 
style to use elaborate metaphors and flowery language to describe the barrister, thereby 
satirizing legal rhetoric.  Trollope points a special critical eye towards what he terms the 
browbeating of witnesses.  Under the examination of Chaffanbrass, a witness's "very 
truths must be turned into falsehoods;" this connects to broader discussions of Trollopian 
honesty.  Legal rhetoric, "the best talents of practiced forensic heroes," is compared to 
torture: "eels are skinned alive, and witnesses are sacrificed, and no one's blood curdles at 
the sight, no soft heart is sickened at the cruelty" (542).  Stylistically, the sentence 
mirrors the rhetorical style of questioning at trial, as one is bombarded with clauses 
colliding with each other.  Trollope refers to the rise of the movement to protect animals 
from cruelty; the implication is that there needs to be a similar legislative restraint on the 
animalistic lawyers. The community sanctions Chaffanbrass's antics: "Men congregate to 
hear him turn a witness inside out, and chuckle with an inward pleasure at the success of 
his cruelty" (545).  Chaffanbrass is alternately represented as a cat, an actor, and a 
gladiator.  Through the uncharacteristic use of figurative language, Trollope offers a 
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description of the barrister that is unusually thorough but at the same time circuitous.  In 
effect, Trollope gives the reader a tirade on Chaffanbrass, mirroring the brow-beating the 
witnesses get; however, to achieve this effect he has to break from his plain style.     We 
notice the contrast in the language as Trollope confronts the conflicting motivations 
between narrative realism and legal rhetoric.  By satirizing legal rhetoric, Trollope 
distinguishes his competing narrative of the legal culture from the artificial one presented 
by lawyers.  
 The balance of legal rhetoric and specialized legal knowledge is an idea Trollope 
examines in his portrayals of lawyers and may be compared with the categories of style 
and realism with authors.  In many ways, Trollope's conflict with the legal profession 
apparently derives from a mistrust of legal rhetoric.  On Alaric's case, Trollope writes: "It 
would be needless to describe how a plain case was, as usual, made obscure by the 
lawyers" (522). Why is Trollope troubled by a lawyer's advocacy to admit an 
"insignificant piece of evidence" which would have no real bearing on the case, when the 
author himself traffics in verisimilitude? In Autobiography, Trollope is dismissive of any 
author “who thinks much of his words as he writes” (177).  Indeed, Nathaniel Hawthorne 
celebrates the simplicity of Trollope’s style: "If I were to meet with such books as mine 
by another writer, I don't believe I should be able to get through them.  Have you ever 
read the novels of Anthony Trollope? They precisely suit my taste" (qtd. in apRoberts 
12).  Ruth apRoberts connects the critical neglect of Trollope with his straightforward 
writing style, observing that Trollope's writing has the effect on many readers of allowing 
one to "slip into the posture of consumer rather than critic" (13).  Yet it is the act of 
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consumption that allows Trollope's fiction to fulfill the purpose of educating imagined 
jurors.  apRoberts traces how critics have shifted from the view that Trollope has no style 
to a view of a clarity that appears effortless; she suggests that "lucid, or the intensive 
pellucid, is the word [Trollope] uses most often to describe the best way for the novelist 
to write" (22).  Indeed, this debate over literary style translates directly to the debate over 
legal rhetoric as opposed to technical legal expertise. 
 In the emerging field of criminal defense, Trollope sees Chaffanbrass as lacking 
technical expertise: "As a lawyer, in the broad and high sense of the word, it may be 
presumed that Chaffanbrass knows little or nothing. He has, indeed, no occasion for such 
knowledge" (TC 535).  For example, Chaffanbrass attacks the prosecution instead of 
defending his client, presenting the mechanical defense that he had "never heard a case 
against a man in a respectable position, opened by the Crown with such an amount of 
envenomed virulence" (TC 560).  The barrister has to be reminded that the prosecution 
was not carried on by the Crown.  Again, the satire here is not merely to point out an 
injustice, as Trollope also examines the nuances of the legal profession itself.  Trollope 
seems suspicious of a professional who does not need a body of knowledge; his scrutiny 
of the legal profession is a narrative technique allowing him to assert his literary authority 
and write “law.” 
 
TROLLOPE’S JURY IN THE THREE CLERKS 
If Trollope’s meditation on community raises issues of class tension and 
education, The Three Clerks exists as a guide to his readers, the imagined jury.  Beyond 
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serving as a window into Trollope’s social vision, representations of the jury in the novel 
highlight his authorial vision.  This section will explore the jury’s role as the “finder of 
fact” in relation to Trollope’s position as a “finder of fact.”  In addition, I will examine 
how the narrative silence of the jury functions in the text.  
In Victorian trials, the jury is charged with deciding questions of fact; however, 
juries gather the facts from, inter alia, witness testimony as elicited by lawyers’ questions, 
and there is no way to tell if a jury is influenced by feeling.  This ambiguity connects 
with the nineteenth-century debate over empiricism.  Indeed, Alaric raises this issue of 
the process by which juries decide questions of fact when questioning the point of a trial 
as opposed to an outright confession:  
He knew he was guilty, he could not understand that it was possible that 
any juryman should have a doubt about it; he had taken the money that did 
not belong to him; that would be made quite clear...what possible doubt 
would there be in the breast of anyone as to his guilt? Why should he vex 
his own soul by making himself for a livelong day the gazing-stock for the 
multitude? Why should he trouble all those wigged counsellors, when one 
word from him would set all at rest? (550) 
The nature of trial by jury creates doubt in Alaric’s conviction despite the facts, because 
jury deliberations are a non-empirical process.  Alaric wants to plead guilty, but 
Gitemthruet forbids it; rather than a professional attorney-client relationship, the dynamic 
is one of ruler and ruled: "You have done me the honour to come to me, and now you 
must be ruled by me. Plead guilty! Why, with such a case as you have got, you would 
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disgrace yourself for ever if you did so. Think of your friends, Mr. Tudor, if you won't 
think of me or of yourself" (539).  That the choice to plead guilty in a trial by jury is 
motivated by the need to preserve the lawyer's reputation is troubling in its disconnect 
from the aims of justice.  Yet the choice to stand trial in consideration of one’s friends is 
a decision that elevates feeling over fact.  As readers, we learn that "the lawyer's 
eloquence converted Alaric;” the implication is that the lawyer’s rhetoric persuaded 
Alaric to weigh feeling over fact.  Although the narrative events of Alaric wanting to 
display honesty and plead guilty, while his lawyer wants to obscure the truth may appear 
to be far-fetched to present day readers, the possibility of these events channels the 
anxieties the public felt over the lawyer's "rule" following the Prisoners' Counsel Act 
(1836).   
 To understand this public debate on advocacy and the jury in the Victorian period, 
it is necessary to consider the passage of the Prisoners’ Counsel Act (1836), which 
granted defendants the right to have a full defense at their trials (Bentley 101).  Until the 
passage of this act, defense counsel could examine and cross-examine witnesses, but it 
could not address the jury and provide commentary about the evidence.  In the eighteenth 
century, the defendant’s own statement of the facts to the jury in a case was thought to 
carry sufficient guarantees of its truth.  Debates surrounding the Prisoners’ Counsel Act 
focused on the capacity of the accused to explain themselves to the jury and the 
advocate’s evolving role as a professional stand-in for the client.  Those for reform 
argued that both uneducated and educated defendants had difficulty explaining 
themselves to the jury; whereas, those opposed argued that the innocent would never fail 
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to adequately represent their own stories.  The fear was that counselors, speaking in their 
clients' stead, would mislead juries with their rhetoric (107).  In the unsigned “Rights and 
Duties of Advocates” (1836), Lord Henry Brougham challenges this position, arguing 
that an advocate’s eloquence is overrated when compared to the power of looks and tears 
in a party’s testimony (167).  Trollope enters into the conversation expressing the anxiety 
over the purchasing of judicial outcomes the Prisoners' Counsel Act appeared to sanction:  
Alaric's guilt was clear as daylight to all concerned; but a man who had 
risen to be a Civil Service Commissioner, and to be entrusted with the 
guardianship of twenty thousand pounds, was not to be treated like a 
butcher who had merely smothered his wife in an ordinary way, or a 
housebreaker who had followed his professional career to its natural end; 
more than that was due to the rank and station of the man, and to the very 
respectable retaining fee with which Mr. Githemthruet had found himself 
enabled to secure the venom of Mr. Chaffanbrass (547). 
 Although Alaric's guilt is apparent, Trollope's representation of his trial still 
focuses on the lawyer's ability to mislead the jury with his rhetoric.  Highlighting how 
legal rhetoric can be highly emotional, Chaffanbrass' address to the jury is not 
straightforward and the style is poetic: “I boldly aver that I have never forgotten myself, 
and I may at times be angry, when I see mean falsehood before me in vain assuming the 
garb of truth--for with such juries as I meet here it generally is in vain--I may at times 
forget myself in anger; but, if we talk of venom, virulence, and eager hostility, I yield the 
palm, without a contest, to my learned friend in the new silk gown" (564).  Chaffanbrass's 
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complaint is that emotions are being used to sway the jury; of course, he is trying to 
manipulate the jury's emotions as well, into feeling guilt or shaming the prosecution.  In 
this way, Trollope emphasizes the extent to which the trial by jury is not necessarily 
driven by facts and empiricism, but rather, something more emotional and subjective.  
Trollope is careful to provide detail of the mannerisms of the lawyer; although 
Chaffanbrass is only allowed to directly address the jury once, he nonetheless 
communicates with the jury throughout the trial.  Trollope demonstrates a keen 
understanding of this dynamic: "'Oh!' said Mr. Chaffanbrass; and as he uttered the 
monosyllable he looked up at the jury, and gently shook his head, and gently shook his 
hands.  Mr. Chaffanbrass was famous for these little silent addresses to the jury-box" 
(483).  Chaffanbrass's legal strategy is to induce the jury to see Undy as guilty and 
thereby view Alaric as innocent; he knows how to address a jury, and "the city juries are 
very fond of [him]" (489). The suggestion is that the jury is malleable and the trial will 
not hinge on facts but interpretation and the extent to which the juries are emotionally 
connected to Chaffanbrass.  Indeed, the jury is depicted as deceivable, as "the judge, he 
well knew, would blow aside all this froth; but then the judge could not find the verdict" 
(483).   As Trollope acknowledges, the judge cannot find the verdict; however, the judge 
can do a great degree of handholding to steer the jury's deliberations.  Trollope illustrates 
this point with the judge's instructions to the jury:  
Gentlemen, I must especially remind you, that in coming to a verdict in 
the matter, no amount of guilt on the part of any other person can render 
guiltless him whom you are now trying, or palliate his guilt if he be guilty.  
 58 
An endeavour has been made to affix a deep stigma on one of the 
witnesses who has been examined before you; and to induce you to feel, 
rather than to think, that Mr. Tudor is, at any rate, comparatively innocent-
innocent as compared with that gentleman. That is not the issue which you 
are called on to decide….As regards the evidence of Mr. Scott, I am 
justified in telling you, that if the prisoner's guilt depended in any way on 
that evidence, it would be your duty to receive it with the most extreme 
caution, and to reject it altogether if not corroborated.  That evidence was 
not trustworthy, and in a great measure justified the treatment which the 
witness encountered from the learned barrister who examined him" (487).   
By writing the jury charge to include the judge's opinion of the cross-examination, 
Trollope confronts the issue of attorneys' brow-beating of witnesses.  Here, the judge 
serves as a check on the attorney, and Trollope emphasizes the plain style of the judge's 
address as contrasted with Chaffanbrass's artistry: "But, alas! the deliberate and well-
poised wisdom of the judge seemed to shower down cold truth upon the jury from his 
very eyes.  His words were low in their tone, though very clear, impassive, delivered 
without gesticulation or artifice, such as that so powerfully used by Mr. Chaffanbrass; but 
Alaric himself felt that it was impossible to doubt the truth of such a man; impossible to 
suppose that any juryman should do so" (488). 
While Chaffanbrass possesses an almost machine-like endurance in the 
courtroom, the jury is portrayed as thoroughly human, ready to offer their "brightest 
attention" which will be "dim enough before the long day be over" (549).  In addition, it 
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is significant that the jury men are not equipped with pen and paper until the second day 
of the trial.  As discussed in Chapter 1, some controversy over the jury's lack of note 
taking at this time.  Historically, this lack of note taking stemmed from a lack of 
education among the jury.  The prevailing presumption was that the facts washed over the 
jury and a general impression formed; note taking is an effort to elevate the standards for 
the jury.  George Stephen, in his treatise written as a guidebook for the common jury 
called The Juryman’s Guide (1845) suggests writing down the facts and never being 
satisfied without hearing every word from the witness’s mouth: “even a slight difference 
of emphasis may attach a very different meaning to the same words; nor is it infrequently 
the case that the witness himself, when he observes the attention with which his evidence 
is received by the jury, is recalled to accuracy and precision” (58).  By placing the pen 
and paper in the jury box, Trollope casts the jury as writers, charged with determining 
"the truth," by recording the actual words spoken, rather than deriving a truth from 
allowing ideas to wash over them.   
The tension between feeling and fact in the jury’s role as “finder of fact” is 
mirrored in Trollope’s position as “finder of fact” in the novel.  Trollope must balance his 
goals of legal realism (“fact”) with his literary vision (“feeling or imagination”).  
Trollope’s vacillation between self-conscious editing and adherence to legal procedure in 
the trial scene disrupts his goal of literary realism.  For example, Trollope inserts himself 
in the narrative to broadcast his withholding of details concerning the trial: "I will not try 
the patience of anyone by stating in detail all the circumstances of the trial. In doing so I 
should only copy, or, at any rate, might copy, the proceedings at some of those modern 
 60 
causes célèbres with which all those who love such subjects are familiar.  And why 
should I force such matters on those who do not love them?" (545).  In so doing, he 
distances himself from the Newgate novels of Bulwer-Lytton and Ainsworth, but at the 
same time the law is central to his narrative.  This narrative technique draws attention to 
his professional authority as editor of the record of the trial.  Trollope strives for realism 
in the courtroom; for example, when Chaffanbrass addresses the jury, he indicates that 
"the forms of the court would not give him the power of addressing the jury again, he 
must now explain to them what he conceived to be the facts of the case" (551). There is a 
self-consciousness with which the author, as “the finder of fact,” tries to get the legal 
procedures right; however, these attempts open the author to the criticism from practicing 
lawyers. 
 One such criticism of The Three Clerks appeared in the Saturday Review.  The 
review is unsigned; however, it has been speculated that the author is Sir Henry Maine, a 
lawyer and frequent contributor to the Saturday Review (Smalley 24).  According to 
Maine, "the law is a pitfall from which few novelists can escape uninjured” (Saturday 
Review, 5 Dec. 1857). The focus of Maine’s critique is on Chaffanbrass's treatment of the 
witness Undy Scott.  Indeed, Maine objects to Chaffanbrass's cross-examination so 
vehemently as to feel compelled to propose a plan for the writing of future fictional legal 
narratives:  
Why do not novelists consult some legal friend before they write about 
law? Is it impossible to find a barrister who has a hobby for criminal law, 
and also a hobby for criticizing novels, and who would bring his skill in 
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both lines to bear upon the correction of a layman's mistakes? We think 
that such a man might be found, and he would be invaluable to all fiction 
writers who evolve descriptions of English trials out of the depths of their 
consciousness, and square them to meet the principles of eternal justice 
(Saturday Review, 5 Dec. 1857). 
Maine imagines a lawyer actively editing a work of literature; however, he seems 
oblivious to Trollope's critiques of lawyers' lack of technical legal expertise throughout 
The Three Clerks.  Indeed, Trollope’s point in his fictional legal narratives seems to be 
that he is thinking in more detail about how lawyers practice law than the Victorian bar 
itself.  While conceiving of a trial out of "the depths" of a conflicted conscience such as 
Trollope's results in simple mistakes about details of the legal process, it also effects a 
reimagining of what community justice signifies.  Trollope is intrigued by the coercive 
power a lawyer is able to exercise in the courtroom; for example, it is suggested that 
Undy Scott remain in his seat to be questioned by Chaffanbrass.  Chaffanbrass will not 
allow it, as his questioning "must be of a nearer, closer, and more confidential nature than 
such an arrangement as that would admit. A witness, to his way of thinking, was never an 
efficient witness till he had his arm on the rail of a witness-box" (478). The distinction 
seems to be that of a participant in the events at trial and that of a passive observer.  
Critics tend to rationalize Trollope's campaign against the brow-beating of witnesses as 
biographical, as he once endured a painful cross-examination.  I would suggest that 
Trollope's investment in the treatment of witnesses is inextricably connected to his 
overarching ideas about community justice, and his nostalgia for an older system of 
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justice which he helps preserve in the cultural memory.  Trollope captures the sense that 
the jury is not just made up of the men chosen for Alaric's trial but also the community 
that judges him from the courtroom, "the agitated crowd with that happy air of command 
which can so easily be assumed by men at a moment's notice, when they feel themselves 
to be for that moment of importance" (553).  This vision of community justice harkens 
back to a trial by witnesses, wherein a group of community witnesses chosen by the 
king’s officials decided a defendant's fate.  In earlier systems of jury trials, the witnesses, 
as those with the first-hand knowledge of the case, became the decision-makers and 
advisors.  However, in the later system of the jury trial depicted in The Three Clerks, 
their firsthand knowledge is filtered through the rhetoric of the lawyer, who is not 
directly connected to the circumstances of the case.  Trollope elevates the voice of the 
witness throughout his text, as characters with first-hand experience in the case composed 
the ancient juries.  The conflicted Trollope looks back to the past forms of juries that 
linger in the British cultural memory and at the same time is willing to question traditions 
of the current jury system that are in contradiction to the needs of modern society.   
In The Three Clerks, Trollope’s vision for legal reform is best represented by his 
polemic against the unanimity requirement for jury verdicts.  He vehemently enters the 
debate on the side of a verdict of a majority: 
And then one of the great fundamental supports of the British constitution 
was brought into play. Reason was thrown away upon this tough juryman, 
and, therefore, it was necessary to ascertain what effect starvation might 
have upon him.  A verdict, that is, a unanimous decision from these twelve 
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men as to Alaric's guilt, was necessary; it might be that three would think 
him innocent, and nine guilty, or that any other division of opinion might 
take place; but such divisions among a jury are opposed to the spirit of the 
British  constitution. Twelve men must think alike; or, if they will not, they 
must be made to do so. There are many ludicrous points in our blessed 
constitution, but perhaps nothing so ludicrous as a juryman praying to a 
judge for mercy. He has been caught, shut up in a box, perhaps, for five or 
six days together, badgered with half a dozen lawyers till he is nearly deaf 
with their continual talking, and then he is locked up until he shall die or 
find a verdict.  Such at least is the intention of the constitution.  The death, 
however, of three or four jurymen from starvation would not suit the 
humanity of the present age, and therefore, when extremities are nigh at 
hand, the dying jurymen, with medical certificates, are allowed to be 
carried off.  It is devoutly to be wished that one juryman might be starved 
to death while thus serving the constitution; the absurdity then would cure 
itself, and a verdict of a majority would be taken" (490) . 
Trollope's position is consistent with his vision of community justice.  By “community 
justice,” I am referring not only to the way in which the jury system places the fate of a 
member of the community in the community’s hands, thereby provoking discussions 
about the degree of education and judicial wisdom required to serve on a jury, but also 
the sense that prior systems of justice linger in the cultural memory and shape current 
modes of thought.  Unanimity was logical when the jury was using its own knowledge as 
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testimony; in that case, the evidence of twelve men was deemed the amount necessary to 
be conclusive.  The opinions of jurymen informed by witness testimony and subjected to 
attorneys’ rhetorical pressure is another matter entirely, and one in which the author 
cannot tolerate coercion in "the spirit of the British constitution." The earnestness of love 
of country cannot allow for the squashing of the individual spirit.   
Trollope’s narration objecting to the unanimity requirement for the jury works 
against tradition and his position follows the conditions of modernity.  A July 10, 1858 
article in The Examiner, entitled "The Jury Torture," argues for an end to the unanimity 
requirement, using the comments of the presiding judge as evidence.  The presiding judge 
argues that he has seen an increase in the intelligence and education in the jury box since 
the plaintiff and defendant are able to testify; therefore, he discharges juries that are 
unable to reach a verdict, arguing that "any detention now is like torturing a jury into a 
unanimity their consciences do not sanction."  The Examiner further claims that in most 
cases the foreman acts as a mouthpiece of falsehood to a fiction of unanimity, and urges 
an end to all torture in the name of achieving a unanimous verdict, as "shutting men up in 
the depth of winter without food or fire being as much a species of torture as tearing their 
flesh or crushing their joints” (“The Jury Torture” 435).  By contrast, James Fitzjames 
Stephen defends the practice of withholding meals from the jury: 
To put a dozen farmers into a bare room, and say, 'You shall not have your 
dinners till you have made up your minds,' is a rough and half humorous 
way of mentally jogging them.  It assumes the possibility of a kind of 
sluggish obstinacy, which requires some slight external stimulus to 
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overpower it: and to view the thing tragically is to misunderstand it.  It 
must, however, be confessed, that the expedient is coarse and rough, and 
that it belongs to an age of less considerate and polished manners than our 
own. (Stephen, A General View of the Criminal Law of England 223)  
Stephen aligns the campaign against the withholding meals from jurors with a push 
towards modernity, arguing that a simpler age would tolerate such treatment.  Trollope’s 
novels include expressions of doubt of the intelligence of individual jurors and 
simultaneously champion majority verdicts to promote independent thought.  That he 
does this not only betrays Trollope’s ambivalence as to the future of the jury but also 
demonstrates how closely these contradictory attitudes are wrapped up with the formation 
of British identity. 
 There is an additional significance to Trollope’s authorial aside regarding the 
unanimity requirement, and it concerns its placement in the text.  The nineteenth-century 
jury exists as a black-box and Victorian novelists preserve legal realism by representing 
this silence in the narrative of the courtroom.  However, I would like to suggest that 
authors use this silence as a narrative technique.  For example, the point at which the jury 
leaves to deliberate is the point in the novel where Trollope includes an authorial aside 
about the dangers of the unanimity requirement.  Trollope shows no need for a legal 
advisor with regard to the rules governing a unanimous verdict.  Instead, he uses the 
break in the legal procedure to insert his “law.”  Additionally, as readers we are 
conditioned to think during the narrative break of a trial, weighing the evidence on our 
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own.  In this moment, Trollope positions his vision for legal reform in the ending of the 
unanimity requirement, with the hope that it would encourage individual thinking. 
In further negotiation of his role as “the finder of fact” in a fictional legal 
narrative, Trollope responds to the Saturday Review critique of The Three Clerks in his 
next novel Doctor Thorne (1858): 
It has been suggested that the modern English writers of fiction should 
among them keep a barrister, in order that they may be set right on such 
legal points as will arise in their little narratives, and thus avoid that 
exposure of their own ignorance of the laws, which, now, alas! they too 
often make. The idea is worthy of consideration, and I can only say, that if 
such an arrangement can be made, and if a counsellor adequately skilful 
can be found to accept the office, I shall be happy to subscribe my quota; 
it would be but a modest tribute towards the cost. (qtd. in Smalley 24)  
The suggestion here is one of professional power, as Trollope's monetary contribution 
would be only a "modest tribute towards the cost" of retaining a legal advisor, as the 
multitude of legal narratives by other Victorian novelists suggest.  That he presents this 
response in the form of an authorial intrusion rather than a separate article is effective as 
a tool of disciplinary policing.  The authorial intrusion distracts the reader from the plot 
of the novel, thereby breaking the literary realism and emphasizing the novel's place as 
fiction.  Trollope's response to the lawyer, enclosed within his own space of authority as 
novelist, acts as a reassertion of his rights as a literary professional critiquing the law. 
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TROLLOPE’S VISION FOR LEGAL REFORM IN ORLEY FARM 
As in The Three Clerks, Trollope’s representation of the jury in Orley Farm 
reflects the debate over the future of the jury in legal treatises and the Victorian press.  In 
An Autobiography, Trollope describes his feelings towards Orley Farm, which was 
serialized in 1861 and 1862:  “The plot of Orley Farm is probably the best I have ever 
made; but it has the fault of declaring itself, and thus coming to an end too early in the 
book.  When Lady Mason tells Sir Peregrine she did forge the will, the plot of Orley 
Farm has unraveled itself; -- and this she does in the middle of the tale" (167).   Rather 
than dismantling the plot, Lady Mason’s admission of her guilt shifts the focus of the 
reader from the actions of the characters to the procedures of the court and provides an 
opportunity to analyze representations of the jury the novel.  In contrast with The Three 
Clerks, Orley Farm announces itself as a fictional legal narrative from the beginning; we 
learn it was going to be called “The Great Orley Farm Case” but the name is not 
conducive to attracting and maintaining a readership so the text is called Orley Farm.  
From the beginning, Trollope’s narrative erases legal classification and deems it 
unnecessary; when summarizing the first Orley Farm case, the narrator emphasizes that 
the legal transcript has been edited; “not half the evidence taken has been given here, but 
probably enough for our purposes” (19). In The Three Clerks, Trollope begins to 
articulate a vision for legal reform.  Orley Farm demonstrates an expansion of Trollope’s 
legal vision, by including a legal reform conference within the narrative. 
Trollope’s Orley Farm works in competition with the law by illuminating its 
controversies; Trollope presents multiple models of advocacy from Furnival, 
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Chaffanbrass, Graham, and the speakers at the fictionalized Birmingham Conference to 
capture the undetermined nature of the advocate’s role.   Trollope’s depiction of 
barristers, solicitors and the jury expose the instabilities of the legal system, while his 
disillusionment with the jury signals his modernity.  As discussed in Chapter 1, in the 
nineteenth century, a tension exists between the vision of the jury as the “palladium of 
English liberty” and the notion that “There is hardly an assize which would not furnish a 
chapter for Punch” The power of juries declined during the Victorian period; the 
establishment of county courts substituted single judges for juries and issues previously 
put to juries were now considered by judges.  Along these lines, Chaffanbrass discusses 
the rising power of judges with his co-counsel Aram: “it’s not the juries, Aram.  It’s the 
judges.  It used not to be so, but it is now. When a man has the last word, and will take 
the trouble to use it, that’s everything” (548).  Victorian debate focused on the need for 
juries, which were optional in some courts, including the new Divorce Court of 1857, as 
well as the relationship between judge and jury and whether juries needed to obey judges’ 
directions on all legal issues.  Victorian commentators were anxious over the jury’s role; 
juries gave no reasons for their decisions and could potentially decide cases on the wrong 
or capricious grounds.  The jury’s role as “finder of fact” reveals tensions between the 
relative roles of fact and feeling upon jury decision making that echo tensions between 
legal realism and imagination Trollope experienced as a “finder of fact” in the novel.    
Trollope signals engagement with legal debate by the way that, in the midst of the 
great Orley Farm case, Lady Mason’s defense team attends the legal reform conference at 
Birmingham.  Critics argue that this conference is based on the first congress of 
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Brougham’s National Association for the Promotion of Social Science in 1857.  The 
transcripts of selected papers from the legal reform conference are significant as they 
emphasize the need for the standardization of the Victorian Bar. For example, Arthur 
Symonds, in "On the Recordation of the Law," makes the case that Victorian England has 
no proper collection of the materials of the law.  Instead, the law is contained in "statutes, 
confusedly heaped together, text-books, often compiled without method and other court 
reports, parliamentary proceedings and periodicals that it seems only for caution, and not 
for a rule for our guidance" (Symonds 75). These anxieties are mirrored by Trollope’s 
lawyers and the lack of consensus with regard to the duties of a professional advocate in 
the Victorian period.  Rather than lacking an understanding of the role of an advocate, 
Trollope’s inconsistencies in depictions of lawyers highlight the need for a cohesive, 
more professionalized Bar. 
One fear addressed at the fictional legal reform conference was that with the 
increased role of lawyers in the courtroom, the jury would be confused by the advocate 
not telling the truth but rather a version of a story from his own perspective.  Here, the 
distinction is between counsel's role as the defendant's mouthpiece and a legal 
professional.  Brougham discusses counsel’s role as a professional stand-in; “the 
advocate is merely bringing before the court whatever the party would have said if he had 
been equally gifted and equally experienced in the rhetorical art" (Brougham 165).  This 
theory counters charges by Bentham and Swift that a litigant’s counsel is essentially 
being paid to tell lies (Judge 154). As in The Three Clerks, Trollope paints Chaffanbrass 
in this light, likening him to an assassin who browbeats witnesses so as to fulfill his 
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professional duty.  Clashing with Chaffanbrass on Lady Mason's defense team is 
Graham, the young member of the bar, who like the reformers at Trollope’s fictionalized 
legal conference, values truth over loyalty to his client; he urges that every lawyer enter 
court to illuminate the truth.  Graham's philosophy is complicated by the advocate’s 
loyalty to his client.  When representing Lady Mason, Furnival refuses to seek the truth: 
“he wished that he knew the truth in the matter; or rather he wished he could know 
whether or not she were innocent, without knowing whether or not she were guilty” 
(251).  According to Brougham, if a client’s case merely has a suspicious appearance, the 
advocate has no obligation to scrutinize it, and satisfy himself whether it is true or false.   
While critics are quick to label Graham as Trollope’s ideal attorney because he 
believes in always telling the truth, Trollope’s legal philosophy holds more nuance.  In 
An Autobiography, Trollope argues that the "most useful lawyers" are those with the 
greatest incomes (108).  This contention complicates his depiction of the lawyers in Orley 
Farm, for the idealistic Graham, whose "notions no doubt were great, and perhaps were 
good; but hitherto they had not led him to much pecuniary success in his profession. A 
sort of a name he had obtained, but it was not a name sweet in the ears of practising 
attorneys" (175).  Graham views Von Bauhr’s three hour lecture at the conference as a 
necessary hurdle to achieving legal reform.  Trollope gives us Von Bauhr reflecting on 
his speech: 
Von Bauhr considers the speech a success, as he had been working on the 
pamphlet for years and his voice sounded sweet in his own ears. And at 
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the end of this elysium, which was not wild in its beauty, but trim and 
orderly in its gracefulness,—as might be a beer-garden at Munich,—there 
stood among flowers and vases a pedestal, grand above all other pedestals 
in that garden; and on this there was a bust with an inscription:—"To Von 
Bauhr, who reformed the laws of nations." (169) 
From this depiction, we expect Trollope to be skewering Von Bauhr for his conceit.  But 
then, he surprises us with the optimism of his authorial aside:  “I am inclined, myself, to 
agree with Felix Graham that such efforts are seldom absolutely wasted. A man who 
strives honestly to do good will generally do good, though seldom perhaps as much as he 
has himself anticipated. Let Von Bauhr have his pedestal among the flowers, even though 
it be small and humble!” (170). The Birmingham conference shows Trollope to be both 
critical and open to reform, in true “conservative-liberal” fashion.  Again and again, when 
we try to pinpoint Trollope’s view of the legal profession, we find a conflicted Trollope.  
It is this ambivalent attitude toward lawyers that reveals the subtleties of Trollope’s 
satire. 
Graham is “The English Von Bauhr,” educating his pupil, the wealthy judge’s 
son, Augustus Staveley.  Staveley challenges Graham’s contention that the English 
system is unjust, positing that "we consider ourselves the greatest people in the world,—
or at any rate the honestest" (176). Graham contends that it is the very Englishness of the 
justice system that is a stumbling block to reform; the British Bar, as gathered at a legal 
reform conference, is not open to the proposals of foreign attorneys because of a certain 
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smugness with regard to its own traditions.  As Graham suggests, "those practices in 
which we most widely depart from the broad and recognised morality of all civilised ages 
and countries are to us the Palladiums of our jurisprudence" (179).  Trollope's modernity 
is apparent; amid a love for the customs that shape the English identity, he recognizes the 
danger in blindly following tradition. Unbound by legal custom or precedential 
reasoning, literature is allowed to be experimental in its discussion of legal ethics and 
philosophies of truth.  
As in the Three Clerks, the jury’s role as “finder of fact” in Orley Farm raises the 
tension between fact and feeling in the determination of the truth.  Trollope addresses the 
fears of the jury being unduly led by a professional orator in his description of the 
barrister Furnival’s eloquence: “his voice was powerful, his flow of words was free and 
good, and seemed to come from him without the slightest effort” (81). Trollope also takes 
up the issue of societal anxiety over the jury’s capacity to perform its assigned function 
by implying a lack of critical observation with regard to Furnival: “those who scrutinized 
his appearance critically might have said that it was in some respects pretentious; but the 
ordinary jurymen of this country are not critical scrutinizers of appearance, and by them 
he was never held in light estimation” (82). This expression of doubt in the jury’s critical 
faculties is juxtaposed with Furnival’s appeal to the jury’s positive qualities.  Furnival 
appeals to the jury’s “intelligence, education, and enlightened justice" (83).  The irony of 
this statement is that, juries of the time were not considered to be capable of careful 
scrutiny, given the system of jury selection.  To serve on a jury, one needed only to be 
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male between the age of twenty-one and sixty, and own property or land, a home with 15 
or more windows or an annual value of at least 20 pounds a year (Bentley 89). Rather 
than educated men, most juries consisted of small farmers and shopkeepers.  This was 
due to the fact that the educated and wealthy were often exempt from jury duty or 
alternatively purchased an exemption.  A major factor behind the perception that 
common juries were of poor quality came from the rule that special jurors, those who 
were the rank of esquire or were bankers or merchants, did not serve on common juries 
(Bentley 191). Edward W. Cox, in The Advocate: His Training, Practice, Rights and 
Duties (1852), instructs new attorneys as to the intellectual limitations of the jury: "the 
Advocate should remember that he is addressing minds of whom the majority are 
certainly inferior to his own in capacity, in subtlety, in quickness of apprehension, in 
nimbleness of thought and reasoning power – minds neither so well informed nor so 
skillful” (Cox 444).   
When Furnival expresses his confidence in the jury, “that the property of his 
clients was perfectly safe in their hands,” (97) the reader understands this safety comes 
from the fact that the barrister is able to address the jury, not a faith in the jury’s decision-
making itself.  English juries were understood to be unrepresentative of nineteenth 
century English society; Trollope alludes to this fact in Furnival’s estimation that “he 
might induce a jury to acquit her; but he terribly feared that he might not be able to 
induce the world to acquit her also” (215).  Those with confidence in the jury, such as 
Dockwrath are thought of as naïve.  Following Furnival’s address to the jury, Dockwrath 
 74 
assures Joseph Mason that “the jury are not such fools as to take all that for gospel” 
(672).  Dockwrath’s naïve faith in the jury is matched by his misplaced belief in Joseph 
Mason’s willingness to pay him for his legal services.  The “spirit of litigation” in 
Dockwrath only leads him to quarreling over the dinner bill in a commercial dining room 
and eventual financial ruin (74).  
Trollope’s position as “finder of fact” matches that of the jury’s fact-finding role, 
in that the author must negotiate between his two aims—legal realism (“fact”) and 
literary vision (“feeling or imagination”).   Orley Farm was criticized by nineteenth-
century barristers for the inaccuracy with which some legal matters were portrayed in the 
text.  In An Autobiography, Trollope frames his discussion of his father, a Chancery 
barrister, through a description of his chambers: "dingy, almost suicidal chambers, at No. 
23 Old Square, Lincoln's Inn, chambers which on one melancholy occasion did become 
absolutely suicidal" (3). In a footnote, Trollope explains that one of his father's pupils 
committed suicide in the chambers.  In this way, Trollope suggests that a lawyer's 
chambers may convey or absorb the emotions of its occupants.  In Orley Farm, Trollope 
uses Furnival's chambers to illustrate when the emotional collides with the professional.  
Furnival’s theory of advocacy enforces the status quo of English legal practice.  
However, he has the capacity to bend rules based on matters of the heart; going against 
legal custom, he meets with Lady Mason in his professional chambers. The image of 
Lady Mason trespassing into the professional space of the barrister highlights the 
difficulty of negotiating the advocate’s two-fold responsibility as both a stand-in for the 
 75 
client and as a legal professional. Furnival thinks of Lady Mason as both a woman and a 
client and his ideas vacillate throughout the text; he imagines both how awful and 
wonderful it would be if Lady Mason had forged the will.  Furnival continues this 
confusion over the personal and professional in his address to the jury.  He begins by 
offering his opinion of his client’s innocence; “I never rose to plead a client’s cause with 
more confidence than I now feel in pleading that of my friend Lady Mason” (685).   
Contemporary reviews protest the injustice of Furnival confusing the jury with his 
personal beliefs.  In “Mr. Trollope and the Lawyers,” the anonymous author argues that 
Furnival’s expression of his opinion as to the innocence of Lady Mason violates the 
professional rules for a barrister; quoting Lord Campbell, the author reiterates, "if the 
advocate withholds an opinion, the jury may suppose he is conscious of his client's guilt; 
whereas it is the duty of the advocate to press his argument upon the jury, and not his 
opinion" (156). The unsigned review in the October 11th 1862 edition of the Saturday 
Review discusses Furnival's address to the jury about being a friend of Lady Mason.  The 
author argues that “there is an evident injustice in a man thus mixing up the two 
characters of pleader and private adviser to the jury.  He only confuses the jury, and gives 
an argument for a particular verdict which he has not the slightest business to give” 
(Saturday Review, 11 Oct. 1862 143). This issue of raising a personal belief before the 
jury is also treated in the Victorian legal treatises on the morality of advocacy.  
Brougham focuses on the need for an advocate to work in a representative capacity only, 
identifying that when an advocate does not uniformly express his opinion, the veracity of 
evidence comes into question (164).  Sir Francis Newbolt, reacting to this breach in 
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professional etiquette, calls Furnival "a doll, stuffed with sawdust" (54).  Furnival’s 
relationship with Lady Mason represents an extreme version of this partiality; yet, this 
exaggeration serves as an important meditation on the morality of advocacy and 
highlights the tension between the attorney’s dual roles of defendant stand-in and legal 
professional.  
In Orley Farm, Trollope’s representation of the cross-examination of witnesses 
continues his critique in The Three Clerks; however in this later novel he directly 
advocates for better treatment of witnesses.  To return to the nineteenth-century legal 
treatise by Cox, new advocates trained in proper defense work in the cross-examination 
of witnesses are encouraged to adopt a warm approach to questioning witnesses:  
It is marvelous how much may be accomplished with the most difficult 
witnesses simply by good humour and a smile; a tone of friendliness will 
often succeed in obtaining a reply which has been obstinately denied to a 
surly aspect and a threatening or reproachful voice.  As a general 
rule…you should begin your cross-examination with an encouraging look, 
and manner, and phrase. (377)  
This standard of legal practice is violated by Chaffanbrass, who with his “wicked, ill-
meaning smile” is notorious for the “browbeating of witnesses” (630).  Similarly, the 
witness Kenneby is told by the judge a dozen times to look at the jury, but he is 
transfixed by Furnival’s face (636).  Trollope advocates better treatment for witnesses: 
“let the witness have a big arm-chair, and a canopy over him, and a man behind him with 
a red cloak to do him honour and keep the flies off” (673).  The unsigned review of 
 77 
October 11, 1862, in the Saturday Review criticizes Trollope on many counts but admits 
that improved treatment of witnesses is the “one point [on which] Mr. Trollope is 
perfectly right” (Saturday Review, 11 Oct. 1862 143).  When the witness Kenneby 
testifies that he his “nearly sure,” Furnival presses him on what he means by “nearly” 
until Kenneby says he was not certain at all.  Trollope likens this technique to “torture” 
(633), a point which E.S. Dallas, in The Times, strongly disputes: “witnesses, no doubt, 
are sometimes bullied into confusion and even forgetfulness; but Mr. Trollope cannot 
seriously mean that when a poor fool like Kenneby gets into the box to swear away 
another person's life or character, his capacity to remember any thing, and the degree in 
which he actually does remember the particular facts in question, ought not to be tested 
with the utmost severity” (Dallas 160).  Chaffanbrass threatens Bolster, another witness, 
with her own trial for perjury if she tells him a falsehood. Cox warns advocates against 
this very practice: “Be it your care to avoid the risk of doing an irreparable wrong, by 
studiously avoiding, either to charge openly, or to insinuate a charge, of perjury against 
any witness, unless there is such proof of it as the infirmity of the senses or of the 
memory cannot explain away” (Cox 457). Chaffanbrass also asks her inadmissible and 
irrelevant questions about “the good things she had eaten that morning at breakfast, and 
at last succeeded in obtaining information as to that small but indiscreet glass of spirits” 
(470).  Despite these blatant examples of professional misconduct, Trollope writes in An 
Autobiography, “I do not think that I have cause to be ashamed of [Chaffanbrass]" (111).   
As in The Three Clerks, the verdict in Orley Farm is characterized by silence over 
how the jury arrived at its decision.  Following Lady Mason’s trial, the announcement of 
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the verdict is almost an afterthought; however, Trollope’s descriptive strategies allow the 
moment a force beyond its space in the text.  The jury is in its box “but few of the gas-
lights were lit, so that they in the court could hardly see each other” (364).  This lack of 
vision calls to mind the opacity of the jury deliberation process, and also exists in contrast 
to Von Bauhr’s eyes “lighted” with inspiration seeking his pedestal among the flowers. 
Following the several days of testimony in Lady Mason’s case, the jury’s deliberations 
are trivial in comparison.  For example, the jury quickly moves from a rumored eight to 
acquit, four for guilty to a unanimous not guilty verdict.  This seems to be related to the 
fact that it is eight o’clock and the judge has left for dinner, while the jury is stuck at the 
courthouse deliberating without food or drink.  After the jury calls the judge from dinner, 
the reader learns that “the remaining ceremony did not take five minutes…the verdict 
was recorded, and the judge went back to his dinner” (365).  The emphasis on food and 
drink references the unanimity requirement for juries, and Trollope’s protestations of this 
rule in The Three Clerks.  In this minimalist representation of the jury, Trollope embodies 
the cultural anxiety over the black-box of the juror, its inscrutability and its procedures 
that keep jurors from independent thought.   
The theories of advocacy and disillusionment with the jury represented in The 
Three Clerks and Orley Farm are Trollope's response to the shifting jurisprudential 
frameworks of nineteenth-century criminal law. As attorneys become the focal point of 
jury trials in the nineteenth century, debates over the morality of advocacy appear both in 
law and literature.  When Peregrine expresses his faith in the courts, “what is the purport 
of these courts of law if it be not to discover the truth, and make it plain to the light of 
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day?,” Trollope responds with “Poor Sir Peregrine! His innocence in this respect was 
perhaps beautiful, but it was very simple” (498). Trollope satirizes the congress at 
Birmingham's idealism on legal reform, by stating that the conference will “drive all 
injustice from the face of the earth” (116).  Yet Trollope’s text focuses on how the vastly 
increased role of lawyers in the courtroom accentuates the tension between fact and 
feeling in the jury’s role as “finder of fact,” mirroring Trollope’s own navigation of legal 
realism and literary authority as a “finder of fact” of his fictional legal narratives.   
 
THE AFTERLIFE OF ORLEY FARM IN THE LEGAL COMMUNITY 
To continue the discussion of Trollope’s role as “finder of fact” balancing legal 
realism with literary authority, it is necessary to consider the afterlife of Trollope’s 
fictional legal narratives.  Modern literary critics tend to treat Trollope’s engagement 
with the law as superficial.  For example, much is made of the fact that Trollope himself 
faced a rigorous cross-examination, and for that Trollope is thought to have had a 
personal vendetta against the law. Some recent criticism suggests that Trollope 
misunderstood the attorney’s role as one akin that of a judge, rather than as an advocate.  
What complicates our assessment of Trollope’s treatment of legal themes is an analysis 
of the afterlife of texts like Orley Farm in the legal community.  Early criticism from 
lawyers focused on legal errors; however, if one looks to the use of Trollope's narratives 
in book chapters, speeches and law review articles written by legal scholars in the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries, it is clear that Orley Farm has a rich afterlife in the 
realm of legal ethics.  For example, in 2008, Columbia Law Professor William H. Simon 
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argues that "Law tends to judge categorically, and legal theory sometimes struggles for 
categorical resolutions, but the predisposition of ambitious fiction is to judge 
dialectically. [legal ethicist] Michael Luban's account of Orley Farm makes it hard to 
resist the conclusion that the novel is better equipped to explore the conflict" (1368).  
Modern literary critics discuss Trollope’s reception by the legal community in terms of 
nineteenth-century reviews and fail to consider the implications of Orley Farm’s use as a 
tool to teach legal ethics.   
When illuminating the subtleties of Trollope’s satirical vision, it is necessary to 
consider how others have viewed legal satire as operating.  Frances Theresa Russell in 
Satire in the Victorian Novel reads the satirical legal narrative as professionally-minded, 
high-brow entertainment: "the Bench and Bar are tempting game for those who enjoy the 
absurdity of legal tricks and manners" (202).  Russell finds the satire to be grounded in a 
protest against injustice, yet she also sees Trollope as empathetic towards the stunted 
legal professional (202).  Jan-Melissa Schramm finds legal satire such as that in 
Thackeray's The History of Pendennis to acknowledge "a sensitivity to the nuances of the 
discursive struggle between legal and literary discourses which characterized the 1840s."  
Schramm sees literary realism and the morality of advocacy as a clash between the 
professions (287).  I'm interested in exploring this relationship between the literary and 
legal professions not only through the writings of authors like Trollope and Dickens but 
also through the commentaries of lawyers like Henry Drinker and Sir Francis Newbolt.  
In addition, considering this rivalry from a structuralist perspective, I am interested in 
extending my analysis to consider the afterlife of Trollope within the community of legal 
 81 
scholars.  Specifically, Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus allows him to move beyond 
a rigid, deterministic type of structuralism in which social agents occupy positions in a 
network that dictates their strategies.  According to Bourdieu, “habitus is a system of 
shared social dispositions and cognitive structures which generates perceptions, 
appreciations and actions” (149).  Applying the idea of habitus to the legal profession, 
lawyers exist as social agents that are the product of the collected experience of the 
historical field of the law. In this case, the social significance of what Bourdieu terms the 
"space of lifestyles" allows us to recognize patterns in appropriation of Orley Farm as a 
tool in the teaching of legal ethics.   
 Sir Francis Newbolt's Out of Court (1925) presents an early example of policing 
between the disciplines.  In the chapter "Legal Errors in Fiction," Newbolt mentions a 
few other texts with legal errors, but then says he cannot find space to discuss errors by a 
variety of authors because they pale in comparison with the magnitude of the errors in 
Orley Farm (3).  Acknowledging the popularity of Trollope’s writings in the early 
twentieth century, Newbolt defends his study of the legal errors within Orley Farm as 
being useful “at least to the profession which he so violently aspersed.” Newbolt is vague 
on how exactly his study will be useful, but as readers we understand his disciplinary 
surveillance as what Foucault calls a discursive formation.  For Newbolt, Orley Farm is 
not only riddled with legal inaccuracies but also a diatribe against the legal profession.  
Citing the recent reissuing of the original 1862 text as evidence that “no reasoned reply” 
had been waged against this attack, Newbolt’s reply moves directly to small procedural 
inaccuracies instead of major philosophical points. For example, he argues that the 
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leading cross-examiner at the Old Bailey could not have had chambers in Ely Place. Even 
the issues he calls monumental, such as the illegal challenge to the jury by the defending 
solicitor, seem to be isolated in nature. 
 If Newbolt attempts to protect the cultural capital of the legal profession through 
his attack on Trollope, then it is interesting that his polemic against Orley Farm also 
includes an attempt at writing fiction.  Newbolt summarizes the events of the novel, and 
then points out what would have occurred in the real world of law.  Newbolt imagines 
what the English judge Baron Parke would have said about the Mason case.  In effect, he 
creates a new fictional narrative, set apart from his critique by the title “ASTOUNDING 
POLICE COURT CASE” (21). Newbolt rewrites Trollope’s trial scene, complete with 
dialogue from Furnival and other counsel.  In this way, Newbolt reenacts the crossing of 
disciplinary boundaries Trollope engaged in when attempting to create a narrative with 
legal realism. 
 Newbolt seems to disregard Orley Farm’s place as a work of fiction.  He claims 
his purpose in exposing the errors in the story is to ask the ordinary reader “whether he is 
satisfied that the writer’s knowledge of the subject entitles him to be heard at all" (45). 
He draws the comparison of a cobbler criticizing the church and a potman criticizing 
surgeons, when neither will be listened to if they are found to be without knowledge of 
their subject.  According to Newbolt, “the story of Orley Farm describes procedure and 
practice which any one of two thousand barristers, or any solicitor on the Roll, could 
have told the author was arrant nonsense.  He must, I submit, take his place by the 
potman and the cobbler" (46).  Newbolt invokes the collective strength of his profession 
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with the image of two thousand barristers rallying against Trollope’s representation of the 
law.  In addition, by equating Trollope with the potman and the cobbler, he emphasizes 
the difference in professional standing in Victorian society between the barrister and the 
author.  While Newbolt demands specialized knowledge from the fictional author, 
Trollope criticizes lawyers for lacking technical knowledge of the law.  Newbolt’s 
criticism demonstrates the competition between the legal and literary professions from 
the perspective of a member of the legal community and complicates our understanding 
of Trollope’s fact-finding role as a novelist.  
 In 1929, the British attorney Winifred Duke echoes Newbolt's concerns about 
lawyers in literature in the Juridical Review.  Reading Newbolt's attack as "shrewd 
shafts," Duke criticizes fiction writers that allow "attorneys to indulge in grotesque 
mistakes of procedure and legality. Trollope was one of the greatest sinners in this 
respect" (3).  Like Newbolt, what Duke classifies as Trollope's "ignorance of the law" is 
limited to the gaps in Trollope’s technical knowledge of procedure and does not consider 
Trollope’s higher-level ideas for legal reform or meditations on legal ethics.  Noting 
contemporary reviews of Orley Farm that pointed out the legal inaccuracies in the novel, 
Duke argues that Trollope learned from this wave of criticism.  Depicting Trollope as a 
scolded child that has learned his lesson, he argues that Trollope "was careful not to 
offend again, and no critic, learned in the law, has pounced upon any legal lapses in The 
Eustace Diamonds or Phineas Redux" (4).  Although Duke’s argument will be treated in 
my discussion of The Eustace Diamonds and Phineas Redux in Chapter 3, suffice it to 
say that Duke forgives Trollope for his legal trespasses: "O earth, lie lightly upon 
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Anthony Trollope, for he was pleasant in his life, and his legal puppets afford capital 
entertainment" (36).  Throughout, the tone of the article suggests that the lawyer-author 
has the power to absolve the author that writes about fictional lawyers of his sins.  One 
explanation for this demonstration of power is the way in which Duke's legal habitus 
allows him to hold a personal stake in the way all lawyers are represented.  The extent to 
which the lawyer's writing on the representation of lawyers in literature is bound up with 
identity and professional self-worth is expressed in the last lines of Duke's article: "The 
lawyer in literature remains, in most cases, a mere character out of a book. The lawyer in 
real life passes from the stage and from his generation's recollection, leaving a tradition, a 
memory, an honoured name" (39).  As a profession with a long history of personal 
attacks, law produces lawyers highly sensitive to their representation, even if in fiction.  
 In addition to books, public lectures illuminate the patterns of Trollope's afterlife.  
In 1949, Henry Drinker, a partner at the law firm of Drinker Biddle, presented a lecture 
on Trollope to the New York Grolier Club.  The essay was published together with 
"Trollope's America" by Willard Thorp in Two Addresses Delivered to Members of the 
Grolier Club.  Drinker also authored the introduction to the 1950 edition of Orley Farm, 
published by Knopf.  Drinker begins his lecture by justifying why he will discuss 
Trollope and the law.  As a lawyer, he feels as though he can say something original 
about the law in Trollope, and he is of the belief that Trollope's objective in the 
representation of legal themes has not been captured or appreciated by past criticism.  
Drinker divides Trollope's barristers into three periods, with those before 1860 as the first 
period, Orley Farm as the transition period, and those after 1861 as the third period (51). 
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He reads Trollope's early representation of barristers as unconvincing stereotypes, while 
he finds realism in the depiction of barristers in Orley Farm and texts after 1861.  Several 
critics attribute Trollope's aversion to lawyers to his own involvement in a trial as a 
witness.  While employed at the postal service, Trollope caught a thief with a marked 
half-crown.  At the trial in Ireland, Trollope was subjected to harsh cross-examination by 
the barrister Sir Isaac Butt, including the accusation that he had framed the defendant.  
Drinker argues that the characterization of Chaffanbrass in The Three Clerks as a brow-
beating cross-examiner, "obviously constituted Trollope's 'compensation' for the 
realization that Sir Isaac Butt had made him ridiculous in the Irish cross-examination and 
for the suspicion that Sir Isaac had injured his reputation for honesty” (52).  Drinker 
suggests he is in a unique position to interpret Trollope's attitudes toward lawyers; 
however, his reliance on purely biographical information results in an analysis that 
overlooks the possibility of a radical Trollope engaging in a legal critique.       
 Acknowledging the "numerous strictures" on the legal accuracy of Orley Farm, 
Drinker concludes that it "will be found, on careful examination, to be remarkably free 
from legal mistakes, except for occasional slips in small matters purely technical, such as 
would naturally be expected and are readily excusable in a novelist" (53).  The technical 
mistakes that infuriated Newbolt are held of little consequence by Drinker, who instead 
focuses on literary details; Drinker points out the absence of fanciful names for barristers 
in Orley Farm, in contrast to Mr. Getemthruit in The Three Clerks.  In this manner, 
Drinker, though writing as a legal professional, relies on the literary technique of close 
reading to craft his argument.   
 86 
 While criticism from Newbolt, Duke and Drinker focused on legal errors, Orley 
Farm begins to serve as a jumping off point for professors of legal ethics in the late 
twentieth century, as evidenced by Thomas Shaffer's On Being a Christian and a Lawyer.  
Shaffer devotes a chapter to representing the guilty, calling it "the oldest and most 
persistent of moral questions for lawyers" (45).  After identifying this longstanding issue, 
Shaffer immediately turns to a discussion of Orley Farm, framing his analysis through 
the eyes of a legal professional: "Trollope's reaction to Furnival is in many ways the 
reaction new law students have to us lawyers when they first come to law school and ask 
us whether it is possible to represent guilty clients. Furnival's reaction to himself is like 
the reaction law professors have to that question" (46).  As a law professor, Shaffer 
packages the analysis for his classroom audience, labeling Felix Graham, as being like 
some of his youngest students, while Chaffanbrass is the sort of lawyer the youngest 
students disapprove of.  Shaffer goes on summarize the plot of the novel and evaluate the 
morality of each of the lawyers. According to Shaffer, Chaffanbrass, Graham, and 
Furnival "were Christians but not one meets the problem of serving the guilty with a New 
Testament answer" (53).  Shaffer uses the character of Mrs. Orme, to whom Lady Mason 
confesses the truth, as a benchmark for the ministry lawyers should offer their clients.  He 
identifies the issue for lawyers as "the problem of collaboration" and counsels lawyers to 
exercise moral influence upon their clients along the lines of Mrs. Orme's counseling of 
Lady Mason (85).  In this way, Shaffer takes a non-lawyer in a fictional legal narrative 
and holds this figure up as a model for students of legal ethics.  Shaffer's use of Trollope 
is more than an introductory anecdote; he quotes lengthy passages and comes to larger 
 87 
conclusions about the author.  For example, he judges that Trollope "did not believe that 
law and lawyers have much to do with conscience or with the just resolution of disputes" 
(81).  Shaffer moves directly from analyzing the character of Mrs. Orme to a discussion 
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the work of legal ethicists Monroe 
Freedman and Richard Wasserstrom.   
 Trollope’s treatment of legal ethics has won broad approval by modern legal 
scholars; nevertheless, one might ask why does a Georgetown law professor who 
specializes in national security and international law write about Orley Farm? According 
to David Luban, "quite simply, it is a great novel about legal ethics" (891).  Luban states 
that he is bringing a Jewish perspective to challenge Shaffer's reading of Orley Farm in 
On Being a Christian and a Lawyer.  If Shaffer's main point is that Mrs. Orme embraces 
the ideals of ministry a lawyer should hold, then Luban understands the novel to condone 
the idea that "sometimes, good people and good lawyers tell lies" in the act of ministering 
to their clients (896).  Luban takes issue with the premise of Shaffer's argument: Lady 
Mason is an abhorrent figure.  Interestingly, the way one legal ethicist attacks the work of 
another is through close reading; Luban uses a close reading analysis to argue that Lady 
Mason is the heroine.  Rather than discuss the law of the novel using legal theory, the 
lawyer presents arguments as literary criticism.  Luban reads Lady Mason as a Rebekah 
figure, strong in the face of patriarchal law; but, he also sees this opposition to the law as 
remaining unresolved in Trollope's novel (910).  On the question of Trollope's sentiments 
toward lawyers, Luban differs from Shaffer.  Shaffer finds Trollope unable to get past the 
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idea of the lawyers disregard for the truth, while Luban believes this reading does not get 
at the "full Trollopian complexity (916).  
 Appearing in The New Criterion in 2007, Marc Arkin's "Trollope and the Law" 
positions Trollope's discussion of the ethics of legal defense as rhetorically of the 
moment.  Arkin finds the treatment of the legal profession in Orley Farm to be 
appropriate to revisit as the twenty-first century British government is engaged in "a root 
and branch effort to rebalance the criminal justice system in favour of victims, witnesses, 
and communities" (23).  In discussing the history of the criminal defense, Arkin focuses 
on the great incentive for a criminal defendant to perjure himself.  It was not until 1898 
that the British criminal defendant gained the ability to give evidence under oath.  In 
effect, the lawyers take the risk of perjuring themselves for their clients so as to maintain 
society's faith in the power of oaths.   
 Arkin goes on to provide a detailed summary of the events surrounding the 
codocil on the Mason estate, as well as a description of each of the attorneys.  According 
to Arkin, Felix Graham "is presumably intended to be the voice of the future—and of the 
author" (25).  In this way, Arkin tries to simplify Trollope's message by aligning the 
author’s voice with Graham's when, in fact, the narrator casts doubt on the idealist 
philosophies of Graham and resists this sort of classification.  Like others, Arkin attacks 
the Trollope's observation that "I cannot understand how any gentleman can be willing to 
use his intellect for the propagation of untruth, and to be paid for so doing" (23).  
Interestingly, he supports his point with a modern day example: he cites the early rush to 
judge the Duke lacrosse players charged with rape followed by their exoneration as a 
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cautionary tale that "a lawyer may be wrong and deprive an innocent party, particularly 
one already guilty in the court of public opinion, of a defense" (26).     
 If Arkin focuses his discussion on modern controversies in the ethics of legal 
defense, Asimow and Weisberg use the nineteenth-century trial of Courvoisier to 
introduce the ethical controversy over criminal defense following a client's confession.  
The use of the excerpt from Phillips' address to the jury is especially powerful in its 
emotional rhetoric: 
Over every portion of this case doubt and darkness rest, and you will come 
to a conclusion against this man at the peril of your souls…. Gentlemen, 
mine has been a painful and awful task, but still more awful is your 
responsibility. And the word "Guilty" once pronounced, let me remind 
you, is irrevocable….It will accompany you in your walks. It will follow 
you in your solitary retirements like a shadow. It will haunt you in your 
sleep and hover round your bed. It will take the shape of an accusing 
spirit, and confront and condemn you before the judgment seat of your 
God. So beware what you do. (qtd. in Asimow and Weisberg 234)  
Following this statement to the jury, one must consider how the Victorian public was 
outraged to discover Courvoisier had confessed his guilt to Phillips.  In addition, this 
excerpt from the record of the trial is an example of the pressures the jury withstood and 
speaks to the larger problems the jury faced in reaching a unanimous verdict.  In his 
aggressive defense Phillips also exposed witnesses that he knew to be telling the truth to 
harsh cross-examination.  
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 Asimow and Weisberg explain that the "reconciliation of professional and moral 
obligations remains highly contested" when it comes to providing an aggressive defense 
for guilty clients, and "the often-vague rules of legal ethics, the spotty judicial decisions 
on the subject, the opinion of the general public, and the views of legal ethicists all 
conflict" (234). Asimow and Weisberg go on to outline the distinction between strong 
and weak adversarialism.  The authors define rigorous advocacy through the philosophy 
of Lord Brougham, as exemplified in Queen Caroline's Case in 1820, wherein he stated 
that the lawyer's duty is "to save that client by all means and expedients, and at all 
hazards and costs to other persons, and, amongst them, to himself" (235).  By contrast, 
the weak adversarial approach recognizes the individual lawyer's moral code and 
ultimately privileges the need for justice over zealous advocacy.  Asimow and Weisberg 
explain that the rationale behind this philosophy is the fear that vigorous defense may 
harm the emotional state of honest witnesses.  To support this point, the authors cite 
Orley Farm.  Interspersed with examples from state ethics committee opinions is the 
following footnote: "Mr. Furnival's cross-examination of John Kenneby in Trollope's 
Orley Farm is a vivid example of extreme psychological harm imposed on a witness 
known to be truthful (246).  
What rhetorical strategy calls Asimow and Weisberg to cite a nineteenth-century 
fictional legal narrative? The juxtaposition of the real and the imaginary is startling.  The 
article does include sections which discuss law and literature, but this section concerns 
the legal history of criminal defense.  A similar effect occurs when Asimow and 
Weisberg consider the adversarial strategy of the closing argument.  The authors note that 
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Phillips's closing address to the jury in Courvoisier demonstrated a strong adversarial 
approach, then include this footnote: "Similarly, Mr. Furnival's emotional closing 
argument in Lady Mason's case in Trollope's Orley Farm persuades the jury to acquit a 
client that he is certain is guilty" (248).  This inclusion of Orley Farm in the context of 
legal scholarship gives the text an authority among lawyers, connecting back to 
discussions of Trollope’s role as “finder of fact” and the balance of legal realism with 
literary authority.  Representations of the jury in The Three Clerks and Orley Farm not 
only raise issues relating to democracy and judicial wisdom but also provide insight into 
Trollope’s legal imagination.   Trollope’s meditations on the future of the jury both 
demonstrate his modernity and function as a juryman’s guide for his readers, the potential 
jurors of England.  Trollope’s narrative technique surrounding features of the jury, such 
as its fact-finding and silence at the verdict is an understudied part of his literary vision.  
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Chapter Three 
Trollope as “Finder of Fact”: The Eustace Diamonds (1871) and Phineas Redux 
(1873) 
In the previous chapter on The Three Clerks and Orley Farm, I discussed how 
Trollope’s role as “finder of fact” compelled him to strike a balance between his goals of 
legal realism (“fact”) and his literary vision (“feeling or imagination”).   Yet Trollope’s 
efforts at achieving legal realism only generated further criticism by practicing lawyers of 
how the legal situations depicted in his novels were riddled with errors in procedure, and 
suggestions that he was unqualified to write such legal narratives.  The critic for the 
National Review elucidates the legal profession’s anxiety over Trollope’s criticism of the 
lawyers in Orley Farm:  
Mr. Trollope probably meant nothing more than that barristers are 
sometimes vulgar and unscrupulous, and judges sometimes petulant and 
overbearing; but he should beware of discussing as a grievance that which 
is really a necessity, and of grounding on imaginary and impossible facts 
an imputation on the honour and good faith of a profession which certainly 
contains in its ranks as many scrupulous and high-minded gentlemen as 
any other. (“Orley Farm,” National Review)  
Following the publication of Orley Farm and the subsequent criticism from lawyers on 
the inaccuracies in the legal plots, Trollope's work includes meditations on the challenges 
of achieving legal realism.  One such aside in Phineas Finn (1868) demonstrates the 
tension between fact and feeling in Trollope’s fiction:  
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The poor fictionist very frequently finds himself to have been wrong in his 
description of things in general, and is told so, roughly by the critics, and 
tenderly by the friends of his bosom. He is moved to tell of things of 
which he omits to learn the nature before he tells of them—as should be 
done by a strictly honest fictionist. He catches salmon in October; or 
shoots his partridges in March. His dahlias bloom in June, and his birds 
sing in the autumn. He opens the opera-houses before Easter, and makes 
Parliament sit on a Wednesday evening. And then those terrible meshes of 
the Law! How is a fictionist, in these excited days, to create the needed 
biting interest without legal difficulties; and how again is he to steer his 
little bark clear of so many rocks,—when the rocks and the shoals have 
been purposely arranged to make the taking of a pilot on board a 
necessity? As to those law meshes, a benevolent pilot will, indeed, now 
and again give a poor fictionist a helping hand,—not used, however, 
generally, with much discretion. But from whom is  any assistance to 
come in the august matter of a Cabinet assembly? There can be no such 
assistance. No man can tell aught but they who will tell nothing. But then, 
again, there is this safety, that let the story be ever so mistold,—let the 
fiction be ever so far removed from the truth, no critic short of a Cabinet 
Minister himself can convict the narrator of error. (46) 
In this passage, the law is contrasted with the natural, the cultural, and the democratic in 
society.  The poetic reverie of salmon fishing or dahlias blooming is abruptly interrupted 
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by the line "And then those terrible meshes of the Law!" The use of the word "And" 
heightens the sensation that the law has crowded out or trespassed on the poetry of the 
previous sentences.  As "meshes" closely follows these physical locations like the opera-
house, the reader feels like the snare is physical not metaphorical.  The prevalence of 
figurative imagery in this passage contrasts with Trollope's usual ordinary language.  The 
reader learns that the pilot is a necessity but the use of the pilot is not without problems.  
Beyond a figurative snare, the physicality of the passage encourages us to imagine the 
law's meshes as the open spaces between the threads of a net, with Trollope's plot threads 
woven through the meshes of the law navigating the places of ambiguity.  Trollope 
outlines the challenge he faces of forging a legal plot with the "biting interest without 
legal difficulties." Here, the "biting" is not only keen but also caustic. The rocks and 
shoals distinguish the author's work in the law, with the lawyer's work, which is always 
represented as sedentary reading in dark chambers at an ink-stained desk.  This passage 
captures the tension between fact and feeling that not only determines Trollope’s literary 
authority as “finder of fact” but also is at the foundation of how a jury determines a 
verdict, and ultimately, how readers understand what it means to have knowledge. 
Focusing on Trollope as a “finder of fact” negotiating legal realism and legal 
imagination, this chapter will explore the author’s relationship with the law following the 
accusations of legal errors raised by lawyer-critics of Orley Farm, and the author’s 
subsequent retainer of an attorney, Charles George Meriwether, as a consultant on the 
legal issues of The Eustace Diamonds.  In fact, The Eustace Diamonds includes a chapter 
that interrupts the narrative and reads as a legal opinion.  The chapter “Mr. Dove’s 
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opinion” is presented as a letter from Mr. Dove, a barrister learned in the law, to the 
Eustace family solicitor Mr. Camperdown.  The letter cites actual legal treatises and cases 
and is a significant response to previous charges of inaccuracy in Trollope’s legal plots.  
If the previous chapter’s discussion of The Three Clerks and Orley Farm illustrated 
Trollope’s modernity through his vision for legal reform, then this chapter seeks to 
develop the response to Trollope’s fascination with legal plots, through an examination of 
epistemologies of knowledge in The Eustace Diamonds and Phineas Redux.  It has been 
suggested that Victorian novelists' interest in the law is tied to the law's practical position 
in industrial society, as well as the secular tradition in which religion had diminished 
social authority (Lacey 622).  Indeed, Trollope’s use of fictional legal narratives allows 
him to offer a secular moral education to readers, who through the frame of the 
courtroom plot assume the role of jurors.  Both The Eustace Diamonds and Phineas 
Redux act as a juryman’s guide; treatments of perjury, ignorance of the law, and theories 
of knowledge implicate faith in communal processes and the community at large.   
As other critics have noted, Trollope’s novels are brimming over with legal 
scenes, pointing away claims that the author was ignorant of the law.  For example, 
Simon Gardner uses the fact that Trollope's novels are full of legal material to conclude 
the author was well versed in the law and may in fact have "assimilated the contemporary 
judicial pronouncements on the subject" of postal acceptance rules in the 1840s, wherein, 
in terms of contractual law, a letter takes effect on its mailing as opposed to its receipt 
(184).  Consistent with the idea of Trollope as a serious legal thinker, Albert Pionke 
argues that Trollope broadcasts a right to assess the law critically through his mastery of 
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the legal elements of his narrative.  Pionke uses biographical details, such as Trollope's 
active engagement in the Royal Literary Fund, to suggest a reading of Trollope's legal 
fictions "as complementary, novelistic interventions into the professionalization of 
writing, and the creation of charismatic authority for writers, especially realistic ones, 
that is equivalent to, and perhaps comes at the expense of, the prestige accorded to the 
law” (150).  Pionke supports my reading that Trollope’s satire is framed as a competition 
between the legal and literary professions, an argument that receives further justification 
through an analysis of The Eustace Diamonds and Phineas Redux.  The relationship 
between lawyers and authors of legal narratives allows for observations concerning 
philosophies of law as well as the negotiation of boundaries between the personal and the 
professional.  In these later legal novels, Trollope continues to write the “law” of 
professional responsibility through representations of the lawyers Mr. Camperdown, Mr. 
Dove, and Mr. Greystock,  In addition, Chaffanbrass’s evolution from The Three Clerks 
to Phineas Redux sheds light on Trollope’s shifting relationship with legal realism and 
legal imagination.  In this way, Trollope’s representations of the law are significant to 
understanding not only his social vision but also his literary authority.  Specifically, 
Trollope uses features of the jury, such as the jury’s role as the “finder of fact” and its 
narrative silence, as narrative techniques and descriptive strategies revealing his authorial 
vision.   
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FACT-FINDING AND TROLLOPE’S LAWYERS IN THE EUSTACE DIAMONDS  
In The Eustace Diamonds, Trollope depicts two different kinds of lawyers —
those that rely on precedent and learning from previous decisions and legal treatises, and 
those that use instinct and rhetoric to put on a show in the courtroom.  With the inclusion 
of Mr. Dove’s opinion, Trollope as “finder of fact” seems to elevate legal realism over 
legal imagination.  At the same time, he demands the same reliance on fact (as applied to 
legal precedent) over feeling (legal rhetoric) from legal professionals.  Yet his narrative 
techniques also suggest the difficulty of reconciling fact and feeling in a legal strategy, as 
well as the danger of relying solely on legal precedent at the expense of the natural law 
tradition.  This observation plays into the tension between empirical and non-empirical 
processes in the law, for much legal rhetoric is motivated by the need to persuade a jury.  
Trollope employs several narrative strategies to demonstrate the relationship between fact 
and feeling for legal professionals, including the depiction of attorneys’ spaces and the 
separation of the personal from the professional.  In so doing, Trollope writes the “law” 
of professional responsibility. 
Similar to the positioning of Mr. Furnival with regard to Lady Mason, Trollope 
creates situations where the personal and the professional collide, disrupting the notion of 
a straightforward attorney-client relationship.  In the first meeting between Camperdown 
and his client Lord Fawn, Camperdown is careful not to alarm his client in his discussion 
of Lady Eustace’s legal troubles; he merely suggests that “there's a stupid mistake about 
some family diamonds” (131).  In his conversation, Camperdown in no way suggests that 
Lady Eustace is to blame, in a marked contrast to the tone of his letter to the widow 
 98 
herself.  In this case, Camperdown withholds from Lord Fawn his opinion that Lady 
Eustace is dishonest, as “it is not the business of a lawyer to tell his client evil things of 
the lady whom that client is engaged to marry” (132).  During this disingenuous 
conversation, Camperdown warns Lord Fawn that under no circumstances can he allow 
Lady Eustace to retain Mowbray and Mopus – “horrible people; sharks, that make one 
blush for one’s profession” (131).  In this way, tiers of legal professionals are 
distinguished by their levels of misconduct.  Trollope also emphasizes the power 
dynamics between the lawyer and his client: “every word that Mr. Camperdown said was 
gospel to Lord Fawn” (132).  If it is problematic for a client to worship his attorney, then 
Trollope's humanization of Victorian lawyers in the legal narratives succeeds in pulling 
them down from any such pedestal.  
According to R.D. McMaster, Camperdown's importance in the narrative cannot 
be judged by the amount of textual space he is afforded (75).  The narrative space 
devoted to Camperdown looms large as his position is closely observed; for example, we 
learn that to visit Dove in his chambers, "Mr Camperdown rose, and slowly walked 
across the New Square, Lincoln's Inn, under the low archway, by the entrance to the old 
court in which Lord Eldon used to sit, to the Old Square, in which the Turtle Dove had 
built his legal nest on a first floor, clues to the old gateway” (335).  When Camperdown 
leaves the physical space legal professionals inhabit, he is portrayed in the novel as a 
physical threat.  Lady Eustace does not respond to Camperdown's letters, so he goes so 
far as to force a meeting at her home by holding her carriage door with his hand.  Lady 
Eustace feels as if he already has the power to search her house before he has obtained 
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the warrant: “at that very moment who should appear on the pavement, standing between 
the carriage and the house-door, but Mr. Camperdown!” (243). In this way, Trollope 
draws attention to the attorney’s physical presence; his crossing of professional 
boundaries is a pursuit based on his feeling towards the woman rather than his knowledge 
about the law of heirlooms and this aggressiveness feels dangerous. This encounter 
throws Lady Eustace into hysterics, because of the public nature of the encounter: “All 
the world of Mount Street, including her own servants, had heard the accusation against 
her” (245).  Stepping outside the bounds of his office, Camperdown’s actions are driven 
by emotion rather than fact.   
If the lines between the lawyer’s personal and the professional roles are critical to 
the development of the law of professional responsibility, then Trollope’s depiction of 
Lizzie’s cousin, the barrister Greystock, serves to probe these boundaries.  Lord Fawn 
tries to walk away from his engagement with Lizzie, and when Greystock questions him, 
he says he will consult his lawyer.  Greystock’s response is that he can't see why a 
gentleman should require an attorney to tell him what to do in such a case.  Coming from 
an attorney, the observation gets to the heart of the challenge of inhabiting both the roles 
of a gentleman and a professional.  In addition, Greystock is torn between his 
professional role as an attorney and his role as a confidant of his cousin. For example, 
when Greystock consults with Lizzie about the diamonds in Scotland, he betrays the 
conflicting nature of his interests: "if you ask my opinion as a lawyer, I doubt whether 
any such proof can be shown.  But as a man and a friend I do advise you to give them up" 
(277).   Camperdown’s word becomes the law on which the case turns for Lord Fawn, an 
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assumption that Greystock questions: “but Mr. Camperdown isn't the law and the 
prophets, nor yet can we allow him to be judge and jury in such a case as this” (191).  
Instead of relying on Camperdown’s appraisal of the case, Greystock wants empirical 
proof through documentation and statements submitted to counsel. Rather than a broad 
satire on lawyers, Trollope’s The Eustace Diamonds explores the tension between 
empirical and non-empirical philosophy.     
Greystock is also represented as a wanderer, geographically and emotionally from 
the law.  For example, Greystock walked to the Temple to work on “mastering the 
mysteries of some much-complicated legal case which had been confided to him, in order 
that he might present it to a jury enveloped in increased mystery. But, as he went, he 
thought rather of matrimony than of law” (155).  Outside of his professional space, 
Greystock’s thoughts on the law are displaced by emotion, as he imagines what the 
community would say about his wedding: “oh, heaven!—there has Frank Greystock gone 
and married a little governess out of old Lady Fawn’s nursery!” (158).  Greystock’s 
consideration of the merits of marrying for love rather than wealth engages the natural 
law tradition and pushes aside legal positivism: “the complicated legal case received 
neither much raveling or unraveling from his brains that night” (157).   
 In An Autobiography, Trollope says that he is not trying to represent the ideal but 
the real (245).  If there is a lawyer that approaches the ideal in The Eustace Diamonds, it 
is Mr. Dove. Trollope describes in great detail the "legal nest" of the barrister "Turtle 
Dove": 
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Mr. Dove was a gentleman who spent a very great portion of his life in 
this somewhat gloomy abode of learning. It was not now term time, and 
most of his brethren were absent from London, recruiting their strength 
among the Alps, or drinking in vigours for fresh campaigns with the salt 
sea breezes of Kent and Sussex, or perhaps shooting deer in Scotland, or 
catching fish in Connemara. But Mr. Dove was a man of iron, who wanted 
no such recreation. To be absent from his law-books and the black, 
littered, ink-stained old table on which he was wont to write his opinions, 
was, to him, to be wretched. The only exercise necessary to him was that 
of putting on his wig and going into one of the courts that were close to his 
chambers;—but even that was almost distasteful to him. He preferred 
sitting in his old arm-chair, turning over his old books in search of old 
cases, and producing opinions which he would be prepared to back against 
all the world of Lincoln's Inn. (335) 
Dove does not appreciate experience in the physical world beyond his chambers; he 
would rather remain in his office than engage with the community.  Isolated in his 
chambers, Dove is able to devote himself entirely to the pursuit of accumulating 
specialized legal knowledge.  Yet Dove's sanctuary exists as a shelter from the 
community, thereby presenting an extreme version of a lawyer motivated by fact, 
untouched by the motivations to resort to legal rhetoric.   The alienation of fact from 
feeling in a legal professional is demonstrated through the depiction of attorneys’ space; 
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Trollope contrasts Dove's sedentary isolation with the wanderings of the attorneys 
Camperdown and Greystock.   
To understand the nuances of Trollope’s criticism of the legal profession, it is 
necessary to examine the relationship between literary and legal discourse during the 
nineteenth century, which underwent evolution in conjunction with the rise of 
professionalism.  In "The Way We Lived Then: The Legal Profession and the 19th-
Century Novel,” Nicola Lacey’s major argument is that the rise of professionalism for the 
Victorian Bar emerged from attempts at collectivizing professional accreditation as well 
as the evolution of technical expertise in criminal law (622).  Her belief that nineteenth-
century realist novels shine a unique light on this facet of criminal law advancements 
supports my major claim that realist texts like those by Trollope, in capturing the 
ordinary, also grasp important elements of legal history (Lacey 623).  Trollope's attack of 
defense lawyers as lacking technical knowledge ties into the profession's attempts to 
modernize in the nineteenth century.  According to Lacey, professions whose 
practitioners needed to demonstrate mastery of the relevant binding precedents of their 
specific areas of legal expertise to thrive were caught in a “double bind…For the most 
obviously legally exclusive techniques were precisely those whose complexity and 
technicality opened them up to the Benthamite critique of law as deliberately fostering 
archaic and obfuscatory fictions" (616).  In other words, pressures upon lawyers to 
specialize through cultivating technical knowledge needed to be balanced with the need 
to preserve a sense of the law’s practicality among the Victorian public.  Trollope seems 
suspicious of a profession where attorneys can distance themselves from the precedents 
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and underlying principles of the law and traffic in legal rhetoric, and The Eustace 
Diamonds is the author’s meditation on this state of affairs.  Trollope pinpoints an uneven 
usage of the common law amongst legal professionals as a source of professional 
weakness in the Victorian Bar.  
The Victorian legal historian J. H. Baker suggests that one cannot speak of a legal 
profession until the rise of standards for professional responsibility (139). The first ethics 
regulation of lawyers was the Statute of Westminster in 1275, imposing standards of 
honesty and a duty of confidentiality.  The London Ordinance of 1280, applying to all 
lawyers practicing in London courts, issued standards for respect and competence.  
According to the London Ordinance, lawyers must "make proffers at the bar without 
baseness and without reproach and foul words and without slandering any man" (Baker 
140).  Another pamphlet, written around 1285 and called the Mirror of Justices, expanded 
on the standards of conduct within the courtroom, suggesting the lawyer "will not by 
blow contumely, browl, threat, noise, or villain conduct disturb any judge, party, 
sergeant, or other in court, nor impede the hearing or the course of justice" (Baker 140).  
What is interesting about the Mirror of Justices is that opinion is split as to whether the 
document was intended as a treatise or a parody.  In any event, pamphlets and laws alone 
did not dictate professional conduct; the lawyer's oath added to the shape of the state of 
legal ethics.    
 Similarly, Trollope's critique in The Eustace Diamonds that attorneys are ignorant 
and uneducated in the technical aspects of legal matters arose out of a longstanding 
criticism of the legal profession. Parliament passed an act in 1402 regulating the 
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admission of attorneys to reduce "the great number of Attornies, ignorant and not learned 
in the Law" (Baker 141).  The 1402 Act included a "do no falsehood" oath that continued 
through the seventeenth century.  The oath addressed issues like using false evidence, 
intentionally delaying litigation, providing a full and thorough representation and 
charging reasonable fees.  The lawyer's oath was significantly shortened in the eighteenth 
century, creating "a void in the written articulation of standards" (Baker 141).  In this 
manner, Trollope's writing fills in where the details of ethical standards had been erased.  
If serjeants operated under a variety of standards regulating conduct, barristers were 
overlooked by Parliament and lightly regulated by the courts.  Until 1980, English 
barristers did not have a written code of conduct; rather, barristers "relied on conduct and 
etiquette handed down by received wisdom" (Baker 144).  Without any document 
codifying the expectations as to a barrister's conduct, Trollope's writing, being read and 
discussed by lawyers, enters the conversation of received wisdom.  In effect, Trollope 
carves out professional space by providing a written code of conduct for the legal 
profession.   
As James Kincaid suggests, The Eustace Diamonds "is Trollope's most insistent, 
least relaxed novel; the narrator chooses every opportunity to generalize and to teach” 
(The Novels of Anthony Trollope 201).  On the spectrum of lawyers, Trollope's portrayal 
of Arthur Herriot represents the relationship between the legal profession and its 
practitioners’ understanding and application of the law.  Frank Greystock's friend Arthur 
Herriot is younger than him and has so far achieved no success as a barrister, but he 
carries around Stone and Toddy's "Digest of the Common Law" (273).  Trollope's 
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discussion of Herriot highlights the disconnect between knowing the law and practicing 
the law: 
The best of the legal profession consists in this;--that when you get fairly 
at work you may give over working.  An aspirant must learn everything; 
but a man may make his fortune at it, and know almost nothing. He may 
examine a witness with judgment, see through a case with precision, 
address a jury with eloquence, --and yet be altogether ignorant of the law. 
But he must be believed to be a very pundit before he will get a chance of 
exercising his judgment, his precision, or his eloquence. The men whose 
names are always in the newspapers never look at their Stone and Toddy, -
-care for it not at all,--have their Stone and Toddy got up for them by their 
juniors when cases require that reference shall be made to precedents. 
(273) 
The more one probes the law as presented in Trollope, the more one recognizes 
his ambivalence about lawyers and the state of the law.  For example, after Trollope’s 
representation of the seasoned lawyer needing to know “almost nothing,” one would 
expect his depiction of the learned barrister Dove to be idealized.   Dove's legal opinion 
represents the epitome of the lawyer as learned technician in the narrative; however, I 
would suggest that the placement of this chapter casts doubt on the idea of Dove being 
the ideal lawyer.  Dove believes that Lady Eustace cannot claim the diamonds as 
paraphernalia because their value is excessive as compared with her income and degree.  
Camperdown tries to discuss the details of the will, but Dove stops him “declaring that he 
 106 
could not venture to discuss matters as to which he knew none of the facts” (342).  In so 
doing, Trollope warns against this kind of extreme reliance on practicing law and 
providing legal advice solely upon knowing precedent at the expense of natural law 
tradition. Rather than labeling any attorney in Trollope's work his vision of the ideal, I 
would argue that his sweeping attention to a variety of legal professionals only 
emphasizes the many pitfalls of the legal profession.  My reading is supported by Marco 
Wan’s argument that "the novel seems to question the desirability of being bound not 
only by Mr. Dove's opinion, but by any opinion at all, whether legal or otherwise" (211).   
The chapter entitled “Mr. Dove's opinion” is preceded by a personal exchange 
between the barristers Frank Greystock and Arthur Herriot, for whom “Stone and 
Toddy,—with a little tobacco, have been all [his] comfort” (291).  Rather than discuss the 
law together, the colleagues engage in an extensive examination of matters of the heart.  
Mr. Dove’s opinion is introduced into the narrative following this highly personal 
exchange between the two professionals.   After reading Dove's opinion, the matter of the 
necklace intrudes into Camperdown's personal life; it interferes with his holiday with his 
family at a little cottage in Dawlish.  Trollope's return to this personal detail in the final 
paragraph of the chapter entitled “Mr. Dove’s opinion” has the effect of isolating the 
legal opinion in the text, by sealing it between two domestic scenarios. In other words, 
Mr. Dove’s legal opinion in the narrative is like his professional space, as Trollope’s 
arrangement mirrors the artificiality of a complete separation of legal precedent from 
emotion and legal rhetoric.  This containment of the legal opinion demonstrates the 
tension for Trollope as “finder of fact” between legal realism and legal imagination—by 
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controlling the legal opinion Trollope isolates the force of legal precedent  in the novel 
and preserves his literary authority.   
Using Carol Lansbury's discussion of Trollope's postal service, Lauren Goodlad 
concludes that "before he ever published a novel, Trollope was already usurping the 
legitimate authority of the law” (qtd. in Pionke 142).  Goodlad is referring to way in 
which postal reports were expected to follow the three-part structure of a legal 
declaration as defined by John Frederick Archbold's A Digest of the Law Relative to 
Pleading and Evidence in Actions Real, Personal and Mixed (1821), causing lawyers to 
question the professional boundaries between the law and the postal service.  In An 
Autobiography, Trollope announces that he has never printed a word as his own that was 
written by others, with the exception of Dove's opinion in The Eustace Diamonds (213).  
On that opinion, authored by Charles Merewether, the present Member for Northampton, 
he writes: "I am told that it has become the ruling authority on the subject" (213).  In this 
statement, Trollope demonstrates the challenge between balancing legal realism and legal 
imagination in his novels.  Trollope suggests that Merewether’s legal opinion in The 
Eustace Diamonds holds weight in the legal community; however, as an author, Trollope 
does not have full ownership over this achievement.  Instead, Trollope states that he has 
been told the opinion has become important; the suggestion is that lawyers or others close 
to the legal profession have relayed this fact to him, as he is not in a position to discover 
this importance himself.  The language makes Trollope’s fiction a legal authority, while 
at the same time distancing him from the legal insider’s perspective.  The sentiment is 
triumphant in light of the fact that Trollope was criticized for his faulty legal research and 
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reasoning in the plot of Orley Farm.  The statement also supports the idea that Trollope's 
use of the law extends beyond satire and sensationalism to connect to the shaping of his 
authorial persona. Yet the statement also demonstrates the impact of “those terrible 
meshes of the Law” on the establishment of literary authority, as witnessed through the 
competition between the literary and legal professions, and Trollope’s negotiation of the 
role of “finder of fact” in his fictional legal narratives.    
Pionke argues that the wealth of case law and precedential reasoning in the Dove 
opinion contrasts with the "poetic, picturesque, chivalric" law of The Eustace Diamonds, 
and that this distinction between the truths derived from common law and romantic law is 
at the heart of Trollope's legal critique (145).  I disagree with this reading of the law in 
The Eustace Diamonds, because it is difficult to reconcile with Trollope's protestations 
about attorneys’ lack of specialized legal knowledge.  While Pionke views "the 
impeccable accuracy" of Dove's opinion as a mechanism by which Trollope asserts his 
authority over the law, errors in the opinion complicate this reading.  Alan Roth, in 
analyzing the law of Dove's opinion, finds fault in the legal research and reasoning, but 
he does not address Trollope's statement of the opinion's rise as a ruling authority. For 
example, he analyzes the selection of cases cited in the opinion and comes to the 
conclusion that several of the cases do not speak directly to the issue at hand.  Roth 
speculates, "Perhaps Mr. Dove subscribed to the belief that a greater number of citations 
make an argument more persuasive" (884).  Trollope was not in a position to determine 
whether the opinion written for him by Charles Merewether was compelling; in a sense, 
he had to place blind trust in an attorney in much the same way his characters do in his 
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novel. According to Roth, Dove gets the legal issues on heirlooms right but misconstrues 
the issues with regard to the necklace as paraphernalia and an inter vivos gift.  Roth 
opines that "had Trollope known, he would certainly have been disappointed" (885).  I 
would agree that disappointment might come into play, but the quality of the opinion also 
points to representations of ordinariness that Trollope sought to represent within his 
novels.  Trollope the narrator devotes much energy in The Eustace Diamonds to 
defending the anti-heroic natures of his characters: "A picture of surpassing godlike 
nobleness—a picture of a King Arthur among men—may perhaps do much.  But such 
pictures cannot do all. When such a picture is painted, as intending to show what a man 
should be, it is true. If painted to show what men are, it is false." The image is rising "not, 
indeed, to perfection, but one step first, and then another, on the ladder” (419).  In this 
way, Dove's imperfectly crafted legal opinion fits perfectly within the larger context of 
Trollope's realist novel.  It is difficult to know what editing process occurred once 
Merewether delivered the opinion to Trollope, but Trollope does not state that the opinion 
was reprinted in its entirety without edits.  For this reason, the errors Roth identifies may 
reflect Trollope’s role as “finder of fact” balancing legal realism with legal imagination.  
In other words, what Roth labels as Merewether’s errors could reflect Trollope’s “law.”  
While Roth confirms that Dove’s opinion is a correct application of the law of heirlooms, 
he does take issue with Dove's statement that "the law prefers custom to devise" (887).  
According to Roth, English courts believed that heirlooms were created by custom and 
not devise, but at the same time the acceptance of heirlooms created by devise was a 
common practice.  If Dove's opinion exaggerates the distinction between custom and 
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devise, then it can be said to be exploring the tension between natural law and positive 
law that is prevalent throughout the novel.   
Dove argues that the jewels are not heirlooms, as they were only mentioned as 
such in a will by the great-grandfather of the present baronet who died in 1820, and 
therefore he could not have devised them to the present claimant.  Lady Eustace may be 
able to claim the diamonds, not as a gift, but as “paraphernalia belonging to her station” 
(299).   Confident in the seriousness with which Trollope engages with the law, 
McMaster believes that Trollope's reading of Blackstone on paraphernalia may have 
sparked this essential piece of the legal plot (80).  By the time Camperdown consults 
Dove for a legal opinion, Camperdown has already called the necklace an heirloom many 
times.  When Lizzie recounts this fact, asking Greystock why Camperdown called the 
necklace an heirloom, her cousin defends Camperdown for his honesty.  According to 
Greystock, Camperdown said what he thought, and Greystock admits that as a lawyer he 
also did not know what qualified as an heirloom.  Greystock is far enough along in his 
career that he does not consult Stone and Toddy; however, he is also proven wrong on a 
technical legal question.  In this representation the way lawyers know things, Trollope 
includes a definition of honesty—ignorance of the law is not an excuse.   
Trollope emphasizes that if lawyers distance themselves from legal precedent and 
depend on legal rhetoric, it could become acceptable to repeatedly identify an item as an 
heirloom because of misinformation.   In the context of his meditations on the decline of 
the virtue of honesty in society, Trollope sees the increased role of legal rhetoric as the 
culprit.  In The Eustace Diamonds, Trollope explicates the problems that arise when 
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experienced lawyers practice law with blind disregard to the precedents.  Part of 
Trollope's teaching in this novel is that legal advocacy cannot emphasize legal rhetoric at 
the expense of reliance on legal precedent; lawyers cannot claim ignorance of the laws.  
Ignorance of the law is Lizzie’s defense, and although society does not forgive her for 
violating natural laws of morality, Trollope also acknowledges the difficulty of holding a 
layperson to knowledge of the law when the lawyers do not have it themselves.  The 
differences between the professional backgrounds of Dove and Camperdown are vast, 
with Dove being learned in the law and Camperdown being more of a businessman than a 
legal scholar, but Trollope emphasizes that they share common ground in their 
paternalistic attitude towards their clients: “The outside world to them was a world of 
pretty, laughing, ignorant children; and lawyers were the parents, guardians, pastors, and 
masters by whom the children should be protected from the evils incident to their 
childishness” (336).  By the end of the novel this worldview is turned on its head, and 
lawyers are shown to be ignorant children.  By removing Camperdown from a position of 
paternalistic authority, Trollope makes room for himself as author as moral guardian to 
his reading public.  In fact, a similar statement of protection is echoed in an narratorial 
aside on authorship:  “To make them and ourselves somewhat better-not by one spring 
heavenwards to perfection, because we cannot so use our legs,-but by slow climbing, is, 
we may presume, the object of all teachers, leaders, legislators, spiritual pastors, and 
masters" (419).  
In Novels Behind Glass: Commodity Culture and Victorian Narrative, Andrew H. 
Miller takes up the discussion of the diamonds as a commodity in the text.  Miller 
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suggests that Trollope emphasizes the narrative invisibility of the diamonds in a number 
of ways, most notably through the iron safe in which Lizzie transports them to Scotland.  
According to Miller, Trollope’s frequent allusions to the diamonds without any 
description or representation in the narrative of the diamonds themselves, draws attention 
to the ways in which “the language of possession itself percolates through the novel, 
defining characters’ moral and psychological identities as well as their relation to the 
material environment” (161).  I would argue that the diamonds are not specifically 
described to the reader so as to illustrate their unstable standing across the legal 
profession in The Eustace Diamonds.  By keeping the diamonds off stage or out of the 
frame, Trollope is representing the uncertainty of dual philosophies of law—lawyers 
relying on legal rhetoric define the diamonds as an heirloom while those lawyers relying 
on legal precedent do not.  Greystock and Camperdown both circulate inaccurate 
opinions about the diamonds because they are not informed about the specialized law.  
The lesson that Trollope demonstrates about the need for specialized legal knowledge 
translates to the anxiety over the jury in how the jury makes its decisions—not seeing the 
diamonds only magnifies the ways in which each imagined juror scrutinizes the case 
without actually seeing the facts on their face.  According to Miller, “Trollope repeatedly 
satirizes attempts to check (the circulation of commodities): the immense energies spent 
in forming public opinion, in imposing legal measures, and in physically protecting the 
Eustace diamonds from theft all prove futile" (163).  Like Miller, I am interested in the 
amount of energy spent forming public opinion, but I see it as a meditation on the limits 
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of a jury to bring justice, and the echoes of a medieval system where the jury's facts came 
from first-hand accounts. 
 
PERJURY AND THE JURYMAN’S GUIDE 
Miller, like others, sees Trollope’s morality as hinging upon principles of honesty; 
his scholarship analyzes how Trollope comes to define an honest understanding of 
ownership in The Eustace Diamonds (163).  I've chosen to discuss this novel because its 
legal plot centers on perjury, a crime that fully implicates the issue of whether the public 
can have faith in the jury.  As discussed in Chapter 2, Trollope was especially troubled by 
the unanimity requirement for juries; the assumption was that forcing unanimous verdicts 
encouraged jurors to lie under oath.  Walter Kendrick affirms my choice of text, arguing 
that "of all Trollope's novels, The Eustace Diamonds exhibits the most intense concern 
with truth and falsehood” (154).   Like Lady Mason, Lady Eustace commits perjury; 
when the iron box housing the diamonds is stolen, she swears that the diamonds were 
inside, when in fact they were under her pillow.  When confessing her crime to Lord 
George, Lizzie acts shocked that she could be prosecuted for perjury: “she hardly knew 
what perjury was. It sounded like forgery and burglary. To stand up before a judge and be 
tried, and then to be locked up for five years in prison! What an end would this be to all 
her glorious success?” (150).  Wendie Ellen Schneider demonstrates how the sanctions 
for perjury, "feared as both a temporal crime and a spiritual sin," relaxed in the mid-
eighteenth century.  Witnesses that formerly would have been disqualified from testifying 
because of the significant risk of perjury began to have their voices heard. Trollope's 
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preoccupation with perjury comes at a time when the laws saw great change in how 
perjury was being treated, a change contemporaries saw as "nothing short of 
revolutionary" (Schneider, “Perjurious Albion” 343).  Schneider attributes the possibility 
of these shifts, to among other things, "a coincidence of a pervasive extralegal reverence 
for sincerity."  Yet Trollope’s The Eustace Diamonds shows disillusionment with the 
reverence surrounding sincerity, as evidenced by nineteenth-century reviews.  One 
review calls the plot “a depressing story” (Spectator 26 Oct.) while another labels this 
tale as Trollope at “his most cynical self” (Saturday Review 16 Nov.).  
If Trollope is cynical about the preservation of honesty as an ideal, then The 
Eustace Diamonds is part of the nineteenth-century pushback against perjury.  In 
England, the new Divorce Court was said to be the “playground of perjurers,” with the 
expectation that women would automatically deny all accusations of adultery.  In 
attempts to safeguard against perjury, the Divorce Court utilized a Queen's Proctor, who 
appealed to the community to acquire information about the parties to the suit that 
otherwise might go undiscovered.  In British India, the punishment for perjury was 
corporal —a tattoo reading "I am a perjurer" inked on the perjurer’s forehead (Schneider 
“Secrets and Lies”).  The threat of prosecution for perjury looms over Lady Eustace 
throughout the narrative, but in the end "nothing was done, and Lizzie triumphed in her 
success" (ED 353).  In this manner, Trollope engages with the pressing question of 
implementing effective strategies to curb perjury.  Jeremy Bentham's Rationale of 
Judicial Evidence (1827) outlines the penalties in use for perjury during the early 
nineteenth century.  He discusses a physical incentive against lying, as deception causes 
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physical pain in the deceiver.  He also discusses a moral sanction of the shunning of liars 
by the community.  Bentham's argument is that these kinds of measures prove ineffective 
in preventing perjury.  In The Eustace Diamonds, Trollope appears to pick up this debate 
over effective measures of discouraging perjury: 
She would not have minded it much if she were simply to be called a liar.  
But he had told her that she would be accused of –perjury.  There was 
something frightful to her in the name. And there were, she knew not what 
dreadful penalties attached to it. Lord George had told her that she might 
be put in prison,—whether he had said for years or for months she had 
forgotten. (339) 
That Lizzie would not mind being called a liar recalls Bentham's argument that 
community sanctions are ineffective.  Yet the prison penalties likewise fail to deter Lizzie 
from perjuring herself.  She recognizes the name of the crime as threatening, but the 
penalty seems so insignificant to her that she cannot recollect whether the prison term 
will be months or years.  Even an awareness of the legal consequences to perjury fails to 
ensure a witness’s honesty.   
 Part of Lizzie's forgetfulness regarding the penalties for perjury emerges from her 
discussion with Lord George on the uneven reach of the law.  Lizzie is surprised that 
Lord George plans to follow the letter of the law rather than the code of a gentleman; he 
promised to keep her story about the diamonds secret, but his intention is to abandon that 
promise if he is ever asked to sit in the witness box.  Lizzie appeals to Lord George for 
help and he tells her about the selective application of the law: “if you were nobody, you 
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would, of course, be indicted for perjury, and would go to prison.  As it is, if you will tell 
your story to one of your swell friends, I think it very likely that you may be pulled 
through” (465).  According to Lord George, he cannot assist her because he is “not near 
enough to those who wear wigs” (466). As other critics have noted, this episode shows 
Trollope engaging in a serious commentary over the ability of the law to obtain equitable 
results (Lacey 625).  Trollope’s suggestion that honesty before the law trumps the code of 
a gentleman not only demonstrates his modernity but also provides a juryman’s guide to 
his readers.      
Ultimately, Trollope’s guide to his readers, the potential jurors of England, 
demonstrates ambivalence with regard to Lizzie’s prosecution for perjury.  Major 
Mackintosh, the police captain, coaxes a confession from Lady Eustace, and then advises 
her that “if she were summoned and used as a witness, there would be no attempt to 
prosecute her for the—incorrect versions—of which she had undoubtedly been guilty” 
(501).  He further recommends that she go to Camperdown to tell the truth.  What Lord 
George calls perjury, Major Mackintosh calls an incorrect version of facts; here, it is the 
official who uses the non-legal term for the offense.  Part of Lizzie's refusal to admit fault 
is an unwillingness to conceptualize her misdeeds within a legal context: “Lizzie, in 
defending herself to herself, felt that, though cruel magistrates and hard-hearted lawyers 
and pig-headed jury men might call her little fault by the name of perjury, it could not be 
real, wicked perjury, because the diamonds had been her own" (518).  The layperson 
strives for a flexibility that the law does not provide— the idea that a “wicked” perjury 
exists in opposition with a harmless perjury is not a way of thinking that positive law 
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supports.  Lizzie is exempted from prosecution for perjury only on the ground that she 
would be called on to incriminate herself in giving evidence against criminals whose 
crimes had been graver than her own. This exemption leads her to reason that “People, 
after all, did not think so very much of perjury,—of perjury such as hers, committed in 
regard to one's own property” (523).  It is the novel’s more villainous figures, Mr. 
Emilius and Mrs. Carbuncle, who take the strongest stand against Lizzie’s perjury.  Mr. 
Emilius tells Lady Eustace that accusations of perjury are “calumnies spoken so openly 
behind your back” and he uses this position as a means of offering assistance in the way 
of marriage.  Mrs. Carbuncle is of the opinion that “when a woman has committed 
perjury, nothing too bad can possibly be said to her.  You are amenable to the outraged 
laws of the country, and it is my belief that they can keep you upon the treadmill and 
bread and water for months and months,—if not for years” (525).  After declaring this 
judgment against Lizzie, Mrs. Carbuncle commits her own immoral act, borrowing a 
large sum from Lizzie without promise of repayment.  Mrs. Carbuncle's reaction to 
Lizzie’s perjury is reminiscent of Mrs. Val’s cry for the hanging of Alaric in The Three 
Clerks; in both instances, Trollope suggests that the law does not allow for shades of grey 
in its sentencing.  Rather than condemning or championing Lizzie’s perjury, Trollope 
presents the complexities of telling the truth in a legal system that does not guarantee 
equitable results.  In this way, Trollope is inviting the active participation of his readers 
and encouraging scrutiny of the law.  
If Trollope encourages his readers to question the law, Lizzie endlessly professes 
her ignorance of the law.  Kendrick emphasizes the fact that Lizzie is "absolutely, 
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alarmingly ignorant" of the law at the beginning of the novel and remains so as the 
narrative progresses (5).  I would argue that Lizzie's ignorance of the law plays into our 
sense of the law's instability; without a clear pronouncement as to the legal status of the 
jewels from the legal professionals in the novel, knowledge of the law seems 
meaningless.  Lizzie discusses her case with every character in the novel, and in so doing, 
showcases her ignorance of the law.  For example, she instructs Mrs. Carbuncle on the 
vagaries of the law: “As for an heirloom, anybody who knows anything, knows that it 
can't be an heirloom. A pot or a pan may be an heirloom;--but a diamond necklace cannot 
be an heirloom.  Everybody knows that, that knows anything" (207). Mrs. Carbuncle 
immediately dismisses Lizzie's interpretation of the law as applied to a pot and pan, 
suggesting its irrationality.  
One can read Lizzie’s expression of ignorance as willful, as Kendrick does, or one 
can consider Lizzie’s ignorance in light of the debate over the codification of the law as 
opposed to common law.  The argument against the common law was that in an era of 
ever changing legal reforms, it was difficult for citizens to know the law (Lobban, “Old 
wine” 114). In the early nineteenth century a battle was raging over the future of the law, 
and whether the law should be found in the common law or alternately be codified.  
Proponents of the common law cited the uncertainty surrounding the development of a 
code with the need to develop alongside of it a new jurisprudence.  The fear also existed 
that unlike the evolution of common law, the code would be limited to reflecting one 
historical moment (Lobban, “Old wine” 119).  This interpretation of Lizzie’s ignorance 
of the law fits my assessment of Trollope’s legal vision as being conflicted.  As “finder of 
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fact,” Trollope must balance legal realism and legal imagination, but achieving legal 
accuracy is challenging when the definition of law is in flux.      
The argument of Lizzie’s ignorance of the law is also complicated by Lizzie’s 
summoning of trial by witness, an ancient form of justice where the jury's facts came 
from first-hand accounts.  When Lizzie and Lord Fawn abandon all faith in their lawyers, 
Lizzie appeals to the community to administer justice.  Initially, Lord Fawn 
wholeheartedly trusted Camperdown and more generally, lawyers as a group, to be 
correct; but once he learns that his attorney was wrong about the necklace being an 
heirloom, he changes his view: "the lawyers were all wrong about it. As far as I can see, 
lawyers always are wrong" (194).  In conversation with Lord Fawn, Lizzie echoes Lord 
Fawn’s distrust calling Camperdown a “cunning old snake” (195).  Following this 
disillusionment with the legal system, Trollope introduces the concept of community 
justice as an alternative to a justice system run by Victorian lawyers.  Lizzie suggests to 
Lord Fawn that they choose a citizen whom they both trust to resolve the breach of 
promise issue of their engagement.  Lord Fawn ultimately rejects this idea, although he 
admits Lady Glencora's word meant almost as much for him as it did for Lizzie. In 
addition, Lizzie threatens to have her friend the Duke of Omnium, head of the liberal 
nobility in England get involved, as Lord Fawn is a liberal. As Lizzie’s attempts to take 
her claim to the community fail, it is no wonder that Lizzie lacks personal investment in 
the community.  Frank explains to his cousin that thieves ought to be discovered for the 
good of the community.  Lizzie's responds: "I don't care for the community. What has the 
community ever done for me?" (458).  Rather than a simple sign of female ignorance, 
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Trollope builds Lizzie’s character as questioning how to achieve justice in Victorian 
England.  After her hopes in an ancient system of justice are dashed, she shows the same 
disillusionment with the community as she does with the lawyers.  It is no surprise that 
contemporary reviewers found The Eustace Diamonds to represent Trollope’s most 
cynical self. 
At the end of the novel, John Eustace calls Lizzie “a very great woman; and, if the 
sex could have its rights, [she] would make an excellent lawyer” (531).  It is difficult to 
determine whether John Eustace, who employs Camperdown, should be the judge of an 
excellent lawyer.  Indeed, Eustace’s assessment of Lizzie’s potential as a lawyer aligns 
with a contemporary review in The Examiner that asks if Trollope is "an unintentional 
ally" for the women's movement (“A review of The Eustace Diamonds” 135).  Despite 
Trollope’s cynicism, his characterization of Lizzie as an interrogator of the law allows the 
reader to interpret Eustace’s comment with some sincerity.  Ultimately, in writing the 
“law” of professional responsibility, Trollope sees the ideal lawyer not as Dove, relying 
strictly on legal precedent, or Camperdown, in his dependence on emotion and legal 
rhetoric, but as Lizzie, in her willingness to question all legal philosophies. 
 
“SURELY, MR. GREYSTOCK, YOU WOULDN’T WISH IT TO GO BEFORE A JURY”: ANXIETY 
OVER THE JURY AS “FINDER OF FACT” IN THE EUSTACE DIAMONDS AND PHINEAS REDUX 
Beyond Trollope’s lawyers, Dove’s legal opinion, and the historical 
representation of perjury, it is necessary to consider the role of the jury in Trollope’s later 
novels.  “Surely, Mr. Greystock, you wouldn’t wish it to go before a jury” (191).  
Discussing his legal options with Greystock, Lord Fawn utters these words with regard to 
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extricating himself from his romantic entanglement with Lizzie.  To understand why 
Lord Fawn would be threatened by having his case heard by a jury, it is necessary to 
consider the community’s anxiety over the jury as represented by Trollope in The 
Eustace Diamonds.  For example, Lady Eustace's friend Lord George is suspected of 
colluding with her to steal the diamonds.   Despite his innocence, Lord George is 
overwhelmed by an imaginary guilt: “a look of guilt is creeping over me.  I have a sort of 
conviction growing upon me that I shall be taken up and tried, and that a jury will find 
me guilty. I dream about it; and if, as is probable, it drives me mad, I'm sure that I shall 
accuse myself in my madness.  There's a fascination about it that I can't explain or 
escape” (318).  Lord George's anxieties point to the manner in which the role of the jury 
captivated the Victorian public.  Trollope captures the sense that any citizen can be 
wrongly accused and put in front of a jury; consequently, every member of the Victorian 
public shares an investment in assuring that juries are competent and produce just results.   
In The Eustace Diamonds, the narrative is framed by community judgment.  The 
opening sentence positions Lizzie in relation to her peers: "it was admitted by all her 
friends, and also by her enemies—who were in truth the more numerous and active body 
of the two—that Lizzie Greystock had done very well with herself” (12).  If what others 
believe of Lizzie is assigned a high value in the novel, then this phenomenon contributes 
to the anxiety over the competency of the jury.  The Victorian jury is composed of 
members of the community.  Without specialized training in how to serve on a jury, what 
keeps jurors from deciding cases on the same capricious grounds as they engage in 
gossip?  In narrating how the public makes decisions about people, Trollope is revealing 
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how jurors may also make decisions about guilt or innocence.  This examination connects 
back to my argument about how the jury exists as a “finder of fact”; yet, there is no way 
to determine if the jury relies on fact or feeling to make its determinations.  It is this 
anxiety over how information gets processed by the community that I see as prevalent in 
Trollope’s narrative.  In this manner, Lady Eustace sits before an imagined jury 
throughout The Eustace Diamonds, as each character has an opinion on the case.  For 
example, Lady Glencora hears a version of the story of the Eustace diamonds in which 
Lord Fawn retreats from the engagement once Lady Eustace’s possession of the 
diamonds is questioned. This falsehood receives emphasis through a narratorial intrusion: 
“The reader will be aware that this statement was by no means an accurate history of the 
difficulty as far as it had as yet progressed. It was, indeed, absolutely false in every detail; 
but it sufficed to show that the matter was becoming public” (203).  In this way, Trollope 
extends his discussion of epistemologies of knowledge, from the lawyers, to the public, 
and by extension, to the juries.   
The fickleness of public opinion in The Eustace Diamonds, as a demonstration of 
an imagined juror’s decision to depend on an uncertain blend of fact and feeling, is most 
clearly represented through Lizzie’s court proceedings.  Lizzie is required to testify in 
front a magistrate regarding her perjury. Although questioned by a barrister with “the 
blandest and most dulcet voice” (545), Lizzie is brought to tears by his cross-
examination, even though the magistrate pointed out that she had confessed her own false 
swearing a dozen times. The barrister asked her “almost in a whisper, and with the 
sweetest smile, whether she was not engaged to marry Lord George,” (419) with him as 
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her accomplice in the robbery.  Greystock appeals to the magistrate to end this vulgar line 
of cross-examination; subsequently, Trollope alerts us that "there was a scene in the 
court" (419).  The magistrate and the public are swayed by Lizzie's "bursting into tears 
and stretching forth towards the bench her two clasped hands with the air of a suppliant" 
(544).  When Lizzie retreats to Scotland to avoid further court appearances, the public 
that at first sympathized with Lizzie’s plight during her court appearance now turns on 
her: “when they hear that they were to be robbed of the pleasure of Lady Eustace’s cross-
examination, there arose almost a public feeling of wrath that justice should be thus 
outraged” (571).  William Cohen reads this situation as betraying the capriciousness of 
public opinion, functioning in a marketplace of sorts.  Cohen argues that The Eustace 
Diamonds operates under a “scandal economy,” wherein the quantification of public 
confidence in the novel allows one issue to impact its value against another issue (183).   
To illustrate, Cohen notes that Trollope writes “since the two robberies, public opinion 
had veered round three or four points in Lizzie’s favour, and people were beginning to 
say she had been ill-used” (qtd. in Cohen 183).  This quantification of public confidence 
can also be read as echo of the quantification that goes on during jury deliberation, as the 
verdict splits and eventually reaches unanimity.  The urge to quantify public opinion may 
seem ridiculous, but it points to the difficulty in achieving a unanimous verdict during 
collective decision making and the subjectivity of a jury’s unwitnessed, undocumented 
thought process.   
The final scene of The Eustace Diamonds completes the sense that the narrative is 
framed by the perceptions of the community.  Mr. Bonteen criticizes the inadequacy of 
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the law which allows Lady Eustace to remain free from punishment.  Mr. Palliser argues 
that he did not follow the case closely, and therefore is not entitled to offer an opinion.  
Lady Glencora's retort is "if people only spoke about what they attended to, how very 
little there would be to say” (581).  Again, the idea is that all of Trollope’s characters 
have an opinion about Lizzie’s case without full knowledge of the facts. Lord Chiltern 
says "I never was so sick of anything in my life as I am of Lady Eustace...And all that I 
can hear of her is, that she has told a lot of lies and lost a necklace" (587).  The Duke of 
Omnium suggests that Lady Eustace will have difficult times ahead, and Trollope 
emphasizes this sentiment in the final sentence of the novel: “In this opinion of the Duke 
of Omnium, the readers of this story will perhaps agree” (588).  By framing the narrative 
with public opinion, Trollope forces his readers to grapple with the ways that judgments 
are made, and to consider the sway of communal processes alongside positive law.  
Ayelet Ben-Yishai concedes that, as demonstrated by Alexander Welsh, Jan-
Melissa Schramm, and Jonathan Grossman, the empiricism of Victorian legal 
consciousness shaped the realist novel (96).  While the rules of evidence develop in 
concert with the realist novel, Ben-Yishai contends that "residues of older, collective 
modes of legal reasoning—fundamental to the idea of a common law—still held 
epistemological sway, even when cloaked in empiricist rhetoric” (96).  Ben-Yishai 
discusses the rise of legal positivism, as supported by Jeremy Bentham and John Austin, 
which acknowledges only human made law as opposed to natural law that relies on 
morality and religious beliefs of what is right and wrong.  According to Austin, 
jurisprudence is concerned with positive law but often “confounded with objects to which 
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it is related by resemblance, and with objects which are also signified, properly and 
improperly, by the large and vague expression law” (85).  In his questioning of the 
superiority of empirical philosophy, it is these non-literal treatments of law—what Austin 
terms “the law of honor” or “the law set by fashion” that Trollope explores.  Austin 
defines positive law as the commands of a sovereign, with commands defined as “a 
signification of desire” wherein “the party to whom it is directed is liable to evil from the 
other, in case he comply not with the desire.”  The establishment of commands by a 
sovereign or sovereign body of persons to a member or members of the “independent 
political society” is what Austin argues distinguishes positive law from other forms of 
law (88).  In other words, Austin favors jurisprudence whose approach is premised upon 
a single ruling authority, which represents a push back against community-oriented 
definitions of the law.  As Ben-Yishai argues, positive law is tied to nineteenth-century 
discussions of empiricism: "the law itself thus becomes an empirical question rather than 
an ethical or moral one” (98).  I agree with Ben-Yishai's claim that "despite the 
unquestioned hegemony of positive law in legal thought and doctrine in the nineteenth 
century, however, residues of nonpositive and nonempirical legal processes were still 
extant” (99).  Ben-Yishai sees Trollope as channeling these communal processes in The 
Eustace Diamonds through a determination of fact based on communal knowledge, or 
gossip.  I’m focused on how Trollope demonstrates the challenge of separating fact from 
feeling in actual representations of communal process, through the jury. 
In the trial of the diamond thieves Benjamin and Smiler, Trollope retains the 
silence of the jury in the Victorian courtroom—as readers we are in the audience and not 
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made privy to the jury’s deliberations.  The closing argument from Benjamin’s attorney 
sets up for readers the choice between fact and feeling.  The argument is based on a 
condemnation of Lady Eustace, with the reasoning being that the jury cannot convict the 
men of stealing the diamonds because Lady Eustace escaped punishment.  This argument 
is a blatant appeal to feeling without regard to fact, as the culpability of Lady Eustace is 
unrelated to the theft by Benjamin and Smiler.  In this way, Trollope offers for his readers 
a test following the moral education of his juryman’s guide.  The verdict in The Eustace 
Diamonds represents the triumph of fact over feeling: “The vigour, the attitude, and the 
indignant tone of [Benjamin’s attorney] were more even than his words;—but, 
nevertheless, the jury did find both Benjamin and Smiler guilty, and the judge did 
sentence them to penal servitude for fifteen years” (574). Despite the voluminous legal 
rhetoric of the counsel for Benjamin and Smiler, the jury issues a guilty verdict.  The 
arrangement of this sentence emphasizes the silence of the verdict, as the jury’s verdict is 
hidden in the middle of a sentence in a clause sandwiched between a description of legal 
rhetoric and the punishment from the judge.  The understated pronouncement and lack of 
description of the jury gives the verdict a universal quality, allowing the reader to enter 
the position of juror. 
In Phineas Redux, Trollope explores the role of the jury through Phineas Finn’s 
trial for the murder of Mr. Bonteen.  The jury comes to the forefront of the plot following 
a request for a delay in the trial proceedings.  A telegram reports the opportunity for 
hearing new evidence, but the man must come from Prague to testify, while the jury 
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remains confined.  The foreman of the jury protests, arguing that “the system under 
which Middlesex juries were chosen for service in the City was known to be most 
horribly cruel—but cruelty to jurymen such as this had never even been heard of” (457). 
In this fictionalized account, Trollope paints a compelling picture of how poor conditions 
for juries impede justice, as one of the jurymen states he is willing to believe the telegram 
without the testimony.  Once the court reconvenes, the foreman again wages a complaint 
against his treatment expressing “a hope that the Legislature would consider the condition 
of things which made it possible that twelve gentlemen all concerned extensively in 
business should be confined for fourteen days because a mistake had been made in the 
evidence as to a murder” (471).  The Chief Justice tries to placate the jury by reminding 
them of “the importance and glorious British nature of their position,” (471) at which 
point one of the jurymen interrupts to tell his story of hardship.  For a fortnight, the solo 
salesman has lost his business while serving as a juror.  Due to his financial sacrifice, he 
receives the sympathy of the courtroom.  In this manner, Phineas Redux differs from the 
other fictional legal narratives treated in this dissertation, as the jury is given a voice.  Yet 
the verdict in this text also differs from the other texts in the lack of suspense.  By the 
time Madame Goesler returns from Prague with the new evidence, it is apparent that 
Phineas has been wrongly accused.  Indeed, this turn of events is reflected in the verdict: 
“the jurymen put their heads together; and the foreman, without half a minute's delay, 
declared that they were unanimous, and that they found the prisoner Not Guilty” (475).  
In the wake of a simple verdict comes a narratorial aside: 
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And Phineas was discharged. According to the ordinary meaning of the 
words he was now to go about his business as he pleased, the law having 
no further need of his person. We can understand how in common cases 
the prisoner discharged on his acquittal,—who probably in nine cases out 
of ten is conscious of his own guilt,—may feel the sweetness of his 
freedom and enjoy his immunity from danger with a light heart. (476) 
Ultimately, Trollope is unable to instill full confidence in the power of the jury to issue 
just verdicts, as Phineas’s acquittal is cause to imagine all the previous acquittals of 
guilty prisoners.  This skepticism over the competency of the jury raises issues related to 
Trollope’s social vision, such as the definition of honesty in modern Victorian society 
and the epistemologies of knowledge.  Additionally, Trollope’s representation of the jury 
is central to his literary vision, as his negotiation of the role of finder of fact mirrors that 
of the jury’s weighing of fact and feeling. In balancing legal realism and legal 
imagination, Trollope navigates “the terrible meshes of the law.”  Through his 
examination of conflicting philosophies of law and the struggle between legal precedent 
and legal rhetoric, he writes the “law” of professional responsibility for Victorian 
lawyers.  
THE RETURN OF CHAFFANBRASS IN PHINEAS REDUX 
To close my discussion of Trollope’s fictional legal narratives, I would like to 
consider the evolution of the barrister Chaffanbrass from The Three Clerks to Phineas 
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Redux.  As in Orley Farm, Trollope’s depiction of Chaffanbrass’s attorney-client 
relationship raises the issue of professional responsibility for lawyers.  As in Lady 
Mason’s trial, the reader is told that Phineas Finn is not guilty of the murder he is on trial 
for; in this manner, the central legal question of the novel is not whether the character is 
guilty but rather, whether the court will provide a just verdict.  Phineas’s trial hinges on 
his character and the value of community justice.  According to Phineas, if he is a 
murderer in the eyes of the public then the jury can hardly punish him further through 
hanging.  In fact, most of the members of Parliament and some of Phineas’s friends 
believe him to be guilty of murder.  When Chaffanbrass visits Phineas at the gaol, the 
prisoner appeals to his counsel to “make men believe that [he is] innocent of this crime” 
(429).  Chaffanbrass assures him that he will make the jury believe in his innocence; 
however, Phineas protests against this outcome: “Comparatively I do not care a straw for 
the twelve men. It is not to them especially that I am anxious that you should address 
yourself” (430).  Significantly, Phineas admits that although he is trained as a lawyer, he 
“may not altogether understand the nature of an advocate’s duty to his client” (430).  This 
exchange is essential as a retort to critics who argue that Trollope does not understand the 
role of a lawyer and the scope of his duty to his client.  Trollope is suggesting that even a 
lawyer himself cannot fully appreciate the attorney-client relationship until he is placed in 
the position of the accused.  Only the accused can understand the impulse for a verdict 
that not only convinces the jury but also accomplishes some kind of moral acquittal under 
natural law philosophy.  Chaffanbrass is moved by the eloquence of Phineas in his 
request for a higher form of justice: 
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Here I am, and to-morrow I shall be tried for my life. My life will be 
nothing to me unless it can be made clear to all the world that I am 
innocent. I would be sooner hung for this, with the certainty at my heart 
that all England on the next day would ring with the assurance of my 
innocence, than be acquitted and afterwards be looked upon as a murderer. 
(432) 
Although Chaffanbrass is touched by the expressiveness of his client, he insists that the 
one goal is the acquittal by the jury, whereas Phineas continues to object —“The one 
object that I shall have before me is the verdict of the public” (434).  Rather than argue 
that Trollope lacks an understanding of the role of the advocate, Cathrine Frank reads 
Phineas’s arguments about public opinion as “bluff and bravura…the necessary fictions 
or roles that sustain his private subjectivity during his very public trial;” (41) however, it 
is more useful to see a conflicted Trollope wrestling with the tensions between natural 
law and positive law as evidenced in evolving theories of advocacy offered through the 
barrister Chaffanbrass.  In this way, Trollope writes the “law” of professional 
responsibility.  
Chaffanbrass expresses professional doubt over his defense of Phineas, not 
because of the evidence (he admits there really is nothing to connect Phineas with the 
murder) but because of the unpredictability of the jury: “But there is no saying nowadays 
what a jury will do. Juries depend a great deal more on the judge than they used to do. If I 
were on trial for my life, I don't think I'd have counsel at all” (426).  According to 
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Chaffanbrass, judges, not juries, control verdicts as “Jurymen are afraid of having their 
own opinion, and almost always shirk a verdict when they can” (426).  The result is 
“mealy-mouthed” verdicts that lack conviction, with the suggestion that a shift in the 
criminal law is to blame —“when forgery ceased to be capital” (426).  Instead of 
portraying Chaffanbrass in The Three Clerks as a vessel dispensing legal rhetoric, 
Trollope recognizes that the legal rhetoric of lawyers is premised on the idea that jury’s 
are active listeners ready to form an opinion, not shirking verdicts and submitting to the 
judge.   
Along these lines, Chaffanbrass’s utility is made apparent in his cross-
examination of Lord Fawn.  As a witness, Lord Fawn feels “in the clutches of the odious, 
dirty, little man, hating the little man, despising him because he was dirty, and nothing 
better than an Old Bailey barrister - and yet fearing him with so intense a fear!” (443).  
But Lord Fawn is a “bad witness” — he wishes to speak the truth, but his slowness and 
haughty demeanor “taught the jury to think he was anxious to convict the prisoner” (444).  
Unlike his senseless browbeating of Bolster in Orley Farm, Chaffanbrass’s browbeating 
in Phineas Redux tears through Lord Fawn’s pomposity to reveal the truth to the jury, 
suggesting that Trollope sees the utility in aggressive examination under certain 
circumstances.  Indeed, Chaffanbrass explains the art of courtroom rhetoric as being “just 
the trick of the trade that you learn, as a girl learns the notes of her piano. There's nothing 
in it. You forget it all the next hour. But when a man has been hung whom you have 
striven to save, you do remember that” (447).  Trollope continues to paint Chaffanbrass’s 
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craft in a sympathetic light, as his address to the jury includes “real unaffected tears” and 
at the end of his seven hour oration he is “taken home speechless by one of his daughters 
and immediately put to bed” (452).  Contemporary reviews swoon over Trollope’s new 
vision of Chaffanbrass: 
There are one or two touches of Mr. Trollope’s finest touches in the sketch 
of the skillful, dirty, old man, exerting all his powers to get Phineas Finn 
acquitted, while yet himself more than half convinced of his guilt…These 
new lights on the character of our old friend Mr. Chaffanbrass, whom in 
previous novels Mr. Trollope has certainly not delighted to honor, are 
touches of real genius. (Spectator, 3 Jan.1874, 378) 
Lacey supports this reading of the shift in Trollope’s portrayal of Chaffanbrass, arguing 
that the characterization of Chaffanbrass in Phineas Redux highlights the “ambivalence 
between lawyers as necessary and skilful professionals versus lawyers as hired assassins 
or meddlers with truth—masking a deep uncertainty about the role of professional 
representation in mid-Victorian Britain” (627).  Even if the portraits of lawyers in 
Phineas Redux are, as McMaster suggests, “more psychologically sophisticated,” (61) 
Trollope’s ambivalence towards lawyers remains strong.  What is most significant about 
the change in Chaffanbrass’s character from The Three Clerks to Phineas Redux is the 
evolution itself, for it indicates Trollope’s serious engagement with the ethics of 
professional responsibility and the development of his “law”.   
If Trollope’s fictional legal narratives offer a competing vision of “law,” then a 
final point for discussing the competing visions of law and literature as means for 
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achieving justice occurs in the trial scene of Phineas Redux, where Chaffanbrass 
questions the novelist Mr. Bouncer.  Chaffanbrass asks the writer about works of fiction 
whose plots include premeditated murders such as Hamlet (1603), Macbeth (1611) and 
Bulwer Lyton’s Eugene Aram (1832).  He cites these murders in literature to argue that 
murder without premeditation is unnatural: “thinking about it a long time! I rather think 
he was.  Those great masters of human nature, those men who knew the human heart, did 
not venture to describe a secret murder as coming from a man’s brain without 
premeditation” (440).   McMaster suggests that this scene resonates with Trollope’s own 
experience as a trial witness while working for the postal service.  In that trial, Trollope is 
cross-examined by Sir Isaac Butt, who pursues a line of inquiry regarding the author’s 
fictional lawyers in The Macdermots of Ballycloran (McMaster 58).  Beyond this 
biographical similarity, this scene serves as a reminder of fiction’s role as a vehicle for 
competing models of justice.  Bouncer concedes that he would not violate probability in a 
novel; in this way, the rules of fiction are brought into direct confrontation with legal 
rhetoric in the courtroom.  
This scene of obvious confrontation between law and literature works to 
emphasize the subtleties of the legal satire in the rest of Trollope’s oeuvre.  Trollope’s 
legal imagination includes his “law,” his juryman’s guide, his vision for legal reform and 
his representations of lawyers that act to fill the void of law pertaining to professional 
responsibility.  While his legal vision becomes more sympathetic and complex in the 
more than a decade between The Three Clerks and Phineas Redux, Trollope remains 
conflicted about the purpose and failings of the modern law, the role of the jury, and the 
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role of legal professionals in Victorian society.  Yet his negotiation as a “finder of fact” 
of legal realism and legal imagination is critical to appreciating the modernity and nuance 
of his artistry. Trollope’s “law” teaches us that we cannot let lawyers trust legal rhetoric 
over legal precedent just the same as we cannot let juries rely on the emotional responses 
to legal rhetoric over a careful analysis of the facts of the case.  In the midst of these 
teachings, Trollope is also trying to balance his own role as author of a fictional legal 
narrative, balancing his use of legal realism with his legal imagination.  To the extent that 
this tension for the author also represents a sort of fact versus feeling dichotomy, his 
narrative indicates an awareness of the challenges inherent to negotiating the conflicting 
philosophies of obtaining and narrating truth. 
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Chapter Four 
Dickens’s Juries and the Rhetoric of Law and Literature 
 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, there was a tension between 
Blackstone’s vision of the jury as the “palladium of English liberty” and the sense that 
jury verdicts were seen as fodder for ridicule by the Victorian press.  Dickens’s 
representation of the British jury shifts between these two poles, from ambivalence in The 
Pickwick Papers (1836-7) to a positive representation in A Tale of Two Cities (1859).  
This shift can be seen as Dickens’s response to the Victorian debate over the future of the 
jury, which reached a high point in the debates leading up to The Common Law 
Procedure Act of 1854.  By making civil jury trials optional in the superior courts, The 
Common Law Procedure Act of 1854 triggered a flurry of legal treatises calling for 
similar reforms to jury trials in criminal courts.  Dickens’s shifting representations of the 
jury offer a unique lens through which to understand not only his political and social 
vision but also his narrative style and characterization.  Representations of the jury in 
literature are significant as they raise questions about class tensions, democracy and the 
formation of the British identity.  In this way, Victorian authors create their own 
juryman’s guidebook to educate their readers, the potential jurors of England.   My 
analysis considers features of the jury, such as the jury’s role as “finder of fact,” the 
silence of the jury, and the lack of voir dire in England leading to truly random jury 
selection, to argue how these features matter in Dickens’s style and characterization—
Dickens as a “finder of fact” and theorizing silence, especially as related to the 
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significance of minor characters.  We should care about jury scenes in Dickens because 
they do more than just reflect tensions in Victorian society about class, democracy and 
British identity formation; representations of the jury offer an important and 
unconsidered perspective on Dickens’s literary vision. 
Trollope’s fictional legal narratives were written during a time when 
disillusionment with the jury was at a high point; however, Dickens’s representations of 
juries span a different historical time.  Dickens’s early legal fiction preceded the decline 
of the jury occurring in the second half of the nineteenth century.  Indeed, the two pieces 
of legislation instrumental in the decline of jury trials were enacted after the publication 
of The Pickwick Papers—the County Courts Act of 1846 and the Common Law 
Procedure Act in 1854.  The County Courts Act of 1846 standardized local courts, 
making juries in local courts optional.  Most litigants chose bench trials instead of trial by 
jury, fueling the fire for the argument of making jury trials optional in superior courts 
(Hanly 255).  Following the consent of the parties to the lawsuit, the Common Law 
Procedure Act of 1854 allowed superior court judges to decide issues of fact at their 
discretion.  Dickens’s representations of the jury in his novels in the second half of the 
nineteenth century act to instill confidence in communal processes.  Explanations for this 
shift implicate Dickens’s social and literary vision—his serious engagement with the law 
as “finder of fact” and his increased investment in the betterment of the common man as 
educator of the citizenry himself.    
In Chapters 2 and 3, I examined how Trollope’s representations of the jury are 
important to understanding both his social and literary vision.  Specifically, I focused on 
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the ways in which the silence surrounding the jury is more than an indication of legal 
realism; authors use this silence as a narrative technique.  In Dickens, the significance of 
narrative silence during the jury’s deliberations needs to be considered in conjunction 
with his use of minor characters. From Sam Weller to Madame Defarge, Dickens’s minor 
characters resonate with readers, sometimes overshadowing the protagonists.  In 
Dickens’s novels, the individual members of the jury are minor characters, but as a 
deciding body, the juries’ verdicts are a driving force of Dickens’s fictional legal plots.  
In The One vs. the Many, Alex Woloch discusses “the essential significance of Dickens’s 
distorted and exaggerated minor characters and the over-significance of minor characters 
within the novels….by examining how minor characters claim so much imaginative 
space within Dickens’s novels” (125).  Although Dickens’s minor characters claim a lot 
of imaginative space in his novels, the members of the jury are unseen, muted, and do not 
take up any space in the narrative.  Dickens deemphasizes the minor characters of the 
jury in his narrative so as to give his readers the opportunity to envision themselves as the 
jury.  
Much scholarly criticism has already been written on Dickens and the law, from 
Dickens’s lawyers and the melodrama of the trial to the ethics of Dickens’s 
representation of crime and his hopes for legal reform.  However, nothing has yet been 
written on Dickens’s juries applying a law and literature methodology.  Part of a law and 
literature methodology is to question why an author turns to the law when constructing 
narratives.  I’m going to address this question with a specific argument and then an 
analysis of a larger conversation that illuminates the hurdles of performing and 
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legitimizing interdisciplinary scholarship.  Specifically, this chapter continues the 
discussion of the previous chapters on the role of the jury in the Victorian novel.  Rather 
than revisiting the detailed portraits Dickens creates of lawyers which have received 
much critical attention, I am interested in analyzing the narrative strategies surrounding 
the jury in Dickens’s writing, which to date have not been properly treated by critics.   
To fully appreciate Dickens’s role as “finder of fact” balancing legal realism with 
literary authority, it is necessary to consider the afterlife of Dickens’s fictional legal 
narratives.  The second half of this chapter considers the rhetoric of law and literature in 
literary and legal criticism on Dickens.  Law and literature scholars find that scholarship 
on Dickens “exemplifies the Law and Literature agenda” (Petch qtd. in Dolin 288).  
There is a disconnect between how scholars of English literature understand the 
significance of the law in Dickens and how legal scholars view the importance of law in 
his works.  According to Jan-Melissa Schramm, a Professor of English, we cannot read 
Dickens’s Bleak House to receive an accurate picture of the law, because he exaggerated 
the ills of the legal system as necessary to serve his satirical aims so as to showcase “the 
heuristic power of fiction” (Schramm, “Dickens and the Law” 277).  Similarly, English 
Professor Jonathon Grossman argues that “Pickwick’s visits to the law offices and the 
court are less about legal reform than about the novel’s form and the establishment of the 
middle-class, professional author in the Victorian period” (172).  By contrast, law 
professors use Bleak House in law and literature seminars to teach legal history and 
ethics.  An analysis of the law and literature scholarship on Dickens’s fictional legal 
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narratives is an excellent point of departure to understand the agenda of this 
interdisciplinary study as well as gain insight into the rhetoric of law and literature.  
 
“THE WELL-BREAKFASTED JURYMAN”: A HUMOROUS APPROACH TO CULTURAL ANIXETY 
OVER THE JURY IN THE PICKWICK PAPERS 
 
The nineteenth-century debates surrounding the jury addressed in Chapter 1 
receive consideration in Dickens’s legal narratives, specifically The Pickwick Papers, 
Oliver Twist (1837), Bleak House (1853) and A Tale of Two Cities.  In The Pickwick 
Papers, Dickens’s representations of the jury are humorous, but at the same time reveal a 
cultural anxiety over the role of the jury as a non-empirical, communal process of 
obtaining justice.  The critical literature on law and The Pickwick Papers tends to focus 
on the lawyers, particularly Dodson and Fogg.  Indeed, Mrs. Bardell’s lawyers in The 
Pickwick Papers captured the public’s imagination so much so that a jury awarded 
damages to a solicitor against a client who called him “a regular Dodson & Fogg” (Fyfe 
44). Beyond the lawyers, Susan Shatto provides legal context for public civil 
disobedience at the time of Pickwick.  Writing on the scene in which Miss Witherfield 
alerts the magistrate that Pickwick and Magnus will duel, Shatto concludes that 
Dickens’s depiction of the duel is part of “the dark side” of legal history in The Pickwick 
Papers (152).   In this way we see that Dickens’s novel treats all aspects of legal 
proceedings inside and outside of the courtroom, including the role of the jury.   
Significantly, the chapter narrating Bardell v. Pickwick begins with a joke at the 
expense of the jury; Snodgrass and Perker instruct Pickwick on the importance of a 
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“well-breakfasted juryman” on the grounds that hungry jurymen always find for the 
plaintiff (398).  Perker explains the rationale behind this theory: 
If it’s near dinner-time, the foreman takes out his watch when the jury has 
retired, and says, “Dear me, gentlemen, ten minutes to five, I declare! I 
dine at five, gentlemen.” “So do I,” says everybody else, except two men 
who ought to have dined at three and seem more than half disposed to 
stand out in consequence.  The foreman smiles, and puts up his watch:—
“Well, gentlemen, what do we say, plaintiff or defendant, gentlemen? I 
rather think, so far as I am concerned, gentlemen,—I say, I rather think—
but don’t let that influence you—I rather think the plaintiff’s the man.”  
Upon this, two or three other men are sure to say that they think so too—
as of course they do; and then they get on very unanimously and 
comfortably. (399) 
Perker, by his exaggerated repetition of the word “gentlemen,” emphasizes how the jury 
members were not truly considered gentlemen.  The question of who could serve on a 
jury remained a contested issue throughout the Victorian period.  The Juries Act of 1825 
adjusted the property requirements to allow £10 freehold and £20 leaseholders to sit on 
juries.  Indeed, this relaxation of the property requirement allowed uneducated men to 
serve as jurors, while at the same time, many educated men such as clergy, lawyers, 
doctors, and military officers sought exemption from jury service (Clarke 11).  The true 
“gentlemen” were able to excuse themselves from jury duty.   Perker’s joke is a dismissal 
of not only the jury’s social standing but also the integrity of the jury as an instrument of 
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justice.  According to Perker, the jury cares little of justice—it can be easily swayed into 
a verdict depending on how hungry its members had become.  At the root of Perker’s 
gibe is the Victorian public’s anxiety about placing its trust in a jury of its fellow citizens.  
This episode from The Pickwick Papers also connects to conversations in legal treatises 
and the Victorian press about unanimity and the policy of withholding food from a jury 
until it has reached a decision.  As discussed in Chapter 1, the common practice of 
withholding of food from a jury until it issued a unanimous verdict was widely 
condemned in the Victorian press as a form of torture.    
In comparison to Trollope’s outrage over the starvation of jurors in The Three 
Clerks, Dickens’s representation of the jury may appear to be harmless jesting.  Yet 
humor is a narrative technique Dickens uses to assuage societal fears about the 
competency of the jury.   According to James Kincaid, Dickens’s humor in his early 
novels includes a serious social critique.  For example, Kincaid argues that humor in The 
Pickwick Papers acts “to reinforce the feeling of freedom and the opposition to order and 
bureaucratic sterility” (5).  In the courtroom scene, laughter causes the reader to feel 
empathy towards the jury and highlights the distinction between the flaws of the jury and 
the flaws of the lawyers.  The jury is represented as human, whereas the lawyers Dodson 
and Fogg manufacture sympathy through staged theatrics.  The Pickwick Papers is more 
than a comic novel and more than a scathing attack on the attorneys Dodson and Fogg; 
representations of the jury engage elements of the national character.  Mary Poovey 
discusses Dickens’s relationship to national character as not only defining to his readers 
what was common to all Englishmen but also the novels themselves being representative 
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of these “national” qualities (110).  In his fiction, Dickens acknowledges that 
“Englishness” is not easy to pinpoint, throwing the extent to which he can identify the 
“national” character into question.  Englishness is dynamic, as suggested by Catherine 
Hall’s definition of “Englishness” as not a “fixed identity but a series of contesting 
identities, a terrain of struggle as to what it means to be English.” (qtd in Clemm 110).  In 
this way, Dickens’s ambivalence over the competency of the jury reflects this grappling 
with British identity formation.   
Grossman argues that in the trial scene of The Pickwick Papers, “the only position 
that matters for Dickens is the lawyers’” (177).  As evidence, he cites Dickens’s cursory 
description of the jury’s place in the courtroom (Pickwick saying “And that…that’s 
where the jurymen, sit is it not?”) in comparison to the extensive descriptions of the 
lawyers.  As further proof of Dickens’s focus on the lawyers, Grossman notes that in his 
illustration Phiz leaves out the rest of the courtroom (Grossman 178).  I would argue that 
during the trial we are continuously reminded of the jury’s presence as a “black box” in 
the legal process.  For example, when Mr. Winkle enters the witness box, he bows to the 
judge.  The judge tells Winkle to “look at the jury” (404).  The judge’s direction reminds 
the reader that Dickens provides little description of the decision-making body.  As the 
jury is repeatedly referred to in the trial, Dickens’s withholding of a description of the 
jury itself enacts the public’s frustration over the mystery surrounding a jury’s 
deliberation.  The narrative silence of the members of the jury is accentuated because 
Dickens’s minor characters usually hold exaggerated force in his novels.  In this way, 
Dickens provides the narrative space for the reader to assume the role of juror. 
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Consistent with the idea of Dickens’s juries being important, ever present, yet 
simultaneously faceless and unknown, the first event which Dickens describes at 
Pickwick’s trial involves the jury.  After “a great deal of bawling,” only ten members of 
the jury were ready to be seated, prompting the counsel to “pray” to the judge to “award a 
tales” (400).  According to Holdsworth, to “award a tales” is to request that the court 
require bystanders (tales de circumstantibus) to provide the requisite number of persons 
on the jury.  In the seventeenth century, as long as one summoned member of the jury 
appeared the rest of the jurors could be tales-men.  In Pickwick’s case, a special jury has 
been summoned; therefore, as dictated in an Act of 1826, the tales-men could be taken 
from the common jury (Holdsworth 129).  In the nineteenth century, tales-men were 
called “guinea pigs” as they waited at the court to serve as jurors and earn a guinea.  As 
“finder of fact,” Dickens balances legal realism with legal imagination.  Here, the realism 
of invoking the tales allows Dickens the narrative space to exercise his legal imagination.  
Under the law, the crowd in a courtroom does have the potential to administer justice, 
and Dickens uses this law in the development of his fiction—this tradition accounts for 
the attention the crowd receives in Dickens’s fictional trials, especially A Tale of Two 
Cities. In this instance, Dickens’s technique of following legal procedure is not limiting 
but rather invites the element of randomness into his novels.  Randomness in Dickens has 
many forms, but as far as the jury goes, Dickens’s representation of the jury reminds us 
of its randomness.  In addition to the use of tales, the English jury, unlike the United 
States, has no process of voir dire.  Faith in the common man is inherent to faith in the 
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jury, and this faith resonates with Dickens’s literary vision of randomness—his reliance 
on a multitude of minor characters given a voice and placed in position of power. 
Dickens’s promotion of a common juror to membership on a special jury engages 
issues of class, for to serve on a special jury a rank of merchant, banker or esquire was 
typically required.  In this way, we begin to see how Dickens’s representations of the jury 
are an important part of understanding his social vision.  The social vision in Dickens’s 
early fiction was considered by Victorian critics to be less coherent than in later social 
novels.  For example, while Sketches by Boz (1836) includes the serious “A Visit to 
Newgate,” The Examiner reviewer found “the fault of the book to be the caricature of 
Cockneyism” (qtd. in Chittick 61).  In a similar manner to “A Visit to Newgate,” 
Dickens’s depiction of Pickwick’s stay at Fleet prison exposes the grim conditions for the 
poor in the penitentiary.   Beyond the conditions in prison, Dickens’s questioning of class 
distinction as arbitrary aligns with the sympathy for the common juror demonstrated 
throughout his fictional legal narratives.  In The Pickwick Papers, Dickens narrates the 
tale of the common juryman, a chemist, who tells the judge “there’ll be murder before 
this trial’s over” (401).  The chemist says this is due to the fact that he cannot afford to 
employ an assistant, and only an errand-boy is left in his shop, who believes “Epsom salts 
means oxalic acid; and syrup of senna, laudanum” (402).  This episode directly engages 
with the debate over whether jurors ought to be compensated for serving on juries, and as 
demonstrated in the newspaper accounts of Chapter 1, was part of the outcry over unjust 
conditions for the actual jurors in this “sacred” institution of the jury.  The judge in 
Pickwick’s trial does not sympathize with the chemist’s plight, but rather argues that the 
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chemist should be able to afford a competent assistant. If many of the treatises on the 
future of the jury in the Victorian period were authored by barristers in positions of 
privilege like Dickens’s fictional judge, then Dickens’s narrative of the jury offers the 
layman’s view to the nineteenth-century reading public.    
To return to the issue of juries as a “finder of fact,” Pickwick’s trial engages the 
issue of whether juries decide questions of fact based on fact or feeling.  Sergeant 
Buzfuz, attorney to Mrs. Bardell, uses legal rhetoric to appeal to the better natures of the 
jurymen—he calls the panel a group of “high-minded and intelligent” men, which 
prompts the jurymen to take “voluminous notes with the utmost eagerness” (403).  The 
issue of note taking by the jury was also a highly contentious one, because without notes, 
the jury allows the facts of the case to wash over them, and is more likely to make 
decisions based on instinctual feelings.  Historically, juries did not take notes.  If this 
custom emerged from a lack of education among the jury, then in the nineteenth century, 
Victorians, in the tradition of empiricism, explored ways to remove uncertainty from the 
jury’s deliberations.  For example, in The Juryman’s Guide (1845), Stephen suggests that 
jurors ought to write down the facts and never be satisfied without hearing every word 
from a witness’s mouth: “even a slight difference of emphasis may attach a very different 
meaning to the same words; nor is it infrequently the case that the witness himself, when 
he observes the attention with which his evidence is received by the jury, is recalled to 
accuracy and precision” (58). Stephen not only educates the jurors on the importance of 
obtaining an accurate representation of the facts but also charges the jurors with a 
responsibility for producing this precision in the witnesses.  In this way, scrutinizing the 
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jury’s method for arriving at a verdict reflects the Victorian societal anxiety over 
uncertainty and the unexplained, with note-taking as a means through which to combat 
the ambiguity the jury’s position as a “black box” engenders.  
The Pickwick Papers uses humor to confront societal anxiety over the 
competency of the jury to properly fulfill its appointed role.  In analyzing a note from 
Pickwick to Mrs. Bardell concerning a slow coach, Buzfuz makes a joke to the jury about 
Pickwick being a “criminally slow coach” whose speed will be “greased” by the jury 
(406).  Only the greengrocer smiles at Buzfuz’s joke, thereby raising the question of 
whether the attorney has the jury’s attention.  Unable to assess the jury’s attentiveness, 
and by implication its competence, Buzfuz narrates it to the courtroom, appealing to “an 
enlightened, a high-minded, a right-feeling, a conscientious, a dispassionate, a 
sympathizing, a contemplative jury of her civilized countrymen” (407).  When the jury 
retires to its private room to deliberate, the joke about hunger is reprised, as the judge 
also retires to his chambers, “to refresh himself with a mutton chop and a glass of sherry” 
(417).  The placement of this reference to the joke suggests that the withholding of food 
and drink has something to do with the return of the jury’s verdict in fifteen minutes.  
Quick verdicts likely produced anxiety in the Victorian public, for the assumption is that 
it should take time to reach unanimity among twelve people engaging in independent 
thought.   Through the use of humor, Dickens hints at the ridiculousness of placing 
twelve men in a room without food, drink or stipend, and expecting a long thoughtful 
deliberation.  In this way, the Pickwick trial anticipates what the legal treatises in the next 
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decade would argue.  For example, The Juryman’s Guide states the requirement of the 
consensus of twelve men to be “the very climax of absurdity” (G. Stephen 66).    
 The jury only deliberated for fifteen minutes, returning a verdict for the plaintiff 
with damages at seven hundred and fifty pounds.  The silence of the jury upon reaching a 
verdict is amplified by Dickens’s narrative style.  Known for his “fondness for 
superfluous detail,” “playful digression” and “flights of metaphorical fancy” (Dickens’s 
Style 11), Dickens’s narration at the issuance of the verdict against Pickwick is a 
departure from his narrative style:  
The jury then retired to their private room to talk the matter over, and the 
judge retired to his private room, to refresh himself with a mutton chop 
and a glass of sherry.  An anxious quarter of a hour elapsed; the jury came 
back; the judge was fetched in. Mr. Pickwick put on his spectacles, and 
gazed at the foreman with an agitated countenance and a quickly-beating 
heart. 
'Gentlemen,' said the individual in black, 'are you all agreed upon your 
verdict?'   
'We are,' replied the foreman. 
'Do you find for the plaintiff, gentlemen, or for the defendant?'  
'For the plaintiff.' 
'With what damages, gentlemen?' 
'Seven hundred and fifty pounds.' 
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Mr. Pickwick took off his spectacles, carefully wiped the glasses, folded 
them into their case, and put them in his pocket; then, having drawn on his 
gloves with great nicety, and stared at the foreman all the while, he 
mechanically followed Mr. Perker and the blue bag out of court. (412) 
 The characters in this scene are abstracted; the judge becomes “the individual in black.”  
After a detailed report of the judge’s charge to the jury, the narrative silence from the jury 
is more pronounced.  Dickens uses a tonal shift to demonstrate the difference between the 
spectacle of the lawyers and the silence of the jury.  If Dickens frustrates the reader’s 
attempts to visualize the jury as individual minor characters at the moment of the verdict, 
then in the moments after the verdict there is an emphasis on sight that brings out this 
lack of vision.  Through Pickwick’s act of staring at the foreman, Dickens uses the 
descriptive strategy of emphasizing sight to illuminate the cultural anxiety over the 
unknown authority of the jury.  The act of staring is empirical in its reliance on the 
senses, and in this way, exists in opposition to the non-empirical processes of the jury.  
Victorians wanted to gain information through the senses, through a faith in the empirical 
processes of observation.  To the extent the deliberations of the jury violated these rules, 
its place in modern society was under scrutiny.   
 The trial scene in The Pickwick Papers not only properly recounts legal procedure 
but also captures and broadcasts popular sentiments about the jury that grounded the 
debate over its future in the British justice system. Dickens’s depiction of the trial in 
Pickwick raises questions related to modernity, in the anxieties over the competency of 
the jury, and the influence of a lawyer’s rhetoric on the jury.   This reading goes against 
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the critical tradition regarding Dickens’s modernity.  According to Juliet John, “critical 
emphasis on Dickens’s modernity has tended to marginalize earlier texts like A Christmas 
Carol, The Pickwick Papers and The Old Curiosity Shop, in which idealism and 
sentimentality occlude anxieties about alienation and change”(8). If these texts are read 
as “Happy Dickens,” the later social novels are the darker, conflicted, even radical 
Dickens.  Using a law and literature methodology makes it difficult to draw a clear 
distinction between cheery Dickens and modern Dickens.  In The Pickwick Papers, 
Dickens demonstrates ambivalence in his depiction of the jury—the jury is 
simultaneously represented as a body of citizens to feel sympathy for and a body of 
citizens to ridicule.  In the decade following the publication of The Pickwick Papers, 
several biographical and historical factors help us understand the shift in Dickens’s 
representation of the jury to a positive one.  
 
THE “ATTENTIVE JURYMAN”: DICKENS’S EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP TO THE JURY AND 
REPRESENTATIONS OF THE JURY IN A TALE OF TWO CITIES 
 
The lightness in Dickens’s humorous approach towards the jury in The Pickwick 
Papers evolves into an interest in what the “attentive juryman” can accomplish in his 
later novels.  Many critics place Dickens’s interest in writing legal narratives in his 
biography.  For example, Sally Ledger, in analyzing Dickens’s experiences with the law 
argues that “although he detested and pilloried the Law, he was also magnetically drawn 
to it” (78).  At the age of fifteen, Dickens began an eighteen month apprenticeship in the 
office of Mr. Edward Blackmore, attorney-at-law in Gray’s Inn.  He also spent some time 
reading law at the Inns of Court and worked as a court reporter for the Court of Chancery. 
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In addition, Dickens’s friends, such as the prominent lawyers Talfourd, Denman, 
Campbell and Hawkins are credited with broadening Dickens’s understanding of the law 
(Fyfe 32).   
Dickens not only witnessed many trials and public executions but also was a 
plaintiff in a copyright suit over the printing of his own works.  Dickens's legal battle was 
over the pirated version of A Christmas Carol entitled "A Christmas Ghost Story Re-
originated from the original by Charles Dickens Esquire and analytically condensed 
expressly for this work" published on January 6 1844 in Parley's Illuminated Library.  
This publication had previously boasted reworded abridgements of The Old Curiosity 
Shop and Barnaby Rudge, but A Christmas Carol proved the last straw, as suggested by 
Dickens’s angry response: 
I have not the least doubt that if these Vagabonds [the publishers] can be 
stopped, they must be.  So let us go to work in such terrible earnest that 
everything must tumble down before it...get an immediate opinion from 
some man, learned in Injunction matters...if he be a man who has a taste 
for Literature besides, so much the better...If we could have a conversation 
with the Counsel, it would be well that I, who know the original book, 
should be present. (qtd. in Hancher 813)  
Not only is Dickens seeking an immediate injunction, he also frames the proceedings 
with some attention toward the aesthetic value of literature.  Dickens wants to be present 
to defend his work as the artist and he desires an attorney with an appreciation for 
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literature.  Dickens's request echoes Talfourd's speech before Parliament advocating for a 
better tribunal to hear literary copyright infringement claims "than judges who have 
passed their lives in the laborious study of the law, or jurors who are surrounded with the 
cares of business, and, except by accident, little acquainted with the subjects presented to 
them for decision" (15). In fact, Dickens obtained legal representation from his friend 
Talfourd and won an injunction in this lawsuit; however, he was unable to recover his 
costs from the infringers and ended up paying for the litigation out of his own pocket 
(Fyfe 22).   
These legal experiences may explain Dickens’s relationship with the law, but for 
the purposes of my argument, Dickens’s writings about his experience serving on a jury 
are most relevant.  “Some Recollections of Mortality,” Dickens’s essay that includes, 
among other things, his experience of serving on a coroner’s jury, appeared in All the 
Year Round in 1863 and was reprinted in the second series of The Uncommercial 
Traveller (1868). In this essay, Dickens writes that in 1839, soon after leasing a 
“frightfully first-class Family Mansion, involving awful responsibilities – I became the 
prey of a Beadle,” being summoned to serve on a coroner’s jury (196).  The case 
involved the question of whether a young mother had concealed the birth of her now 
deceased child or had actually killed the child.  In “Some Recollections of Mortality,” 
Dickens prides himself on asking questions of the witnesses during the inquest, and 
applauds the coroner for supporting his inquisitiveness.  The jury found the mother only 
guilty of the minor offense of concealing the birth, rather than infanticide.  In his account 
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of his service as a juror, Dickens does not describe the other members of the jury; rather, 
he describes sitting together “in a sort of boardroom, on such very large, square, horse-
hair chairs that I wondered what race of Patagonians they were made for” (197).  In his 
biography, the coroner had only good things to say about Dickens as a juror: “But 
Dickens as a judge of how the official should behave to the poor, and of how a popular 
court should be conducted, is ideally situated; and the man whom he has commended in 
such relations need not fear the judgment of posterity” (Carlton 68). Dickens was so 
moved by the young mother’s case that he retained counsel for her defense, with whose 
representation she received a lenient sentence. Dickens’s personal narrative demonstrates 
the potential influence of the jury and his investment in his civic duty. 
Although Dickens does not publish a non-fiction piece about his experiences 
serving on the jury in 1839 until 1863, there is a scene in Bleak House that recalls his 
own experience serving on the coroner’s jury.  The coroner’s investigation of the death of 
Nemo includes “the feeble-minded beadle [who] comes flitting about Chancery Lane 
with his summonses, in which every juror's name is wrongly spelt” (159).  In Bleak 
House, “an attentive juryman” questions the coroner’s decision to block Jo’s evidence 
from the investigation of Nemo’s death (162).  The “attentive juryman” echoes the role 
Dickens held on the coroner’s jury; yet, perhaps lacking Dickens’s influence, the 
attentive juryman’s concerns ultimately have no effect on the jury’s verdict.  Jo’s 
testimony is blocked, and with it, the coroner’s jury rules Nemo’s death accidental and 
goes to “hang about the Sol's Arms colloquially” (164).  Dickens emphasizes the frivolity 
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of the jury’s pursuits, despite the gravity of their duty: “half-a-dozen are caught up in a 
cloud of pipe-smoke that pervades the parlour of the Sol's Arms; two stroll to Hampstead; 
and four engage to go half-price to the play at night, and top up with oysters” (164).  In 
representing the collective energy of the jury in this manner, Dickens seems to leave open 
the potential for change a panel full of “attentive” jurymen could have if persuaded to not 
take their civic duty lightly.  
Consistent with the idea that the jury’s potential as an institution could be fully 
realized if only juries could be empanelled with “attentive” jurymen, the characters that 
disparage juries are not the heroes in Dickens’s writings.  For example, the narrator in 
Dickens’s “To be Taken with a Grain of Salt” denigrates the jury.  This ghost story, 
appearing in All The Year Round at Christmas 1865, is told from the perspective of a 
juror at a murder trial.  Upon receiving the jury summons for the Criminal Court at the 
Old Bailey, the narrator’s manservant is surprised as he believed “that class of Jurors 
were customarily chosen on a lower qualification” than the narrator’s, who is the head of 
a Department at a Bank branch (115).  Before being called to jury duty, the banker sees a 
phantom in his bedroom, who turns out to be the murder victim.  When all of the jurymen 
are sleeping together in one room, the banker again is visited by the murder victim, 
appearing as the thirteenth juryman. The narrator describes his fellow jurymen as 
“mischievous blockheads”: 
Among our number was a vestryman - the densest idiot I have ever seen at 
large - who met the plainest evidence with the most preposterous 
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objections, and who was sided with by two flabby parochial parasites; all 
the three empanelled from a district so delivered over to Fever that they 
ought to have been upon their own trial, for five hundred Murders. (115) 
This portrait of the jurymen’s incompetency might seem to negate my claims of 
Dickens’s faith in the “attentive juryman,” if not for the ambiguity surrounding Dickens’s 
supernatural tale.  The jury does not hear any evidence in this narrative; rather, the 
narrator’s knowledge of the prisoner’s guilt is based on his own visions of the phantom 
victim.  As the title of the story suggests, the reader is not intended to be persuaded that 
the narrator is not a madman.  
In another instance of the jury being disparaged by an unheroic character, in 
Oliver Twist, Fagin’s associate Toby Crackit is the one who says he is “as flat as a 
juryman” (244).  And Mr. Bumble, who also beats children, badmouths the jury: 
'Juries,' said Mr. Bumble, grasping his cane tightly, as was his wont when 
working into a passion: ‘juries is ineddicated, vulgar, grovelling wretch                 
‘So they are,’ said the undertaker.    
'They haven't no more philosophy nor political economy about 'em than 
that,' said the beadle, snapping his fingers contemptuously. 
‘No more they have,’ acquiesced the undertaker.                                                                          
'I despise 'em,' said the beadle, growing very red in the face. (21) 
Bumble’s diatribe against the jury is occasioned by his recalling serving on a coroner’s 
jury for a reduced tradesman, “who died in a doorway at midnight” (21).  The jury found 
that the tradesman died from exposure to the cold and want of the common necessaries of 
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life.  In addition, a special verdict suggesting that the relieving officer could have done 
more to save the man’s life is discussed, which Bumble dismisses as “all the nonsense 
that ignorant juryman talk” (21).  Again, Dickens alludes to the ideal of the “attentive 
juryman” that uses his civic duty to secure justice.   
As in Oliver Twist, it is the anti-heroic characters who criticize the jury in A Tale 
of Two Cities; yet, in Dickens’s novel of the French Revolution we find a comparative 
study of the jury in the English and French systems.  It is in this comparative study that 
Dickens draws out the Englishness of the Old Bailey trial.  As Catherine Hall argues, “it 
is the very assumptions about ‘others’ which define the nature of Englishness itself” (qtd. 
in Clemm 110).  Additionally, the question of what an “attentive juryman” can achieve is 
examined through an exploration of the crowd, the potential jurors of England.  Like the 
crowd, the jury is chosen at random and does not receive specialized training regarding 
how to perform jury service; therefore, the ways the crowd publicly weighs information 
to make decisions is revealing to what goes on in the black-box that is the deliberations of 
the jury.  If the jury exists as a “finder of fact,” then the question becomes how the jury 
arrives at its verdict.  Like Trollope, Dickens narrates the cultural anxiety over this issue 
by representing the citizens making decisions based on both fact and feeling.  Ultimately, 
the narrative silence at the verdict requires readers to enter their own narrative. 
Appearing in All the Year Round in April through November of 1859, A Tale of 
Two Cities received little attention from critics at its publication.  For example, The 
Athenaeum ran just a ten line review instead of its customary three or four columns (P. 
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Collins 433).  Carlyle and Wilkie Collins were among the defenders of the novel, as well 
as Dickens himself, claiming “I hope it is the best story I have written” (433).  According 
to Collins, the lukewarm response to A Tale of Two Cities may be attributed to the 
unpopularity of Dickens’s previous works Little Dorritt and Hard Times.  Collins also 
cites the experimental nature of the novel with its historical plot and lack of humor as 
contributing to its cool reception (433).  A Tale of Two Cities continues to receive little 
critical treatment today relative to Dickens’s other works that are popular in the 
classroom.  What is especially surprising is that it is nearly ignored by law and literature 
scholars, despite the presence of its four trial scenes.  An exception is an article by Simon 
Petch, who reads A Tale of Two Cities as a comparative analysis between French and 
English cultures of professionalism (36).  In Dickens and the Law, Robert Coles notes 
that “we sometimes forget” Sydney Carton is a lawyer (575).   Alexander Fyfe concurs, 
arguing that we forget Carton is a lawyer “because the interest which centers round him 
does not move on the legal plane” (Fyfe 77).  The characterization in A Tale of Two 
Cities is unlike that of Dickens’s other works, so we do not receive the detailed portraits 
of lawyers like we do of Jaggers or Tulkinghorn.  Coles argues that “unlike Bleak House 
or Great Expectations, this novel does not directly approach the law as a profession.” 
Indeed, Coles calls the law “a footnote” in A Tale of Two Cities (578).  Coles’s analysis 
betrays the tendency of lawyers to equate the law with the depiction of lawyers in fiction.  
Of course, beyond lawyers, the judges and the jury are essential parts of the legal system.  
Rather than a footnote, the trials in Dickens’s historical novel warrant attention as a 
comparative study and demonstrate his position as a “finder of fact.” 
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Dickens’s negotiation of the dual aims of fact and imagination are reflected in the 
criticism on A Tale of Two Cities.  From the novel’s opening sentence, there is a tendency 
by readers to consider how juxtapositions will shape the narrative, but rather than 
grounding the reader historically, the first paragraph emphasizes imagination over reality.  
John Kucich notes that the opening catalog “comments more on the needs of the 
historical imagination . . . than on the actual tenor of any particular age” (qtd. in Griffiths 
814).  In fact, much critical work devotes attention to how Dickens’s experimental 
historical novel lacks historical detail.  Although the doubling of character and plot has 
been discussed extensively, less attention has been given to the way Dickens sets up a 
comparative history between the British and French legal systems.  Devin Griffiths 
argues that “the historical imagination projected by A Tale of Two Cities was profoundly 
modern in its commitment to a new comparative history, a method of historical inquiry 
that replaced both the liberal progressive thesis of Whig history and the stadial histories 
of the Scottish Enlightenment with a mixed understanding of the differential and 
contingent forces of historical change, as demonstrated through comparison across 
historical periods and between national cultures” (813).  My analysis considers how 
Dickens’s comparative historical strategies highlight the differences between the English 
and French juries.  According to Ledger, Dickens’s comparative look at the Old Bailey 
trial and the French Revolutionary Tribunal reveal the inability of either system to secure 
justice (82).  While I would agree Dickens highlights the flaws in both justice systems, 
his depiction of Darnay’s acquittal at the Old Bailey encourages his readers to place their 
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confidence in the British institution of the jury, especially in comparison with the French 
system.   
The reader experiences the first and only British trial in A Tale of Two Cities, of 
Charles Darnay for treason, through the perspective of the grave robber Mr. Cruncher.  
As illuminated by the trial scene in The Pickwick Papers, if a member of the jury does 
not appear, the court can require bystanders to hear the case in the absent jurors’ place as 
tales-men.  As a member of the crowd, Cruncher is part of the imagined jury and an 
“attentive juryman”; yet, Cruncher would not meet the property or income requirements 
necessary to qualify as a tales man.  In this manner, Dickens as “finder of fact” balances 
legal realism and legal imagination; his fiction calls us to imagine a more democratic 
standard for jury qualification.  Embodying the ideals of an “attentive juryman,” 
Cruncher asks an unidentified man in the crowd at the Old Bailey about the treason case 
at hand.  The man explains “the sentence” in all its gruesome detail, at which point 
Cruncher questions whether this is “the sentence” since the prisoner has not yet stood 
trial.  Through the eyes of Mr. Cruncher, Dickens argues that society does not need to 
fear decisions being made by jurors based on feeling rather than fact.  Dickens gives 
Cruncher’s opinion on the state of the law’s credibility through an exchange between 
Cruncher and an ancient law clerk over the merits of quartering those found guilty of 
treason (58).  Cruncher’s instinct is that quartering is “barbarous”; the clerk responds by 
stating the fact—that “it is the law.” Cruncher’s reliance on feeling embodies a stronger 
sense of justice than the empirical thought of the law clerk.   
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In addition to examining the tension between empirical and non-empirical modes 
of understanding, Dickens also distinguishes between the emotional force of a crowd and 
the feelings of an individual.  If the “attentive juryman” can save the institution of the 
jury, then the collective jury is what is jeopardizing its future.  For example, unanimity 
requirements result in a lack of individual decision-making and weighing of evidence.  
Dickens cautions against the dangers of the crowd mentality in A Tale of Two Cities:    
The sort of interest with which this man was stared and breathed at, was 
not a sort that elevated humanity.  Had he stood in peril of a less horrible 
sentence—had there been a chance of any one of its savage details being 
spared—by just so much would he have lost in his fascination…Whatever 
gloss the various spectators put upon the interest, according to their 
several arts and powers of self-deceit, the interest was, at the root of it, 
Ogreish. (69) 
The crowd of spectators is also represented as animalistic: “a buzz arose in the court as if 
a cloud of great blue-flies were swarming about the prisoner, in anticipation of what he 
was soon to become” (70).  Indeed, Dickens suggests that there is something contagious 
about being a spectator at a trial.  For example, Miss Manette’s anxiety while giving 
testimony at Darnay’s trial is reflected in faces of the spectators in the courtroom:  
Any strongly marked expression of face on the part of a chief actor in a 
scene of great interest to whom many eyes are directed, will be 
unconsciously imitated by the spectators…Among the lookers-on there 
was the same expression in all quarters of the court; insomuch, that a great 
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majority of the foreheads there, might have been mirrors reflecting the 
witness. (72) 
Dickens’s concern for the moral welfare of the citizenry, as an “ogreish” interest 
in Darnay’s trial clouds judgment and good reason, directly impacts our understanding of 
the imagined jury.  This view is supported by Patrick Brantlinger who views the “rhetoric 
of toxicity” in Dickens as part of the cultural conversation over the ways in which 
criminal mentality gets spread (qtd. in Schramm 286).  As Brantlinger suggests, through 
The Pickwick Papers Dickens emerged as “the superstar of the Victorian novel-reading 
public” (13).  With this reading public came responsibility for the authors of fictional 
legal narratives, which converged over the debate of whether crime fiction deterred or 
encouraged criminal behavior.  The confession of the valet in the Courvoisier trial that 
reading Jack Sheppard (1839-40) had inspired him to slash his master’s throat provided 
some support for those who argued that crime fiction negatively affected public behavior 
(Brantlinger 72).  Dickens famously defended himself in the 1841 preface to Oliver 
Twist, arguing that depicting thieves “in all their deformity, in all their wretchedness, in 
all the squalid poverty of their lives…would be a service to society” (qtd. in Brantlinger 
75).  Brantlinger is skeptical of Dickens’s defense, explaining that representations of 
crime always run the risk of being misunderstood.  The debate over the ethics of 
representing crime in fiction translates to the ethics of representing the jury.  There is a 
danger to questioning the abilities of the jury to make just decisions and I would argue 
that Dickens’s increasingly positive representations of the jury from The Pickwick Papers 
to A Tale of Two Cities reflect an awareness of this risk.   
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As in Oliver Twist, the denigration of the jury as an institution in A Tale of Two 
Cities comes from characters that Dickens portrays in a negative light.  For example, the 
prosecution of Darnay begins with the image that “Mr. Attorney-General rose to spin the 
rope, grind the axe, and hammer the nails into the scaffold” (64).  The Attorney-General 
addresses the jury through a shaming process:  
That, Virtue, as had been observed by the poets (in many passages which 
he well knew the jury would have, word for word, at the tips of their 
tongues; whereat the jury’s countenances displayed a guilty consciousness 
that they knew nothing about the passages), was in a manner contagious; 
more especially the bright virtue known as patriotism, or love of country. 
(65) 
The Attorney-General cites patriotism in the same breath that he shows scorn for his 
fellow Englishmen.  In A Tale of Two Cities, patriotism as a motive for civic virtue is 
tainted, as both of the witnesses against Darnay have checkered records of debt, theft, and 
violence yet consider themselves “true Britons.” Even so, the Attorney-General’s 
rhetorical strategy of belittling the jury’s education engages with the debates over the 
necessary education of a juror discussed in Chapter 1.  Dickens approaches the question 
of the measure of “judicial wisdom” expected for a common law juror through the 
Attorney-General’s address: “That, for these reasons, the jury, being a loyal jury (as he 
knew they were), and being a responsible jury (as they knew they were), must positively 
find the prisoner Guilty, and make an end of him, whether they liked it or not” (66). The 
parenthetical statements emphasize the presence of a faceless, voiceless jury that the 
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narrator refers to as “they.” The jury only has an identity as a collective, since only the 
final verdict matters and the opinions of each of its constituent members are irrelevant.  
Dickens demonstrates the conflict between the jury as a revered institution, relevant to 
the question of what it means to be British, and the way the jury serves as an object of 
ridicule.  It is not surprising that other than the Attorney-General, the character that 
disparages Darnay’s British jury is Sydney Carton.   Even Mr. Cruncher remarks on 
Carton’s incompetency as a lawyer at this early juncture in the novel: “I’d hold half a 
guinea that he don’t get no law-work to do.  Don’t look like the sort of one to get any, do 
he?” (76) Upon visiting Darnay after the trial, “the old seesaw Sydney” calls the jury 
“numskulls” (82).   
Despite this questioning by Carton and the Attorney-General of the jury’s 
competence, the British jury as depicted in A Tale of Two Cities is a model one in several 
ways.  First, the jury was not unanimous and wished to retire to discuss the verdict.  In 
Chapter 1, I addressed the debate over the unanimity requirement for jurors, as critics 
argued the pressures of reaching a consensus produced unjust, ill-considered verdicts.  If 
in The Pickwick Papers the jury’s return of a verdict in fifteen minutes suggests a hurry 
to get to dinner, in A Tale of Two Cities Dickens imagines an engaged jury.  Another way 
in which Dickens’s narrative shows the jury in a positive light is through the judge’s 
reaction to the jury’s decision to deliberate: “[the judge] showed some surprise that they 
were not agreed, but signified his pleasure that they should retire under watch and ward, 
and retired himself” (76).  In this way, Dickens depicts the jury as acting independently 
of the judge’s influence.  This is significant because Victorian opponents of trial by jury 
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argued that juries should be abolished because the jurors did not actually decide anything, 
but rather, followed whatever the judge instructed them to decide anyway.  The English 
jury’s decision to deliberate in A Tale of Two Cities provokes a reaction from the crowd:  
“it began to be rumoured that the jury would be out a long while.  The spectators dropped 
off to get refreshment” (76).  In The Pickwick Papers, Perker warns Pickwick about the 
dangers of a hungry jury and the issue reemerges here in 1859, when the crowd fuels its 
rage with “mutton pies and ale” while the jury decides the fate of a man without 
refreshment.  Darnay’s jury returns after ninety minutes, suggesting that some discussion 
between jurors took place rather than a quick unconsidered verdict.  The duration of the 
jury’s deliberations is short compared to some highly publicized cases in nineteenth-
century Britain, but an improvement over the fifteen minute deliberation during 
Pickwick’s trial. 
Dickens’s narrative calls readers to ask how do we separate the “orgreish” crowd 
from the jury of twelve men we entrust to achieve justice? In England, the jury is not part 
of the “buzz” of “great blue-flies” but rather exists independently as a decision-making 
body.  Dickens’s narrative strategy reflects the rhetorical imbalance of the trial; in A Tale 
of Two Cities the reader is privy to all of the lawyers’ argumentation and none of the 
jury’s deliberations other than a hastily written note with the word “AQUITTED” (78).  
Cruncher is unable to get back into the courtroom, so the jury verdict itself is not part of 
Dickens’s narration. This narrative silence distinguishes what happens in the crowd from 
what happens in the jury room.  Throughout the courtroom scene, the reader shares the 
perspective of a spectator; however, at the reading of the verdict the reader is not a 
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spectator.  In so far as this narrative technique distances the reader from the crowd, it 
offers a moral education.   
Critics are divided on the trajectory of Dickens’s social vision.  Some argue that 
he became more conservative by the time of his writing of A Tale of Two Cities while 
others find his later work to embody the radical Dickens. My evidence of Dickens’s 
representations of the jury aligns with readings that his social vision deepened over time, 
as suggested by the shift from ambivalence in The Pickwick Papers to a positive 
representation in A Tale of Two Cities.  The English jury’s acquittal of Darnay on the 
charges of treason serve as a model, suggesting Dickens’s optimism for future English 
juries to issue just verdicts.  Hilary Schor argues that A Tale of Two Cities cannot be 
imagined to have “the immediate reformist impulses” of Dickens’s other social novels of 
the 1850s—Bleak House, Hard Times (1854) and Little Dorrit (1855) (71).  In contrast to 
Schor, Ledger clarifies how A Tale of Two Cities fits into Dickens’s mid-century social 
agenda, arguing that Darnay’s acquittal in his treason trial in England “is Dickens to a 
certain extent superimposing his mid-century reformist vision of the legal process onto a 
harsher eighteenth-century legal regime that he would like to purge” (90).  I agree that 
Darnay’s acquittal is more than a plot necessity; Dickens’s novel builds confidence in the 
jury’s ability to reach a just verdict at a point in history where public perception of the 
competence of the jury was low.  Dickens’s representations of the jury engage questions 
of class and education, as well as the tensions between fact and feeling, while 
maintaining faith in the ideal of the “attentive juryman.”    
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Despite the crowd’s “ogreish” nature, the English jury exists independently of the 
both the judge and the crowd as evidenced by its acquittal of Darnay, whereas the 
Revolutionary Tribunal represents the absence of a separate and independent decision-
making body of jurors.  Darnay’s second trial in France differs in many ways from the 
British trial.  While the absence of lawyers at the Revolutionary Tribunal may be the 
most obvious difference between the two proceedings, the interplay between the jury and 
the crowd is the more interesting point of distinction.  During the testimony accusing 
Darnay of being an emigrant, “the Jury and the populace became one” (297).  Dickens 
notes that “at every vote (the Jurymen voted aloud and individually), the populace set up 
a shout of applause” (297). The sanctity of the British institution of the jury is based in 
the privacy of its operation; no one is privy to the jury’s deliberations.  In this manner, A 
Tale of Two Cities can be read as a tribute to the preservation of the independence of the 
British jury.  This lack of distinction between the jury and the mob becomes more 
apparent during the third trial after Darnay is reaccused: 
Every eye was turned to the jury. The same determined patriots and good 
republicans as yesterday and the day before, and to-morrow and the day 
after. Eager and prominent among them, one man with a craving face, and 
his fingers perpetually hovering about his lips, whose appearance gave 
great satisfaction to the spectators. A life-thirsting, cannibal-looking, 
bloody-minded juryman, the Jacques Three of St. Antoine. The whole 
jury, as a jury of dogs empanelled to try the deer. (329) 
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It is significant that a French juror is actually identified by name, whereas the members of 
the British jury remain faceless, unknown and anonymous.  Along these lines, Madame 
DeFarge tells of how she investigates Dr. Mannete’s cell with a fellow-citizen who is a 
member of the jury.  Dickens also describes the mannerisms of a juryman, “the craving 
man on the jury rubbed his hands together, and restored the usual hand to his mouth,” 
(330) which emphasizes his presence as an individual character in the novel, not his part 
in an official, unbiased panel.  To return to my argument about minor characters, the 
imaginative space that the members of the French jury occupy in A Tale of Two Cities 
emphasizes the lack of space for Dickens’s readers.  Here, Dickens emphasizes that 
before “that unjust Tribunal, there was little or no order of procedure, ensuring to any 
accused person any reasonable hearing” (329).  In this comparative history, Dickens 
depicts England as having some procedural safeguards to ensure fairness in its trial 
process so that trial by jury did not devolve to an animalistic hunt for blood.  The 
fickleness of the French crowd, inseparable from the jury, drives a dangerous tide toward 
violence: “At every juryman's vote, there was a roar. Another and another. Roar and roar” 
(333).  One popular reading of A Tale of Two Cities is as a cautionary tale against what 
could happen if the corrupt legal system of mid-nineteenth century England did not 
undergo reform; yet, I would also suggest that the novel presents a narration against 
proposed reforms to abolish the use of the jury.  The British crowd at the Old Bailey 
might be dangerous and in need of a moral education; however, Dickens’s vision for an 
ideal jury is one that makes decisions independently of the crowd and the judge.    
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DICKENS AS FINDER OF FACT AND THE AFTERLIFE OF DICKENS’ FICTIONAL LEGAL 
NARRATIVES 
The simultaneous influences of feeling and fact in the jury’s role as “finder of 
fact” are mirrored in a Victorian novelist’s position as “finder of fact” in the novel.  In 
chapters 2 and 3, I discussed how Trollope’s role as “finder of fact” compelled him to 
strike a balance between his goals of legal realism (“fact”) and his literary vision 
(“feeling or imagination”).  In writing fictional legal narratives, Dickens negotiates a 
similar balance between fact and feeling.  As in Trollope, Dickens’s attempts at legal 
realism invite attacks from practicing lawyers concerning inaccuracies on points of law 
and legal procedure.  The legal historian and attorney James Fitzjames Stephen, criticizes 
Dickens for his irresponsible use of law in his novels:  
A popular novelist may produce more disaffection and discontent than a 
whole army of pamphleteers and public orators, because he wears the cap 
and bells, and laughs in your face when you contradict him.  A novelist 
has no responsibility. He can always discover his own meaning.  To the 
world at large, Jarndyce v. Jarndyce represents the Court of Chancery.  To 
anyone who taxes the writer with unfairness, it is merely, he is told, a 
playful exaggeration. ("Mr Dickens as a Politician" 359)  
What angers Stephen about the way in which Dickens can produce a legally realistic 
depiction of Chancery while at the same time being at liberty to exercise his imagination 
is that “the world at large” does not know the difference.   
 168 
Stephen also wrote a “celebrated trashing” of A Tale of Two Cities (Petch 40).  
Stephen argues that Darnay’s trial for treason is modeled on the trial of a French spy 
called De la Motte.  Appearing in the State Trials in 1780, De la Motte’s trial also 
included a principal witness who was of bad character.  What infuriates Stephen is that “it 
would be perfectly impossible to imagine a fairer trial than De la Motte’s, or stronger 
evidence than that on which he was convicted”(45).  According to Stephen, all of the 
melodramatic elements the reader finds in Darnay’s Old Bailey trial are disgraceful 
embellishments.  It is difficult to discern why Stephen cannot afford Dickens any 
authorial discretion in his reimagining of the trial.  Stephen condemns Dickens for his 
vagueness and lack of legal knowledge, while at the same time insisting that Dickens’s 
fictional legal case adheres closely to a State Trials transcript, indicating some degree of 
research by Dickens.  Stephen argues that in Darnay’s English treason trial, Dickens 
“does his best to show how utterly corrupt and unfair everybody was who took part in the 
proceedings” (46).  In his assessment of the players in the courtroom, Stephen makes no 
mention of the jury that Dickens depicts as securing justice for Darnay.  
Stephen’s criticism was not the first occasion that Dickens's legal narratives had 
been attacked as irresponsible; he had already experienced similar criticism for an article 
in Household Words entitled "The Martyrs of Chancery" (1850).  In this essay, Dickens 
depicts the fate of a Chancery prisoner as worse than a criminal convict, because the 
Chancery prisoner never knows when he will be released: "he may, and he frequently 
does, waste a lifetime in the walls of a gaol, whither he was sent in innocence; because, 
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perchance, he had the ill-luck to be one of the next of kin of some testator who made a 
will which no one could comprehend, or the heir of some intestate who made none" 
("The Martyrs of Chancery" 2: 250).  Dickens explains that if the party does not defend a 
Chancery suit or pay the costs he in thrown in gaol for "contempt" ("The Martyrs of 
Chancery" 2: 251).  He goes on to profile several prisoners who have been held without 
review for decades; for example, one man appealed an order and waited seventeen years 
for the order to be heard and then reversed because of a mistake.  According to 
Holdsworth, Sir Edward Sugden "had no difficulty in showing that particular abuse was 
then a thing of the past" (81).   
 Holdsworth references a letter to the Times in January 1851, in which Sugden 
explains that the prisoner held by mistake, to which Dickens referred, had been purged of 
his contempt fourteen years ago and his detention was related to a debt which had 
nothing to do with Chancery (Atlay 36).  Sugden also assured Dickens that his own Act 
required that prisoners be visited at the gaol by a Master to learn of remedies and 
applications for release.  In a published response, Dickens indicated that Sugden's 
procedure was not being carried out in practice.  In this manner, Sugden accuses Dickens 
of creating "imaginary" martyrs, while Dickens counters by accusing Sugden of 
promoting a law which in practice was not implemented.  That Dickens's work received a 
response from a high official like Sugden illustrates the potential the author had to shape 
Victorian law.  Dickens resented Stephen’s line of attack and made efforts to broadcast 
his legal accuracy and adherence to fact. At the same time, Sugden's criticism of 
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Dickens's reliance on ex parte sob stories may have induced Dickens to ground his satire 
in Bleak House in authoritative fact.       
 In the Preface to the First Edition, Dickens asserts that "everything set forth in 
these pages concerning the Court of Chancery is substantially true, and within the truth" 
(5). He specifically cites the case of Gridley as one "made public by a disinterested 
person who was professionally acquainted with the whole of the monstrous wrong from 
beginning to end" (5).  This reference is to William Challinor, author of the legal 
pamphlet The Court of Chancery: Its Inherent Defects, By a Solicitor (Letters 6: 623).  In 
a letter to Challinor, dated March 11 1852, Dickens acknowledges the receipt of the 
lawyer's pamphlet (Letters 6: 623).  If the estate in Jarndyce and Jarndyce is absorbed in 
costs causing the suit to "lapse and melt away," then Gridley's case sees a similar end: 
"my whole estate, left to me in that will of my father's, has gone in costs" (250).  
Gridley's case allows Dickens to revisit the issues he raised in "The Martyrs of 
Chancery."  For example, Gridley explains that he has been "in prison for contempt of 
Court" (252).  One could argue that using a case from a solicitor offered Dickens a layer 
of protection unavailable in "Martyrs of Chancery," for which he used stories related by 
prisoners.  Challinor quotes John Forster's The Life of Charles Dickens in illustrating his 
pamphlet's impact on Bleak House: "Dickens was encouraged and strengthened in his 
design of assailing Chancery abuses and delays by receiving, a few days after the 
appearance of his first number, a striking pamphlet on the subject containing details so 
apposite that he took from them, without change in any material point, the memorable 
case related in his fifteenth chapter" (qtd. in Challinor 243).   
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 In Bleak House, Dickens stays faithful to the "material points" of the attorney's 
case, including the three hundred pound legacy, the seventeen defendants (with one being 
left out) and the legal costs equal to three times the legacy.  Where Dickens departs from 
Challinor's pamphlet is in the defendant's response to the situation.  Challinor ends his 
description of the facts of the case with a discussion of legal procedure.  The Plaintiff's 
solicitor lends Challinor a copy of the supplemental bill (which includes all of the prior 
proceedings before the discovery of the missing defendant) so he may file his client's 
answer; wherein, Challinor learns that his client must pay for an office copy of the bill 
before putting in his answer (206).   By contrast, Dickens leads Gridley to "accuse the 
individual works of [Chancery]" for which he goes to prison for contempt of Court and 
threatening a solicitor (252).  In this manner, Dickens uses Challinor's facts to generate 
his fiction and return to the issues that troubled him upon writing "The Martyrs of 
Chancery."   
Early criticism on Pickwick and the law from attorneys tends to the extremes of 
either glowing praise or scathing condemnation, depending on the extent to which the 
author finds Dickens’s representation of the law to be accurate.  Lecturing on Pickwick 
and the law in 1893, Frank Lockwood, a barrister and Member of Parliament, describes 
turning to Dickens for a respite from the critics of the legal profession:   
Being reminded, as I was, that the subject of the law was unpopular, I 
turned—as I have often done in the hour of trouble—I turned to my 
Dickens, and there I found that at any rate in Dickens we have a great 
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literary man who has been impartial in his treatment of lawyers.  He has 
seen both the good and the bad in them. (12) 
Lockwood presents a catalog of Dickens’s lawyers in Pickwick, concluding that he is 
“grateful” for the “fair and impartial consideration” of his profession (12).  Ultimately, 
Lockwood urges the public to be grateful for Dickens, whom he credits with ushering in 
legal reform.   
By contrast, an attack alleging unforgiveable legal inaccuracy appears in 1890 in 
The Cornhill Magazine, wherein the author attempts to clear the names of Dodson and 
Fogg, Bardell’s attorneys in The Pickwick Papers.  The anonymous author appears to be 
an attorney or otherwise associated with the legal profession, as the article discusses the 
ways in which “critics complain that quality of our mercy is strained” when taking on 
clients in Mrs. Bardell’s position (“In The Matter of Dodson and Fogg, Gentlemen,” 
149). The author goes through every claim in Mr. Pickwick’s case and finds the novel’s 
indictment of Dodson and Fogg to rest on a “medley of inconclusive facts and 
unsupported assertions” (152).  The author reads the case against Dodson and Fogg as 
serious and acts as though a defense of the lawyers is necessary: “It says little for his 
readers’ sagacity that he should have obtained so general a concurrence in his views; it 
says as little for their chivalry that no one has attempted a defense of the men he assailed” 
(152). Indeed, the early criticism of Dickens by lawyers seems to be generated from 
strong, personal emotions arising from anxieties stemming from the debate over the 
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ethics of legal advocacy.  As discussed in Chapter 3, one can connect these anxieties to 
the concurrent rise in the professionalization of the legal field. 
Beyond criticism by Victorian commentators, I am interested in analyzing the 
afterlife of Dickens in the legal community during the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries.  The ways in which lawyers read Dickens over time shed light on the rhetoric 
of law and literature.  Law Professor Jane Baron provides a definition for the rhetoric of 
law and literature: 
The large claims about literature’s importance for law have a structure: 
“unlike law,” the arguments go, “literature does this or that (humanizes, 
sensitizes, etc.)” or, reversed, “like literature, law has this or that attribute 
(textuality, conventions, etc.) In asserting likenesses and unlikenesses, 
these formulations assume and rhetorically construct a separation of 
domains, a separation that I see as problematic and under-analyzed. (2275) 
Applying Baron’s theory to the scholarship of Dickens and the law, I would argue a 
starting point for disciplinary blindness comes when literature scholars try to answer the 
question of why Dickens wrote fictional legal narratives.  Literary critics tend to explain 
Dickens’s interest in the law through biography, noting that he was involved in legal 
cases and rejected the law as a profession. Yet, focusing on Dickens’s involvement and 
subsequent rejection of the legal profession appears to be a superficial analysis caused by 
disciplinary blindness—it is as if the critic is saying Dickens found the law to be dry and 
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literature to be human.  Framing Dickens’s interest in this way only feeds into modern 
stereotypes about the law’s soullessness and does not explain his fascination with the 
intricacies of legal procedure.     
Criticism by lawyers writing in the early to mid twentieth century on Dickens 
runs the gamut with respect to the commentators’ opinions of the accuracy and quality of 
Dickens’s depiction of the law and lawyers. John Marshall Gest, in an address to law 
students at the University of Pennsylvania in 1905 informs them “Now, you may learn a 
great deal of law in a very agreeable way by reading novels” (402).  He instructs law 
students to not only read Bardell v. Pickwick but also the trials in A Tale of Two Cities, 
the trials of the Artful Dodger and of Fagin in Oliver Twist, Kit’s trial at the Old Bailey in 
the Old Curiosity Shop, and the death sentence of Magwitch in Great Expectations (Gest 
426).  Gest is one of many legal scholars who catalogs the legal professionals in Dickens, 
identifying each and every barrister, solicitor and law clerk. This technique of presenting 
an exhaustive catalog of all of the legal characters not only arouses strong emotions in the 
commentator but also leaves the commentator with a strong impression of Dickens’s 
overarching feelings towards lawyers.  For example, Robert Donald Neely, upon 
cataloging Dickens’s lawyers, sees Dickens’s condemning of the legal profession: “his 
contact with the legal profession and the courts evidently engendered in him an intense 
hatred for the whole bar—few of his lawyers are any credit to the profession” (10).  
Thomas Alexander Fyfe, in Charles Dickens and the Law (1910) views the 
relationship between the fictional legal narrative and the lawyer as providing 
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entertainment to the public: “It has often struck me that some young lawyer with time on 
his hands might do his profession a service, and amuse the public, by compiling a volume 
of extracts from popular novels setting forth the law as expressed in the novels, and in a 
parallel column the law as it really is” (17).  Fyfe may not see potential for legal 
instruction in Dickens’s narratives; yet, he does believe in the author’s legal accuracy— 
“He never lays down bad law, and he never credits a member of the legal profession with 
impossible professional conduct” (21).  Fyfe suggests that Bleak House’s appeal to 
lawyers is from the subtlety of the legal humor, which is “often missed by the lay readers, 
who more readily understands the lawyers of the Pickwick Papers” (27).   
The attorney Theobald Mathew, writing in 1918 speaks of The Pickwick Papers 
as “faithfully recorded fragments of legal history” (323).  In detailing the legal accuracy 
of Pickwick, Mathew notes that the novel’s accuracy extends beyond the details of trial 
procedure such as Mr. Pickwick’s remaining out of the witness-box because litigants in 
the superior Courts were not allowed to testify until 1851 (324).  For example, Perker 
advises Pickwick that “we must have habeas-corpus;” in fact, since Pickwick was a 
defendant who had not satisfied the plaintiff, he was either to be placed in the sheriff’s 
custody or removed by habeas corpus to the King’s Bench or Fleet Prison (Mathew 327).  
Mathew goes so far to suggest that The Pickwick Papers function as a textbook for law 
students:  “Has not the time come for an annotated edition of that masterpiece, to which 
the student-at-law may be referred by readers and lecturers for a reliable account of the 
practical working of the law of personal actions when Queen Victoria ascended the 
throne?” (328).  In this way, he sees little distinction between Dickens’s contributions to 
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the law and his son, Henry Fielding Dickens’s work as a Common Sergeant.  Lawyers 
writing on Dickens in the early twentieth-century want to mark Dickens as a proponent 
and perhaps honorary member of the Victorian Bar, placing him in the role of a 
humanizer of an already unpopular profession. 
Fyfe’s question of how Charles Dickens, as a non-lawyer, acquired information 
typically known only to lawyers and legal specialists is taken up by legal critics in the 
mid-twentieth century. For example, F.E. Vaughn expresses “astonishment over 
Dickens’s extensive knowledge of court procedure,” arguing that the “when and how” of 
Dickens’s gaining such specialized legal knowledge is a mystery (595).  Implicit in 
Vaughn’s observation is the idea that specialized legal knowledge is too esoteric or 
sacred to be faked and that the only rational explanation is that Dickens had unrecorded 
training in the law.  Similarly, Lord Chief Justice Hewart of Bury wondered at “the range 
and accuracy of knowledge which had somehow been acquired by this amazing young 
novelist of twenty-four years.  How had he acquired it?” (Gould 78).  Subsequent law 
review articles betray an anxiety over this possibility of a legal professional being fooled 
into reading Dickens’s law as astonishingly accurate.  For example, W.B. Gould 
emphasizes the “sketchiness” of Dickens’s legal knowledge and labels the author “at 
best, only a layman-lawyer” (88).  
  Modern scholarship on Dickens by lawyers tends to follow similar patterns to the 
scholarship of the late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century—lawyers either 
react with outrage over legal inaccuracies or astonishment at how well Dickens knew 
court procedure.  Using a law and literature methodology allows us to see both responses 
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as important moves in disciplinary policing. First, it is necessary to review the theoretical 
framework that grounds the law and literature movement.   
The law and literature movement emerged in the 1970s and different theories 
have been put forward to explain its emergence.  Guyora Binder and Robert Weisberg 
suggest it was a methodology with which to counteract the law and economics movement 
(Peters 73).  Amy Ronner suggests the law and literature movement was a humanist 
movement motivated by a desire to rehabilitate the elitist notion of a lawyer removed 
from the people (12).  Julie Stone Peters argues that the study of law and literature grew 
out of a general interdisciplinary struggle, wherein the nature and value of traditional 
academic disciplines was under attack (71).   
Critics agree that James Boyd White’s The Legal Imagination marks the 
beginning of the law and literature movement.   In it, White, a lawyer by training, 
examines the intersections between law and literature as a tool for determining “the 
possibilities of different forms of speech or expression: of the judicial opinion or the 
poem, for example, or of the narrative, in the law and out of it” (xii).  White characterizes 
the law as an art and a branch of rhetoric; in practice, it is the art of making compositions 
of one’s own using the special language of the law.  For White, “the greatest power of the 
law lies not in the particular rules or decisions but in its language, in the coercive aspect 
of its rhetoric—in the way it structures sensibility and vision” (xiii).  White’s scholarship 
focuses on the ways in which lawyers and law students may benefit from literary study.   
From this jumping-off point, the law and literature movement considers both law 
in literature, the analysis of legal themes in literature, and law as literature, which uses 
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literary techniques to interpret legal scholarship.  Peters, a Professor of English, 
recognizes a thematic division in the discipline between the humanist, hermeneutic, and 
narrative strands of legal scholarship.  Under this categorization, “law in literature” 
scholars such as White fall under the humanist tradition, arguing that literature shows the 
law how to be human.  The hermeneutic branch is characterized by the belief that literary 
theory can be used to interpret law.  As Peters suggests, law as literature scholars saw 
theories such as deconstruction and poststructuralism as a radical means with which to 
attack the traditional interpretative modes of the law (446).  The third approach to law 
and literature is the narrative jurisprudence, or legal storytelling movement.  In the 
broadest sense, legal storytelling is the use of narrative in the theory or practice of law.  
Narrative legal scholars believe that storytelling should be incorporated into several 
aspects of cases, including evidentiary hearings, witness statements, closing arguments, 
and judicial opinions.  This chapter examines the rhetoric of the law in literature branch 
of the movement. 
Law Professor Robin West characterizes the insights obtained by applying the 
perspective of the law in literature strain of the law and literature movement as follows:  
We should attend to the depictions of law we find in imaginative 
literature, for the simple reason that literature may contain truths about law 
that are not easily found in nonnarrative jurisprudence…Those insights are 
not, however, either obvious or uncontested, and their unearthing requires 
serious scholarship as well as pedagogy” (101).  
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What West calls the “obvious” nature of the truths lawyers are able to unearth from 
fictional legal narratives is also a concern of Peters, who writes about the reductive ideas 
each discipline holds of the other.  Peters argues that interdisciplinarity emerges out of 
some “invisible pain…each discipline’s secret interior wound: literature’s wounded sense 
of its insignificance, its inability to achieve some ever-imagined but ever-receding praxis; 
law’s guilty sense of its collaborationism, its tainted complicity with the state apparatus, 
its alienation for alienation itself” (78).  According to Peters, law and literature look to 
each other to fill each other’s inadequacies; yet, this very process creates distance by 
emphasizing each discipline’s otherness.  Peters argues that each discipline is looking for 
what is missing in itself.  However, I would argue that in studying the rhetoric of law and 
literature criticism on Bleak House, each discipline seems protective of its own 
disciplinary interests and does not, as Peters contends, seek to complement the other. 
Legal scholars study Bleak House as an accurate reflection of legal history. The extent to 
which literary scholars downplay the degree to which fictional legal narratives are 
engaging deeply with the law suggests some anxiety over disciplinary boundaries.  If 
Dickens’s engagement with the law transcends satire then the critical conversation 
surrounding Dickens’s work is something more than a literary debate and lawyers have 
valid contributions to add to the critical conversation.    
 A common trope in the criticism regarding Dickens and the law is that Dickens 
hated lawyers.  Peter Ackroyd believes that Dickens “carried hatred enough for all forms 
of the law itself” (qtd. in Ledger 79).  Unsurprisingly, the law professors who teach 
Dickens do not subscribe to this belief.  Literature scholars tend to see a law versus 
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family dynamic in the double narrative of Bleak House whereas legal scholars focus on 
the humaneness of the lawyers.  Bleak House’s double narrative is especially interesting, 
for legal scholars rarely mention Esther in an article on Bleak House, whereas literature 
critics focus on her narrative.  A major strain of law and literature scholarship has been 
motivated by the idea that literature can humanize the law anew.  Professor Robert 
Weisberg of Stanford Law School refutes this inference that literature offers empathy and 
individualization as an alternative to the law’s soulless genericism, labeling it a 
“distortive effect plaguing law and literature” (88).  Nonetheless, Dickens remains 
popular in law schools—while many literary critics talk about his caricature of lawyers, 
broad satire, and general distaste for the law, lawyers look to Dickens for humanity.  
According to Mariana De Marco Torgovnick, a professor of English, 
“Interdisciplinary study works because people from one discipline are not routinely 
bound by the same assumption as people from another.  They do not necessarily share the 
same blind spots, focus on the same things, or think about problems in the same way…In 
other words, interdisciplinarity brings with it the benefits of defamiliarization” (Friedman 
313).  As Susan Stanford Friedman suggests, this relationship allows for “brilliant 
breakthroughs” in scholarship (313).  However, I would argue that this 
“defamiliarization” can also cause tension between disciplines.  In the field of law and 
literature, literature scholars lack the foundation in the law and its interpretation and 
application necessary to critique the law while legal scholars lack the experience to teach 
close reading.     
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The critical question is how Bleak House is taught in law schools when literary 
scholars caution against treating Dickens as a realistic mirror of the law.  In an article 
appearing in Teaching Law and Literature (2011) published by the Modern Language 
Association of America, English Professor Kieran Dolin discusses his development of a 
law and literature approach to teaching Bleak House to both law students and literature 
students.  Dolin begins with Richard Weisberg’s characterization of the fields of law and 
literature “that both fields structure reality through language and both have more or less 
formalized practices of reading and writing” (289).  Dolin’s approach to teaching Bleak 
House is also informed by the methodology of Barbara Leckie’s work tracing the impact 
of the cultural ideologies that bind both law and literature.  In emphasizing Dickens’s 
faith in literature as a tool for legal and political reform, Dolin does not mention the 
criticism of Bleak House for exaggerating the ills of Chancery to fulfill Dickens’s 
satirical purpose.   Rather, he notes that the ills of Chancery “were not exaggerated or 
fanciful” (291).  Although Dolin’s syllabus for the Bleak House and the law seminar 
includes legal documents such as court opinions, the impulse seems to be to read 
Dickens’s portrayal of the law as accurate and worthy of study by both undergraduate 
English students and graduate law students.   
In “Bleak House in Law School,” an article in Approaches to Teaching Dickens’s 
Bleak House (2008) Robert Googins, Professor of Law, discusses his Dickens and the 
law seminar for second and third year law students.  Students are required to read Bleak 
House before the semester begins, suggesting that the course is more about considering 
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Dickens’s text in the context of modern legal issues than close reading strategies.  Indeed, 
the actions of Dickens’s lawyers are considered to determine how they would be in 
violation of current standards of professional responsibility.  This use of the text raises 
the question of what law and literature pedagogy is trying to achieve.  If the literature is 
sidelined, then Googins’s teaching Bleak House plays into the disciplinary fears Peters 
discusses of literature being inconsequential.  In contrast to Dolin, Googins does identify 
setting a date for Bleak House as “an objective of the course,” because of critical articles 
and Dickens’s statement in the preface to the first edition.  Here, Googins may be 
referring to Stephen’s “The License of Modern Novelists” wherein Stephen attacks 
Dickens on the issue of Dickens's timeliness, noting that the "Court of Chancery was 
reformed before [Dickens] published Bleak House" (Stephen 349).  In the Preface to the 
First Edition of Bleak House, Dickens asserts that "everything set forth in these pages 
concerning the Court of Chancery is substantially true, and within the truth" (5).  Googins 
explains that one can accept Dickens statement if the novel is set around 1827 with Lord 
Lyndhurst as the model for the Lord High Chancellor, since the Chancery Commission 
Report of 1850 showed the ills of the 1820s to remain present despite subsequent reform.  
While it is true that by 1852, the consolidation of fees into a suitors' fund and the 
termination of sinecures had occurred, much within Chancery remained unchanged 
(Lobban “Reforming the Nineteenth-Century, 392).  
Turning to Dickens’s representation of lawyers, Law Professor Richard Weisberg 
devotes a chapter to Dickens’s lawyers in his seminal study Poethics, where he claims 
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that “fiction about law continues to uncover better than any other medium the private 
lives of lawyers…and compels us to recognize that lawyers’ private lives directly affect 
their public performances” (18). In addition to cataloging the lawyers, the legal critics 
identify patterns in the lawyers’ behavior. For example, Ronald Boughman identifies 
several patterns in Dickens’s lawyers – “physicality, public vs. private façade, accuracy 
of thoughts, feelings and facts, a degree of asexuality, and a connection with questions of 
life and death” (175).  In a similar manner, Weisberg identifies fictional lawyers as either 
sympathetic and ineffective or professionally successful and possessing six 
characteristics: verbal manipulation, apartness, distrustfulness, professional ethical 
relativism, frugality, and passivity (57).  The close reading strategies of Weisberg arise 
from a legal tradition, wherein fact patterns are compared against one another to find case 
law precedent.  From an interdisciplinary perspective, the tendency to catalog and 
categorize the lawyers in Dickens seems to emerge from a need to harness literature’s 
ambiguities.   
When modern lawyers write about Bleak House, they, like earlier critics, tend to 
focus on the degree of accuracy with which Dickens represents legal procedure or 
Dickens’s representations of the legal professionals—the solicitors Tulkinghorn, Vholes 
and Kenge and the law clerk Guppy.  In the depiction of Tulkinghorn, Weisberg finds 
“one of those great moments in Law and Literature when the professional veil of the 
successful lawyer is about to be pierced” (70).  According to Richard Weisberg, 
misogyny motivates Tulkinghorn’s pursuit of Lady Dedlock’s secret, which allows 
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Weisberg to posit that Dickens reveals to his readers that the law is far from objective and 
neutral and is rather controlled by personal prejudices and passions. While Weisberg 
reads Tulkinghorn’s character and behavior as “an extreme of darkness, of monomania, 
of perversity,” (73) several lawyers have written justifications for Tulkinghorn’s actions.  
Stanley Tick finds in Dickens’s depiction of Tulkinghorn an “enlightened ambivalence in 
the timeless debate between past and present values” (210).  Michael K. McChrystal 
acknowledges Tulkinghorn’s villainy, but questions whether his behavior violates ethical 
standards for American lawyers (393).  Maureen E. Markey is troubled by law review 
articles defending Tulkinghorn’s actions, arguing that “any such inclination is not only 
wrongheaded, it is also dangerous in that it only adds to the already tarnished image of 
the profession” (689).  The rhetoric of Markey’s argument helps to illuminate the 
challenges of a law and literature methodology.  Ordinarily, when literary critics analyze 
the ambiguities of a fictional character, their work does not reflect on themselves as 
literary critics unless there is plagiarism, sloppy research, or the defense of truly 
unconscionable behavior.  But Markey seems to be suggesting that there is a danger in 
law professors defending Tulkinghorn because it directly impacts the reputation of the 
profession.  Markey does not specify the group whose estimation of lawyers would be 
changed by defending Tulkinghorn, and I have not found critical work from modern 
literary critics on Dickens decrying this law review scholarship.  Indeed, the dearth of 
literary scholarship citing these law review articles suggests that modern literary scholars 
might not be the audience of legal critics writing on Dickens and the law.   
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A review of the law and literature criticism on Dickens exposes the challenges of 
practicing interdisciplinary scholarship.  Modern literary critics caution against reading 
the law in literature as accurate, whereas modern legal critics are more likely to see the 
law in Dickens as a true portrayal of legal history.  Bardell v. Pickwick does appear in a 
law textbook, Taylor on Evidence, as support for the hearsay rule.  By cautioning readers 
against interpreting the law in Dickens as realistic, literary scholars not only shield 
Dickens from complaints of legal inaccuracy but also limit his relevancy outside of the 
field of literature.  If literary critics do not treat Dickens’s use of the law seriously, then 
legal frameworks are degraded in the law and literature conversation.  Legal critics focus 
on the law in Dickens and its accuracies or ethical dilemmas without paying attention to 
literary technique or engaging in close reading.  Mining a literary work for its treatment 
of the law often results in scholarship that misses the complexity of Dickens’s literary 
vision.  Despite these challenges, law and literature continues as an interdisciplinary 
movement, perhaps because, as Robert Weisberg suggests, the appeal of finding a united 
literary and legal discourse is “in the vision, often the dream, of a unified culture” (89). 
The ways in which Dickens’s texts get read by lawyers through the centuries not only 
reveal the relationship between the literary and legal professions but also suggest modern 
applications for historical studies of lawyers’ interpretations of literature.     
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Chapter Five 
Ambiguous Verdicts and Juryless Trials: Collins’s The Law and the Lady (1875), 
Braddon’s An Open Verdict (1878), and Haggard’s Mr. Meeson’s Will (1888) 
 
Representations of the jury in literature are significant as they raise a host of 
questions about democratic processes.  Through treating these questions, Victorian 
authors create their own juryman’s guidebook to educate their readers, the potential 
jurors of England.   But jury scenes in literature have importance beyond the light they 
shed on social and political questions.   Representations of the jury allow us to gain an 
understanding of not only an author’s social vision but also an author’s literary vision.  
This final chapter focuses on novels where the institution of the jury has failed to produce 
just results or the jury is altogether absent.  In so far as Wilkie Collins, Mary Elizabeth 
Braddon, and Henry Rider Haggard write beyond the jury, literary strategies and 
solutions outside of the law resolve legal issues in their narratives.  The ambiguous 
verdicts in The Law and the Lady and An Open Verdict create a level of uncertainty 
intolerable to Victorian society, while the inclusion of a juryless trial in Mr. Meeson’s 
Will allows Haggard’s vision of the trial to completely supplant that of the nineteenth-
century Probate Court.  These narrative strategies allow these texts to fit my broad 
definition of the law—the “law” of the jury includes legal treatises, the Victorian press, 
and fictional legal narratives.  Collins’s “law” on the Scotch verdict illustrates the 
dangers of proposed reforms to the English jury relaxing the unanimity requirement in 
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jury verdicts, while Braddon’s “law” looks to empiricism to combat the ambiguity of 
communal processes.  If Haggard’s “law” imagines the possibility of a female jury, then, 
Haggard, along with Collins and Braddon, follow the critical tradition of sensation fiction 
questioning gendered identity. 
Historically, sensation novels have been excluded from the narratives categorized 
as “Novels with a Purpose,” those that possess the power to engage in social questions 
and challenge the status quo (Rodensky 4).  Sensation novels, with their melodramatic 
plots, and primarily female audience, are categorized as popular fiction.  But it is these 
texts’ very popularity that makes them an ideal vehicle in which to address social 
questions pertaining to communal processes.  Analysis of legal themes in literature is 
useful in identifying when authors are in dialogue with the shifting jurisprudential 
frameworks of their time.  If correlations can be made between shifts in a legal definition 
and depictions of a law in a literary text, then the work may be read as reflecting and 
contributing to the socio-legal context.  It has been argued that of all literary genres the 
sensation novel is most successful in addressing issues of Victorian law about women; 
indeed, much critical attention has been paid as to how sensation writers were shaped and 
influenced by the public conversation over the Parliamentary Debates leading up to the 
Divorce Act of 1857 (Houston 18).  In addition, critics have considered definitions of 
criminal responsibility and the rules of evidence through an integrated literary and legal 
discourse.  However, sensation novels remain understudied in relation to the law, 
especially the lesser read novels by well-known authors that I have chosen for this 
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chapter.  Fictional legal narratives by Braddon, Collins and Haggard represent the 
cultural anxiety over the role of the jury in the Victorian period.   
A VISION FOR REFORM IN COLLINS’S THE LAW AND THE LADY 
In The Law and the Lady (1875), Collins uses a foreign justice system, in this case 
the Scotch system, to explore the relationship between national identity and English law; 
the aim of the heroine is to “change an underhand Scotch Verdict of Not Proven into an 
honest English Verdict of Not Guilty” (108).  A verdict of Not Proven indicates that, in 
the opinion of the jury, there is insufficient evidence to convict the defendant.  At a time 
when the English jury’s reputation in criminal law trials was tarnished, its future 
depended on establishing its competency and accountability.  This chapter demonstrates 
how the Scotch legal system’s Not Proven verdict stands for the worst fears of the 
English legal system—a verdict without inherent meaning, where the meaning is created 
by the community and a defendant left in limbo.  Critics suggest Collins is Orientalizing 
Scotland by having the English legal system conquer the Scotch; however, it is important 
to read this move within the context of the English cultural anxiety over the future of the 
jury.  Collins’s text reminds readers that despite bad verdicts in the English court system, 
such verdicts are preferable to ambiguous verdicts.  Collins’s text uses a failure of legal 
remedies to destabilize the law; Valeria Brinton must assume the fact-finding role to clear 
her husband Eustace Woodville of the Not Proven verdict on the charge of poisoning his 
first wife.   
Collins is known for his use of the fictional legal narrative as a vehicle for reform.  
A brief turn to Collins’s The Woman in White demonstrates this practice.  As Jenny 
 189 
Bourne Taylor observes, Collins’s reputation as a novelist until recently has rested on The 
Woman in White and The Moonstone (iv).  Serialized in 1860, and set in 1849 and 1850, 
The Woman in White follows in the wake of the highly publicized and discussed 
Parliamentary Debates on the Divorce Act of 1857 as well as the inception of the Divorce 
Court.  The Woman in White can be read as entering into a conversation with the 
arguments for and against extended rights for married women from the Parliamentary 
Debates.  This assessment is supported by Surridge: “though The Woman in White is set 
before the Divorce Act came into effect, its plot structure of domestic mystery, detection, 
uncovering, and dramatic public revelation is absolutely that of the post-1858 period” 
(145). 
In the Preamble to The Woman in White, the narrative is placed outside the law: 
“but the Law is still, in certain inevitable cases, the pre-engaged servant of the long 
purse; and the story is left to be told, for the first time, in this place” (9).  Mr. Kyrle 
advises Walter “as a lawyer, and as a lawyer only, it is my duty to tell you, Mr. Hartright, 
that you have not the shadow of a case” (108).  In this way, Collins raises questions of 
legality while operating outside of the formal strictures of the law. This subversion of the 
law provides a narrative space in which to consider the opposing views on questions of 
divorce, evidence, and criminal responsibility.  If The Woman in White and The Law and 
the Lady are shown to be participating in and exposing the anxieties surrounding the legal 
debates of the Victorian period, then this approach establishes another way in which 
sensation novels are subversive.   
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The Law and the Lady was serialized in the Graphic and published in three 
volumes by Chatto & Windus in 1875.  According to Taylor, Collins wanted to expand 
his readership; his aim was to “never remain satisfied with a familiar community of 
readers but to extend the boundaries of his audience: to try to reach that ‘Unknown 
Public’ beyond the pale of literary civilization” (x).  His discussion of legal reforms, then, 
was designed to reach a wide audience of the Victorian public, and what better way to 
appeal to a large swath of English society than through narrating nineteenth-century 
anxiety over that most English of institutions—the jury.  In The Law and the Lady, the 
Scotch verdict of Not Proven issued against Valeria’s husband leaves the couple in a state 
of marital limbo until Valeria can find the facts which the jury could not to determine her 
husband’s guilt or innocence.  In the opening pages of the novel, we witness Valeria 
Brinton become Valeria Woodville; however, Valeria quickly discovers that her 
husband’s name is Eustace Macallan, leading her to pursue the secrets of her husband’s 
past.  In this way, Valeria is placed in the role of detective.  Receiving lies from her 
husband, she appeals to his friend Major Fitz-David for the truth.  Unwilling to break his 
confidence with Eustace, Major Fitz-David allows Valeria to search for clues to her 
husband’s “terrible secret,” which she discovers is that a Not Proven verdict was issued 
against him after being tried for murdering his first wife with arsenic.  Major Fitz-David 
provides Valeria her first definition of the Not Proven verdict:   
There is a verdict allowed by the Scotch law, which (so far as I know) is 
not permitted by the laws of any other civilized country on the face of the 
earth.  When the jury are in doubt whether to condemn or acquit the 
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prisoner brought before them, they are permitted, in Scotland, to express 
that doubt by a form of compromise.  If there is not evidence enough, on 
the one hand, to justify them in finding a prisoner guilty, and not evidence 
enough, on the other hand, to thoroughly convince them that a prisoner is 
innocent, they extricate themselves from the difficulty by finding a verdict 
of Not Proven. (95) 
Within Fitz-David’s definition, there is the suggestion that the Not Proven verdict is 
considered uncivilized by the English for unspecified reasons.   
I would argue that the allowance of doubt is what Victorians would find truly 
objectionable about the Not Proven verdict, especially in light of the English standards 
for jurors.  In Trial by Jury, Patrick Devlin outlines the English jury’s role:  
The jury just says yes or no.  Indeed, it is not allowed to expand upon that 
and its reasons may not be inquired into.  It is the oracle deprived of the 
right of being ambiguous.  The jury was in its origin as oracular as the 
ordeal: neither was conceived in reason: the verdict, no more than the 
result of the ordeal, was open to rational criticism.  This immunity has 
been largely retained and is still an essential characteristic of the system. 
(30) 
Not allowing juries to express their doubts or present anything other than unambiguous 
verdicts was not without its troubles in the Victorian legal system.  Indeed, the question 
of how to achieve unanimous verdicts from juries without sacrificing justice was one 
which troubled both the authors of legal treatises and the Victorian press.  Rather than 
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allow ambiguity, the legitimacy of the nineteenth-century English jury was being 
bolstered by a sea of legal treatises directing the jury’s treatment of evidence.  Up until 
the sixteenth century, juries reached decisions based on personal knowledge of the facts 
of a case; therefore, the need for guidance in measuring this knowledge was not apparent.  
Once the use of the jurors’ personal knowledge ended, and jurors were expected to 
evaluate evidence presented in court, judges began to provide instructions about how to 
process the assessments jurors were making in a systematized manner.   In England, the 
standards for jury decision-making mirrored the contemporary philosophical thought as 
legal treatises borrowed language from philosophers.  For example, Barbara Shapiro 
explores how Lockean conceptions of knowledge shaped legal treatises on the rules of 
evidence in Victorian courts.  John Locke envisioned probability as a graduated scale that 
extended from the unlikely “mere opinion” through the probable “confidence” to a still 
higher category called “rational belief” or “moral certainty.”  Victorian legal treatises 
used reigning empirical philosophies, such as Lockean degrees of certainty, to form the 
concept of the beyond the reasonable doubt standard that judges adopted in courtrooms. 
Jurors were instructed to decide on “moral certainty” or certainty without doubt when no 
absolute certainty is obtainable in the empirical realm (Shapiro 41).   The Victorians 
wanted processes quantified, measured and explained; the deliberation of the jury lacks 
this transparency (Devlin 71).  Instead of allowing for transparency, the Not Proven 
verdict ushers in doubt.  Walter E. Houghton discusses the Victorian anxiety over doubt 
and how “a succession of doubts may finally merge into one overwhelming doubt that 
anything is worth doing or life worth living” (73).  In The Law and the Lady, the Not 
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Proven verdict casts a shadow of doubt over the remainder of Eustace Macallan’s days; 
as a result, Collins’s attention to the Scotch legal system suggests to the English how 
much worse its doubts could be if it allowed ambiguity in jury verdicts. 
Collins promotes the English legal system, but part of his fictional legal narrative 
exists decidedly outside of Victorian legal culture—his envisioning of Valeria as a 
lawyer.  This obvious step outside of the law signals that The Law and the Lady exists at 
least in part as a competing “law,” providing Collins with the space to use the law to 
build his literary identity.  If in The Eustace Diamonds (1871), Lizzie is thought to have 
made a good lawyer, then in The Law and the Lady, Valeria goes a step further and 
actually acts as an attorney, arguing to her husband that “what the Law has failed to do 
for you, your Wife must do for you” (108).  Valeria does not blindly accept Major Fitz-
David’s explanation of the Not Proven verdict.  Instead, she consults Ogilvie’s “Imperial 
Dictionary,” which states, “A verdict of Not Proven only indicates that, in the opinion of 
the jury, there is a deficiency in the evidence to convict the prisoner” (108).  Based on 
this definition, Valeria sees the verdict as only representing the jury’s lack of a decision.  
Valeria’s thinking shifts from the opinion of the jury to the “opinion of the world,” as she 
expresses her determination to collect the evidence necessary to prove Eustace’s 
innocence.   Upon Valeria’s discovery of her husband’s secret, Eustace abandons her, 
requiring the intervention of Eustace’s lawyers to service the settlement payment of one 
half of his income.  When Valeria refuses Eustace’s payment, her encounter with the 
lawyers turns hostile.  The lawyers are shocked by Valeria’s response; one partner asks 
for her reasons while the other reminds him that she “was a lady, and had therefore no 
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reasons to give” (110).  Valeria’s disregard for legal professionals must be considered 
against the male characters’ admiration for lawyers in the novel.  When Valeria decides 
that she wants to make it her life’s work to prove her husband’s innocence, Eustace’s 
protestations center on his faith in the law: “My defense was undertaken by the greatest 
lawyers in the land, he said.  After such men have done their utmost, and have failed—
my poor Valeria, what can you, what can I, do? We can only submit” (100).  Valeria 
argues that “the greatest lawyers are mortal men” who have made mistakes.  Valeria’s 
uncle also chastises her for being “conceited enough” to think she can succeed where 
lawyers have failed (112).  Like Beatrix in Braddon’s An Open Verdict (1878), Valeria is 
unwilling to place blind trust in the legal practitioners.  This suspicion of the legal order 
allows both Collins and Braddon to carve out a space to write outside of the law and 
imagine extralegal solutions to legal problems.  In this manner, authors demonstrate 
literature’s ability to enact justice outside of the common law and statutes.       
As John Reed suggests, once the Not Proven verdict has been delivered in The 
Law and the Lady, “only someone outside the regulations of the law can informally 
prosecute the case; remarkably for a Victorian novel that person is a determined young 
woman” (222). In support of my position, Catherine Siemann argues that Valeria assumes 
the role of appellate lawyer to fix the verdict.  Valeria not only assumes the role of a 
lawyer, she also explains how she will distinguish herself from what a licensed lawyer 
could do; she believes she will be able to ask the questions that lawyers might think it 
beneath their dignity to pose.  Valeria is not interested in following legal protocol; she 
condemns the prosecutor’s address to the jury for stating his belief in Eustace’s guilt, a 
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statement entirely expected from a prosecutor.  In fact, she acts violently towards the law, 
tearing the pages of the prosecutor’s address to the jury from her husband’s trial book.  
The transcript of the trial is filtered through two narrative lenses, as Valeria reads a report 
of Eustace’s trial and then reproduces it in the narrative.  Thus, the transcript is fashioned 
as more of a narrative than a legal document.  At first, the reader is given the sense of this 
transcript’s legal accuracy: “turning to the second page of the Trial, I found a Note, 
assuring the reader of the absolute correctness of the Report of the Proceedings….It was 
some relief to me to discover this Note, and to be satisfied at the outset that the Story of 
the Trial was, in every particular, fully and truly given” (153).  Witness testimony is 
presented in the novel as having been reproduced verbatim from the trial transcript; 
however, Valeria also announces herself as an editor.  She even edits the “glorious 
oratory” of her husband’s defense attorney explaining in a parenthetical, “I wish I had 
room to quote more of it!” (167).  A key moment when Valeria assumes the role of editor 
is immediately before the jury gives its verdict. Valeria directs her wrath towards the 
judge in his directions to the jury.  The judge instructs the jury that it must be satisfied 
with circumstantial evidence, a point to which Valeria takes no issue.  In addition to 
instructing the jury to accept circumstantial evidence, Valeria believes the following 
instruction to the jury sealed her husband’s fate: 
But, having told the Jury they might accept circumstantial evidence, he 
turned back again on his own words, and warned them against being too 
ready to trust it! “You must have evidence satisfactory and convincing to 
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your own minds,” he said, “in which you find no conjectures—but only 
irresistible and just inferences.” (170) 
Valeria believes that the jury would have been “thoroughly bewildered” by the judge’s 
instructions and therefore “took refuge in a compromise” (170).  Although emphasizing 
how the charge of the judge bewildered the jury, Valeria only includes an excerpt from 
the judge’s charge in the narrative, saying “I need give no further extracts from the 
summing up” (169).  Collins’s narrative technique has several implications.  With Valeria 
controlling the evidence, the reader is not able to make a decision about the case based on 
the complete trial record, with the effect being that the case is taken outside of the law.  
Frustration ensues, for deep in the trial transcript we are now eager to be put in the jury’s 
place.  Despite removing the illusion of legal realism, the narrative manages to place us 
in the same emotional state as the jury.  Valeria assumes that the jury is bewildered by the 
judge’s charge; as readers, we are equally bewildered by Valeria’s narrative omission.  
The narrative technique creating confusion in the reader does not allow for passive intake 
but instead encourages active reading, replicating the attention necessary for the ideal 
jury to weigh the evidence.    
Valeria describes the Scotch verdict as “timid and trimming” (170).  Indeed, it 
only took the jury one hour to deliberate.  If the jury were to try to reach a unanimous 
verdict of either innocent or guilty, one would expect a much lengthier deliberation, 
given reports from the Victorian press that jurors were deprived of food and drink for 
long stretches of time.  If the future of the English jury was questioned because of 
complaints of expense and delay, then Collins reminds us of a greater danger in the hasty 
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Scotch verdict.  Graham Willmore in Is Trial By Jury Worth Keeping? (1850) argues 
against the notion that the time-consuming nature of a jury deliberation warranted its 
demise, suggesting that “there cannot be a more dangerous delusion in politics, than to 
suppose an institution good because it is cheap, or bad, because it is deliberate, or even 
tedious” (4). Valeria also adds as an aside that “a jury of women would not have taken a 
minute!” (170).  The implication seems to be that women would immediately reach the 
“lame and impotent conclusion” of Not Proven to avoid a difficult decision.  As in Mr. 
Meeson’s Will, Collins allows the reader to imagine a jury of women, which would not be 
established in England until 1920.  By stepping outside of the narratives given 
precedential effect by the common law, Collins’s writes his own “law” in The Law and 
the Lady.  Valeria’s imagining of a female jury is derisive; however, her viewpoint is 
explained by the patriarchal law that binds women in the narrative.  As in The Woman in 
White, Collins takes up the issue of marital cruelty.  When Eustace finds out through a 
newspaper article that Valeria has gone against his wishes and not abandoned her 
investigation of the Not Proven verdict, his face darkens but he ultimately consents to 
trust his wife.  Valeria shows compassion for the wives that might not have such 
sympathy: “My heart turned pityingly to those other wives, whose husbands, under 
similar circumstances, would have spoken hard words to them—would perhaps even 
have acted more cruelly still….What had I done to deserve my happiness? What had they 
done, poor souls, to deserve their misery?” (370).  In this manner, we imagine a female 
jury to lack agency, to live under the fear of marital cruelty.  At the same time, Valeria is 
“thoroughly disgusted” by Major Fitz-David’s marriage to an overdressed opera singer.  
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The young lady marries the old man for financial support and Valeria calls the union a 
“vile bargain” (380).  Valeria’s self-proclaimed obstinacy, as well as her distancing of 
herself from other women, allows her to forge her independence as an amateur appellate 
attorney.   
According to Mary Husemann, the Scotch verdict is not “lame and impotent as 
Valeria claims, it is actually very dynamic and potent because it recognizes a broader 
range of accountability than the absolutism of guilt and not guilty” (79).  Most 
significantly, a Not Proven verdict could communicate the existence of a divided jury, 
which England had no way of documenting in its verdicts of guilty or not guilty.  The 
question then becomes, is a Not Proven verdict the solution to the unanimity problem 
plaguing English juries during the Victorian period?  A debate over ending the unanimity 
verdict in England raged because as, Brown suggests, “If a real unanimity of opinion 
existed in the vast number of cases in which juries pretend to find unanimous verdicts,—
it would be a lie against nature, and nothing short of a miracle” (23).  The Law and the 
Lady suggests the negative human repercussions to Not Proven verdicts; thus, while 
Collins invites discussion of the reliability of juries, he does not advocate for the 
ambiguity that a lack of unanimity would allow.  Catherine Siemann argues that the Not 
Proven verdicts “expose the reality that verdicts may be less than reliable,” which would 
be disconcerting to “a Victorian audience well-attached to its certainties” (20).  
Siemann’s statement is inconsistent with the anxiety over the unreliability of English jury 
verdicts circulating in the Victorian press, however.  The unreliability of jury decisions 
was already well-known by the English public, and by introducing the Scotch verdict 
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Collins demonstrates how the jury could be empowered to heighten the problems with 
ambiguity already plaguing the public’s faith in the institution of the jury.  
Collins’s fictional Not Proven case follows many facts of a case that had already 
seized the Victorian public’s imagination.  Several critics see a connection between the 
trial in The Law and the Lady and the trial of Madeleine Smith in July 1857, which also 
resulted in a jury returning a verdict of “Not Proven with arsenic.”  The trial of 
Madeleine Smith “caused perhaps more excitement, both in Scotland and elsewhere, than 
any other murder trial of the century” (Maceachen 136).  Madeleine Smith was a twenty-
one year old accused of poisoning her lover, Pierre Emile L’Angelier.  As in The Law 
and the Lady, Smith’s defense team argued that the arsenic was purchased to improve a 
bad complexion.  Karin Jacobson sees the important similarity between the two trials as 
lying in the Not Proven verdict.  According to Jacobson, “In the course of both 
investigations, the law becomes entwined with the sensational narratives it seeks to make 
‘plain,’ breaking the boundaries between legal and emotional discourses, between law 
and ladies, between the plain and the ornamental, and, finally, between the domestic and 
the uncanny” (285).  In other words, Jacobson reads the novel and the Madeleine Smith 
trial together as an expression of the difficulty of mapping women’s sexuality onto legal 
discourse (285). What Taylor finds compelling when analyzing the similarities between 
the cases is that Madeleine Smith’s letters to her lover were read to the courtroom just as 
the prosecution reads from Eustace Macallan’s diary during his trial.  Ultimately, Taylor 
argues that through references to the Madeleine Smith case Collins is “both obliquely 
implying Eustace’s moral if not actual responsibility, and drawing on these earlier 
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resonances to suggest that the central question of the trial is somehow bound up with 
perceptions and anxieties surrounding femininity as masquerade, or impersonation” (xx).  
My reading of the Madeleine Smith case focuses on the representation of the jury.  As in 
The Law and the Lady, the jury in the trial of Madeleine Smith deliberated for a short 
amount of time, returning a Not Proven verdict in thirty minutes.  With a trial lasting nine 
days and individual orations spanning four hours, it is difficult to see how the jury could 
have processed all of the facts of the case in such a short time frame.  Both the Madeleine 
Smith trial and Collins’s fictional representation of the Not Proven verdict demonstrate 
how easy it is to decide not to decide, and how dangerous this level of uncertainty is for 
any system of justice.  
The law fails on both a systematic and individual level in The Law and the Lady, 
not only through the issuance of a Not Proven verdict but also in Eustace’s inadequate 
representation by his legal counsel.  According to Maceachen, “The Collins lawyer is a 
faithful family friend, banker, investment broker, and confidential adviser on every 
subject” (127).  To complicate Maceachen’s assessment, Collins’s representation of the 
Macallan family solicitor Mr. Playmore is not one of admiration or admonishment.  The 
lawyer is not the hero of the novel, but he is also not the villain.  Instead, Playmore is “a 
cheerful Scotchman… neither old nor young, neither handsome nor ugly; he was 
personally not in the least like the popular idea of a lawyer; and he spoke perfectly good 
English, touched with only the slightest possible flavor of a Scotch accent” (256).  In The 
Law and the Lady, the Scotch identity is juxtaposed with a fierce sense of English 
pride—the absence of a Scotch accent has a positive connotation in this instance.  The 
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crux of this novel depends on a custom that illuminates the distinction between English 
and Scotch lifestyles.  Critical evidence revealing Eustace’s first wife’s suicide is found 
in a shredded letter that remains in a dustheap.  According to Playmore, “In tidy England, 
I suppose, you would have all that carted away out of sight.  We don’t mind in Scotland, 
as long as the dust-heap is far enough away not to be smelt at the house” (270).   Collins 
has been accused of Orientalizing Scotland, in that “he exploits the difference between 
England and Scotland to justify English identity, suggesting that greater English authority 
in Scottish affairs would help the Scots manage their untidy legal system” (Husemann 
81).  According to Anne Longmuir, “Critics have not given Collins’s interest in the 
heterogeneous nature of the British state the attention it deserves” (165). In The Law and 
the Lady, Longmuir sees Scotland, in particular its legal judgments, as a force 
interrupting the order of civilized England.  Again, reading the English law as civilized 
seems to ignore Collins’s practice of engaging with legal frameworks in flux, such as the 
debate over The Divorce Act surrounding A Woman in White.  Additionally, Collins 
shows Eustace’s attorneys in England to be as unimpressive as Playmore.  Longmuir 
reads Valeria’s attempts to challenge the undecidability of the Scotch verdict as a 
mechanism for “restoring both the normative English social sphere and her own identity” 
(171).  As in A Tale of Two Cities (1859), where Dickens’s narration of both English and 
French trials allows for a comparative legal analysis, Collins’s fictional narrative 
illustrates the ways in which the Scotch verdict wrecks havoc on the English social order, 
and thereby can be viewed as a cautionary tale against reforms to the English jury that 
might relax the requirements on unanimity.   
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Beyond Playmore’s Scotch identity, Collins’s technique of sidelining the lawyers 
in his fictional legal narrative allows him space to forge his literary identity.  Playmore 
does not assume a role of authority in the novel; rather, Collins positions Playmore in a 
supportive role to assist Valeria’s pursuits in her role as an amateur detective. Valeria 
reports to Playmore on the new evidence she has obtained in the case of her husband, 
Eustace Macallan, and Playmore is pleasant about admitting her superior perspective: 
“Here is the client leading the lawyer” (257).  As in Trollope’s Orley Farm, Collins’s 
lawyer struggles with the boundaries between the personal and the professional.  For 
example, Playmore withholds a new idea he has pertaining to Eustace’s case from Valeria 
on the grounds of “professional caution” (257).  Excusing himself, Playmore admits, “I 
don’t want to be professional with you—my great anxiety is to avoid it.  But the lawyer 
gets the better of the man, and refuses to be suppressed” (257).  In other words, Collins 
explores the complicated ways in which a lawyer negotiates his personal interactions. 
During the second half of the nineteenth century, codes of professional responsibility for 
attorneys were under development.  Thus, Collins’s depiction of attorneys is more than 
character development; it is “law,” filling in a gap in the standards for legal professionals.  
Playmore describes the experience where “the lawyer disappears and the man resumes his 
proper place” (258).  In this way, the phenomenon suggests that the lawyer cannot be a 
man while being a lawyer, that law robs a man of his humanity and requires machine-like 
responses.  Significantly, it is the lawyer who admits the law was unable to secure justice 
for Eustace: “The light which the whole machinery of the Law was unable to throw on 
the poisoning case at Gleninch has been accidentally let in on it by a Lady who refuses to 
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listen to reason and who insists on having her own way” (260).  Valeria, while remaining 
in charge of the investigation, comes to rely on Playmore’s legal opinion as she 
investigates her husband’s case.  When she includes a memorandum from Playmore, 
Valeria simultaneously accepts and rejects it in the narrative, self-consciously justifying 
its inclusion through a disclaimer:  “If you don’t agree with this view, and if you are 
dying to be done with me and my narrative, pass on to the next chapter by all means!” 
(372). Like Beatrix in An Open Verdict, Valeria ultimately trusts her own abilities above 
those of her lawyer.  Even in the final pages of the novel, she considers her influence on 
her husband “to be decidedly superior to the influence of Mr. Playmore” (376).  In 
addition to critiquing the Scotch verdict, Collins’s representation of lawyers’ failures 
allows for the competing “law” in his fictional legal narrative.  
Collins completed his legal training at Lincoln’s Inn between 1835 and 1842 but 
never entered legal practice.  Maceachen argues that Collins’s background in the law 
inspired him to write to usher in legal reform, and he was particularly effective at 
bringing obscure legal injustices such as the Not Proven verdict to the eyes of the public 
(121).  According to Maceachen, Collins’s novel uses a poor case to make a claim against 
the Not Proven verdict, for Eustace Macallan does not have the reader’s sympathy.  
Indeed, from the beginning of the novel, Eustace’s impulse to explain away the 
inconsistencies in his life story with ridiculous lies only heightens Valeria’s “miserable 
conviction that there was an abyss in the shape of a family secret” (35) between her and 
her husband.  She learns that the legality of her marriage is in question from her nosy 
landlady and uncovers the truth of her husband’s past by being handed the book of his 
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trial by a coarse young showgirl.  Upon the unveiling of his secret, Eustace abandons 
Valeria to fight in the war and his wife finds him cruel to have deliberately added to her 
anxiety.  Like Bella Scratchell in Braddon’s An Open Verdict, Miserrimus Dexter in The 
Law and the Lady tampers with evidence essential to the resolution of the legal plot.  
Dexter steals a letter Sara Macallan left for her husband under her pillow.  Sara explicitly 
asks Eustace to prevent a postmortem examination by producing her suicide note, for she 
“wants nobody to be blamed or punished” (363).  Playmore speculates that if a guilty 
verdict had been issued against Eustace, Dexter would have come forward with the letter; 
it was only in the unresolved state created by the Not Proven verdict that Dexter was 
willing to suppress the evidence to make his enemy suffer.  Collins demonstrates another 
pitfall to the Not Proven verdict, arguably, that without true wickedness an unjust verdict 
is able to stand.  Ultimately, Sara Macallan’s suicide note reveals the extent to which 
Eustace’s flirtations with another woman provoke his first wife’s jealousy and despair.  
Instead of a flawed case to protest an unjust verdict, Collins’s narration of Eustace’s 
imperfections make the fictional case study more compelling.  Eustace is not a saintly 
figure obviously wronged; rather, he is a human any reader could relate to in his missteps 
and insecurities.  It is this relatable quality that inspires sympathy with the repercussions 
of the open verdict; Eustace’s lack of openness with his first wife does not mean that he 
deserves to be considered a possible murderer for the rest of his life.  Collins’s technique 
of using a flawed test case returns us to the frustration of the reader at the reading of the 
Not Proven verdict in the trial transcript, inspiring self-consciousness over the 
responsibility to squash ambiguity in jury trials.  
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PATTERNS OF RESISTANCE: BRADDON’S “LAW” 
Like Collins, Braddon maintains a questioning attitude toward the law; in Lady 
Audley’s Secret (1862), An Open Verdict, and The Lawyer’s Secret (1861), she narrates 
legal situations only to discredit or explain why the law is incapable of assuring justice 
within these circumstances.  In Beyond Sensation, James Kincaid identifies the “Braddon 
problem” as captured by Lauren Goodlad, viewing Braddon as “a popular writer whose 
works dramatize (‘sensationalize,’ ‘gothicize’) women’s lives without articulating any 
obvious ‘feminist’ position” (xii).  Braddon’s treatment of the law presents its own 
“Braddon problem”— Braddon utilizes the legal narrative to cast doubt on our faith in 
lawyers and legal institutions, but does not offer a vision for reform.  Unlike Trollope, 
who includes an authorial aside decrying the unanimity requirement in The Three Clerks, 
Braddon does not broadcast her legal opinions.  In response to critics who find Braddon’s 
work to subscribe to normative Victorian standards of morality, some critics find 
“resistance” in Braddon’s work (Tromp and Gilbert vii).  This license to question the law 
follows the pattern of resistance which recent critics find in Braddon’s novels, 
particularly in Lady Audley’s Secret. 
According to Houston, Lady Audley’s Secret “stands out as a commentary on the 
law’s machinations” (18).   Indeed, Lady Audley’s Secret, partially serialized in 1861, 
abandoned, and then published in full in 1862, has been discussed alongside marriage 
reform and enclosure acts to understand the law’s impact on Victorian women (Langland 
3).  Beyond the feminist readings of this text, Braddon offers a detailed portrait of an 
underachieving legal professional.  Robert Audley is “supposed to be a barrister…but he 
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had never either had a brief, or tried to get a brief, or even wished to have a brief in all 
those five years, during which his name had been painted upon one of the doors in Fig-
tree Court” (32).  Far from a serious professional, Robert reads French novels, strolls in 
Temple Gardens, and rescues stray dogs.  When George Talboys asks Robert to be the 
guardian of his son, Robert feels it is a great responsibility for someone who could never 
take care of himself.  The force of Robert Audley’s ineffectiveness is magnified when 
read against another Braddon novel from the same year.  The Lawyer’s Secret, which 
appeared in Welcome Guest and Littell’s Living Age in 1861, is a novella based on the 
familiar fear that one’s lawyer, a trusted advisor, will be a liar and a cheat.  The lawyer in 
this text, Horace Margrave, is not only the guardian of a young orphan woman named 
Ellinor Arden but also the object of her affection.  Margrave has been entrusted with the 
small fortune Ellinor has inherited from her mother.  In addition, when her uncle John 
Arden dies, Ellinor is named the sole beneficiary.  Arden’s will includes the condition 
that in order to maintain the fortune, Ellinor must marry Henry Dalton, her uncle’s 
adopted son, within a year of her majority.  Motivated by love, Margrave attempts to 
increase Ellinor’s small inheritance from her mother so that when the time comes to 
choose she will be free to keep her mother’s fortune and become his wife.  In the process 
of trying to grow the inheritance, Margrave instead speculates away Ellinor’s uncle’s 
fortune.  Margrave confides in Henry, requiring him to keep silent about the loss of the 
fortune.  Upon her marriage to Henry, Ellinor sees her new husband’s subsequent 
stinginess as reflecting bad character, when, in fact, the couple has no fortune to spend.  
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Margrave waits until he is on his deathbed to confess his failed speculation to Ellinor.  At 
the end of the novel, Ellinor forgives Margrave and reconciles with her husband.   
In The Lawyer’s Secret, Braddon, like Trollope and Collins, confronts the issue of 
a family placing blind trust in its family solicitor.  For example, in The Eustace 
Diamonds, “every word that Mr. Camperdown said was gospel to Lord Fawn” (132).  
Similarly, in The Lawyer’s Secret, Ellinor’s trust in her guardian reaches levels of 
infatuation and devotion; however, in the first chapter, once Margrave chastises 
himself—“Horace Margrave, if you had only been an honest man”—the reader realizes 
that the attorney is not the trustworthy guardian that the heroine sees (11).  The contrast 
in the title between the cold and impersonal “lawyer” as opposed to Mr. Hargrave and his 
intimate “secret” mirrors the tension between the professional and the personal lives of 
lawyers which interested both Dickens and Trollope.  Like Furnival in Orley Farm 
(1862) and Jaggers in Great Expectations (1860-61), Margrave is represented as both a 
man and a professional; indeed, the narrative reveals to us Margrave’s professional 
judgment being clouded by personal feelings of love for his ward.  Additionally, a lawyer 
is expected to keep the confidences of his clients; however, in Braddon’s novella, the 
lawyer demands confidentiality from Dalton, who is a poor but rising barrister himself.  
Margrave’s secrets should be those of his clients, not his own. As Matthew Sweet 
suggests, “Before the details of his shame are explicitly revealed, you are likely to have 
divined the nature of the lawyer’s secret” (xii).  With this knowledge early in the novel, 
the reader is able to see how stereotypes about lawyers sustain the story and prolong the 
time before the unveiling of Margrave’s secret. For example, the mystery as to why 
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Dalton withholds money from Ellinor during their marriage is prolonged by Ellinor’s 
ability to explain away his parsimoniousness through the stereotypes of a lawyer:  
  I dare not order a jewel, a picture, an elegant piece of furniture, a stand of 
hothouse flowers; for, if I do so, I am told that the expenditure is beyond 
his present means, and that I must wait till we have more money at our 
command.  Then, again, his profession is a thousand times dearer to him 
than I.  No brief-less, penniless barrister, with a mother and sister to 
support, ever worked harder than he works, ever devoted himself more 
religiously than he devotes himself to the drudging routine of the bar. (26) 
In Miss Mackenzie (1865), Trollope wonders about how easy it is to perpetuate negative 
stereotypes about lawyers in general while at the same time, trusting one’s own attorney: 
“is it not remarkable that the common repute which we all give to attorneys in general is 
exactly opposite to that which every man gives to his own attorney in particular?” (167).  
Ellinor places blind trust in her own solicitor Margrave, while subjecting her husband, 
who is also a lawyer, but not her own, to the common judgments against the profession.   
 Braddon’s Margrave is not only unethical, he is also feminized; his secret brings 
on a fever attack that the doctors attribute to nerves.  Margrave’s response is “A nervous 
lawyer! My dear Mrs. Dalton, can you imagine anything so absurd?” (36). It takes 
Horace Margrave’s imminent death from typhus fever to confess his wrongdoings to 
Ellinor: “for God’s sake, Ellinor, no tenderness! That I cannot bear.  For four years you 
have never seen me without a mask.  I am going to let it fall. Henceforward you will 
think of me with scorn and detestation” (66).   Margrave explains that he made Henry 
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Dalton bear the weight of his secret because he did not believe he would live long and 
could not bear the thought of Ellinor’s contempt – Margrave’s actions as a lawyer are 
motivated by emotions and protecting his own heart without regard to the practical 
consequences to his client.  In short, despite his own wealth and stature in the 
community, the lawyer wrecks havoc on the lives of two young orphans in a botched 
attempt to gain further wealth.  Braddon’s plot of a lawyer’s actions may seem far-
fetched, but as in The Law and the Lady, this fictional legal narrative emphasizes the lack 
of a code of professional responsibility for lawyers in the Victorian period.  Rather than 
creating a representation of a lawyer that falls far outside of the realm of what was 
acceptable for legal professional behavior, Braddon’s text reminds readers that there was 
no standard in place, thereby drawing attention to the danger in a lack of standard.  In 
portraying an incompetent lawyer who preys upon the goodwill of a young orphan, 
Braddon requires her readers to take pause before trusting their lawyers implicitly.  Thus, 
Braddon carves out space for her competing version of the “law,” receiving development 
in An Open Verdict (1878). 
Like Collins’s The Law and the Lady, Braddon’s An Open Verdict treats 
circumstances in which the legal process fails to produce a decisive result.  Although 
English criminal law does not have the equivalent of the Not Proven Scotch verdict, it 
does allow an open verdict in a coroner’s investigation.  The open verdict in an inquest is 
not a verdict against a defendant; therefore, it cannot be analogized with the Not Proven 
verdict.  By positioning her narrative in a space where the law is unable to satisfactorily 
to secure justice, Braddon emphasizes the disconnect between law and justice and puts 
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forward literature as a “law” for envisioning justice beyond legal remedies.  Braddon’s 
representation of the jury not only captures the public’s anxiety but also is significant to 
understanding her literary vision.  While The Law and the Lady may be categorized as a 
non-canonical work by a canonical author, Braddon’s An Open Verdict is out of print; so, 
a plot summary is useful.  Braddon’s novel revolves around an open verdict—the jury 
finds “Mr. Harefield had died from the effects of laudanum, but by whom administered 
there was no evidence to show” (58).  Mr. Harefield’s daughter Beatrix purchased small 
quantities of laudanum at several shops to combat her own sleeplessness.  Beatrix’s 
sleeplessness is due to her father’s refusal to approve of her chosen suitor Cyril 
Culverhouse.  Although Beatrix has won Cyril’s heart, the governess Bella Scratchell has 
also fallen in love with him.  In an act of jealousy, Bella steals a letter from Mr. Harefield 
to Beatrix on the day of his death, taking control of Beatrix’s legal fate.  Without this 
crucial piece of evidence, Beatrix is suspected of poisoning her father, and loses the 
affections of her suitor.          
A contemporary reviewer sees An Open Verdict as a departure from Braddon’s 
sensational legal texts that take a page out of the Newgate Calendar, for “in spite of its 
professional title, [the work] contains no graver crime than larceny, and no actual breach 
of any other article of the Mosaic Code than the fraudulent abstraction of a document 
involves” (“An Open Verdict,” Examiner, 246).  Turning to The Newgate Calendar, one 
could argue against the notion that the open verdict was not a legal process rife with 
violent connotations:  
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On Monday morning an inquest was held at Baitsbite, near Cambridge, on 
portions of a child which had been found piecemeal in the Cam. The body, 
which had been in the river about a week, was ripped up and mutilated, 
was deprived of both legs and left arm, and decapitated.  There was 
nothing to throw further light on the horrible affair, and an open verdict 
was returned. (177) 
This entry from 1872 is all the more horrific for its ending—the open verdict amounts to 
the law throwing up its hands and giving up.  The narrative of a Victorian trial transcript 
bears much similarity to the resolution found in the three-volume sensational novel; 
however, an open verdict disrupts our sense of this similarity, as it designates the case as 
unsolvable and the ending unwritten.  Thus, Braddon’s narrative of the open verdict 
supplies the “law” by providing the decisive conclusion the legal system was unable to 
produce.  Although Braddon does not announce her vision for legal reform in the novel, 
she does repeatedly suggest that the answer to just verdicts can be located in the tenets of 
empiricism.  In the Victorian public’s imagination, the open verdict would be associated 
with disappointment and incompetency.  For example, in the treatises surrounding the 
infamous Road Murder case of 1860, in which an open verdict was returned, voluminous 
notes suggest that “the Coroner’s Inquest was a bungle” (Stapleton 4).   Additionally, an 
interview with a member of the jury hearing the Road Murder case in 1861 provides 
confirmation of this sense of disappointment: “I do say I am discontented, for my own 
part, to the bringing in of an open verdict. I did not feel that we were doing justice to 
ourselves or giving satisfaction to the country” (The Road Murder 109). 
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The legal plot in An Open Verdict may be less sensational than in Braddon’s 
previous works; however, this fact does not detract from the treatment of the law in the 
novel.  Rather, the emphasis on everyday life allows Braddon to offer a serious 
consideration of legal culture.  Braddon engages with the same questions regarding the 
ethical standards for lawyers raised by other Victorian novelists; yet, unlike the case for 
Collins and Dickens, nothing in Braddon’s biography suggests a connection to the law.  
This fact allows us to approach the question of why her works treat legal themes apart 
from a biographical explanation.  Far from an issue that only appealed to those with a 
background in the law, the future of the institution of the jury led to a debate that 
impacted and shaped the thoughts of the non-legal population and resonated in the 
cultural memory.  An Open Verdict is grounded in the coroner’s jury, which reflects the 
early jury more than any other modern forms.  Early jury practice, brought to England by 
the Normans, was based on an oath a juror made to the King.  The oath-takers served in 
inquests not unlike the procedure at a coroner’s inquest.  The coroner's jury of the 
nineteenth century has been characterized as “grafting a judicial character upon an 
inquisitorial office” (Devlin 163).  In An Open Verdict, the coroner’s jury does not state 
the cause of death; this is an instance of the law creating uncertainty that Braddon uses to 
create suspense.  Beyond the purposes of plot, Braddon’s representation of the coroner’s 
jury raises questions about communal processes and illuminates the human repercussions 
of ambiguity in legal verdicts, as in The Law and the Lady.   
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Sydney Taylor, in A Digest of the Law and Practice Relating to the Office of the 
Coroner, outlines the standards for a jury’s verdict in an inquest:                                                                   
The verdict of the majority of the jury, if at least twelve, may be taken.  
Failing agreement on verdict, the coroner may detain the jury, or adjourn 
to the next assizes, in which case their recognizance should be taken.  But 
the difficulty of non-agreement can generally be avoided by leaving part 
of the verdict open.  The coroner must accept the jury’s presentment.  The 
coroner should not unduly influence the jury, who should arrive at their 
finding in private and announce it publicly. (20)  
Braddon frames the inquest as being guided by human errors –“one or two jurymen 
late—a good deal of blundering in calling over the names—some small disputations 
about nothing particular—a general muddling away of time” (II.18).  In other words, we 
look beyond the ideal of the law to the operation of the law, which cannot exist separate 
from the unpredictable nature of man.  Braddon’s description of the jury, like Dickens’s 
in “Some Recollections of Mortality” (1873), focuses on the furniture the jury sits upon 
rather than the jurors’ faces; the jurymen sit in “heavy oaken chairs” (II.18).  The jury is 
described as “looking very much as if they were sitting at a new Barmecide’s dinner” 
(II.19).  A “Barmecide’s dinner” is one with imaginary food, an interesting situation, 
seeing that the withholding of food from a jury until a verdict had been reached was part 
of the argument about systematic mistreatment of jurors circulating during the nineteenth 
century.  Starving a dissenting juror was allowed unless a juryman’s life was in danger.  
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The illusory quality of the feast also points to the lack of evidence in front of the jury, 
and the way in which a decision will be reached based on intangible impressions and 
instincts about Beatrix.  For example, when Beatrix admits to the coroner that she had 
recently purchased laudanum for her own sleeplessness, the jury responds: 
The jury, who had been getting a little absent-minded during what they 
considered a somewhat wire-drawn interrogation, became suddenly on the 
alert.  Four and twenty eyes were fixed inquisitively upon the pale face of 
the witness.  (II. 29) 
The jury reacts to the sensational but circumstantial evidence about the laudanum but not 
the servants’ testimony of their own observations.  The most profound description of the 
jury’s reliance on perceptions rather than evidence is in the way the jury reacts to the 
change in Beatrix’s appearance from the day of her father’s death to a week later: 
She was deadly pale, but firm as a rock. That firmness of hers, the calm 
distinctness of her tones, the proud carriage of her beautiful head, 
impressed the coroner and jury strongly, but not favourably.  They had 
been more ready to sympathize with her a week ago, when she had stood 
before them trembling, and bowed down by her distress. (II. 56) 
Beatrix’s apparent strength is interpreted by the jury as suspicious.  In this way, 
the law is depicted as failing to support women in their independence and perpetuating 
ideas about female hysteria.  One wonders if she had appeared as distraught and feverish 
as Horace Margrave in The Lawyer’s Secret if the jury would have still issued an open 
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verdict.  Following the detailed account of witness testimony and evidence presented 
throughout the coroner’s hearing, the jury’s verdict is stark in comparison: “The jury 
agreed upon their verdict, after some deliberation” (II. 62). The narrative silence 
surrounding the verdict is what one would expect as a spectator in the courtroom, but in 
this third-person omniscient narration, Braddon chooses not to narrate the jury’s 
deliberations. The tonal shift of the chapter causes the verdict to feel like suppression.  
The verdict ends the chapter and the narrative shifts to a drawing room scene.  The 
abruptness of the shift in combination with the under-narrated verdict juxtaposed with a 
careful presentation of all the evidence of the case compels the reader to narrate the jury’s 
deliberations.  Braddon’s use of a narrative silence elicits a response from her readers, 
and we become the jury.   
In contrast with The Lawyer’s Secret (1861), the lawyer’s role in An Open Verdict 
does not include providing solace for its female heroine.  At her father’s death, Beatrix 
does not “throw herself into the sanctuary of English law” (II. 19).  Unlike Trollope’s 
characters that hold their family solicitors in great esteem, Braddon’s heroine “had no 
instinct of her mind to seek comfort, counsel, or succor from Mr. Scratchell” (II.19).  In 
particular, the family solicitor Mr. Scratchell is represented as a feckless automaton.  
Kenrick calls Scratchell “a piece of such common clay” that could not “comprehend the 
finer feelings of human porcelain” (II. 53).  Indeed, Braddon portrays a village lawyer as 
someone not to be trusted blindly.  Mr. Scratchell seems to be motivated solely by 
financial concerns, as he was “subservient to the last degree, his sole anxiety being to 
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retain his position, and to ingratiate himself and his family in Miss Harefield’s favour” 
(II. 96).   
Moreover, Mr. Scratchell treats his family in the business-like manner of a 
lawyer; he forces his daughter Bella into a loveless marriage so as to profit from the 
wealth of her suitor.  Indeed, Scratchell pretends to be reluctant to give his young 
daughter’s hand in marriage to the old man Mr. Piper so as to obtain a larger marriage 
settlement.  Braddon represents an antagonistic relationship between Beatrix and her 
family solicitor.  When advising Beatrix he cannot fathom why she would pay off the 
mortgages on Culverhouse Castle before becoming Sir Kenrick’s wife and take on the 
“absurd” (II. 46) risk that the wounded soldier might die. He tries to protect her interests 
but in the end relents based on his own self-interest: 
To make himself disagreeable to Beatrix, even in the endeavour to protect 
her interests, might be fatal.  Women are such self-willed, unreasonable 
creatures, he argued within himself.  If he thwarted her in this ridiculous 
whim, she might resent his conduct all her life…He was as dependent 
upon the Harefield estate for sustenance as a barnacle on a ship’s bottom.  
In a word he could not afford to offend her.  (II. 46) 
Mr. Scratchell protests to Beatrix that it would be impossible to immediately pay off the 
mortgage on the Culverhouse estate by a hasty sale of her stocks and shares.  Beatrix’s 
reply is that of an empowered woman like Valeria Macallan: “Nothing is impossible to a 
clever family solicitor; you can do the preliminary act by deposit of my deeds.  
Remember, Mr. Scratchell, if you accomplish this thing for me, I shall always consider 
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myself deeply bound to you.  It is a favor I shall never forget” (II. 47). Rather than 
depending on Scratchell for advice, Beatrix asks her lawyer to do as she wishes despite 
his objections.  Indeed, Beatrix turns to the Vicar, Mr. Dulcimer, for guidance in 
business, not spiritual affairs. 
As in The Law and the Lady, female skepticism over an attorney’s power is 
matched by a male confidence in the legal professional.  Both Dulcimer and Cyril seek to 
obtain better legal representation for Beatrix at the coroner’s investigation, as “Mr. 
Scratchell is very good as a collector of rents, but not exactly the man for a critical 
position” (II.41).  When Beatrix receives representation at the coroner’s hearing, it is by a 
nameless man, “a lawyer from London, a little dark man, with heavy eyebrows and a hard 
mouth, a defender who inspired Beatrix with a nameless horror” (II. 77).  The lawyer 
does nothing but increase the community’s suspicion.  Rather than an act of 
empowerment, in Braddon’s novel, Cyril’s suggestion of hiring a London lawyer is the 
first indication of weakness in the face of Beatrix’s misfortune.  Cyril is unable to provide 
emotional support to Beatrix, as he believes it is his duty to put his profession first and 
distance himself from a woman tainted by gossip, even if that woman is his fiancée. 
Thus, Braddon suggests that extralegal methods may be the only way to truly secure 
justice for Beatrix.  For example, Cyril’s cousin Kenrick offers his own assistance instead 
of attempting to hire a lawyer. Mr. Dulcimer dismisses Kenrick’s proposal, claiming that 
only a lawyer can help Beatrix.  Yet Kenrick is the only person willing to put himself out 
as a provider of personal assistance instead of hiding behind the cold professional 
assistance of the law.  Illustrating the tension between legal advocacy and communal 
 218 
processes, Braddon’s text suggests that legal professionals cannot provide a substitute for 
the support of one’s community. 
As in English jury trials, the thought process of the coroner’s jury remains a black 
box in An Open Verdict; however, Braddon voices the anxieties of the Victorian public 
over the proceedings of the jury through the words of Beatrix’s community.  As 
discussed in chapter one, the impartiality of jurors was contested in the nineteenth-
century debate over the future of the jury.  In addition to calling the coroner “a hireling 
and a time-server” (II.84), Miss Coyle, the leader of the crusade against Beatrix, raises 
the issue of bias: 
I believe the coroner’s jury would have come to a very different verdict if 
Miss Harefield had been poor and a stranger.  Look at the men who were 
on the jury.  Why, there was Haslope the grocer, who has served the Water 
House ever since he has been in trade; and Ridswell the upholsterer, who 
had the order for the funeral. Slavish creatures who have fattened upon the 
Harefield family! Of course they would not condemn the daughter of their 
patron. (II.124) 
In Is Trial By Jury Worth Keeping? (1850), Willmore addresses the issue of jury bias in 
the nineteenth century, arguing that “every trial is a public lecture in impartiality” (40).  
At the same time, he acknowledges that impartiality is difficult not only for juries but 
also for magistrates: 
It is almost impossible for any one, however practiced, absolutely to shut 
out from the consideration of a case, all knowledge other than that which 
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he has derived from the evidence.  Every man who has had any experience 
of Quarter Sessions, must have often heard Magistrates commenting upon 
the acquittal of a prisoner in the following strain:—“That man ought not to 
have got off—we know him—he has maintained his family on plunder a 
long while—he has been the plague of the country—his brother has been 
transported—they are all a bad lot, and the greatest poachers in the 
neighborhood.” And this without the slightest conception that they had 
any bias one way or the other! (54) 
Indeed, Miss Coyle’s criticisms seem to be based on the human element in jury decision-
making, which is only accentuated by the uncertainty of an open verdict.  By contrast, 
Sam Weller in Dickens’s The Pickwick Papers says that Pickwick would not have been 
found guilty of breach of promise if he was in their profession. The discussion of jury 
bias comes from a conversation between Sam and his father over why the jury so easily 
came to convict Mr. Pickwick: 
“If your gov'nor had been a coachman,” reasoned Mr. Weller, “do you 
s'pose as that 'ere jury 'ud ever ha' conwicted him, s'posin' it possible as the 
matter could ha' gone to that extremity? They dustn't ha' done it.” 
“Wy not?” said Sam, rather disparagingly. 
“Wy not!” rejoined Mr. Weller; ''cos it 'ud ha' gone agin their consciences. 
A reg'lar coachman's a sort o' con-nectin' link betwixt singleness and 
matrimony, and every practicable man knows it.” (694) 
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Brown, in The Dark Side of Trial by Jury (1859), finds impartiality to be a problem 
among common jurors in a similar situation as described by Weller.  According to 
Brown, in common juries, “all their partialities are saved up for brother chips, for 
carpenters, builders, tailors, shoemakers, and such like innocents, who are book to win 
the moment they enter the course with a gentleman to contest the reasonableness of their 
bills or his liability to pay” (15).  If common jurors side with other men from their class, 
then, in Brown’s estimation, they tend to find against those in positions of power without 
regard to fault—lawyers, railway companies, and insurance companies, just to name a 
few.   
The narratives by Braddon and Dickens both highlight the tension over the issue 
of bias within juries and betray the anxiety of the public in trusting in panels of the 
general population, assembled without regard to class with this potential for bias.  Devlin 
describes the English tradition of addressing the jury: “[Lawyers] should address the jury 
as an impersonal body of twelve and the less they know about them as men and women 
the better.  In fact they know nothing at all about them; and it is very doubtful whether 
they would be allowed to find out anything very much” (34).  Devlin acknowledges that 
American lawyers would be surprised to learn that the English trial system does not use 
voir dire to delve into the personal information of potential jurors.  In Devlin’s 
estimation, prejudices are rare and become so diluted in the jury’s deliberations that their 
impact is negligible (34).  If Victorians craved certainty, then the selection of a jury 
without the element of control that voir dire provides required a deep faith in the English 
common man.  Public opinion is split as to the prevalence of jury bias; yet, in 
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combination with other factors such as the unanimity requirement and the education of 
jurors, jury bias demonstrates how the future of the jury intersects with questions of class 
and democracy central to the formation of the English identity.   
The jury’s inability to rule Mr. Harefield’s death a suicide or murder leaves 
Beatrix open to attack, as the public opinion supplies its own definitive judgment of 
guilty when the jury was unable to make a decision.  Beatrix Harefield may not be 
condemned by the jury of common people during the coroner’s hearing, but she is held in 
suspicion by her neighbors and even her suitor Cyril Culverhouse.  When Cyril considers 
the public opinion against Beatrix, the town becomes an individual: “Then as to motive? 
Well, one not look very far for that, argued Little Yafford” (II.83).  The unification of a 
village into one voice mirrors how a coroner’s jury ultimately becomes one voice.  Yet 
Braddon emphasizes the lack of individual thinking in the voice of Little Yafford as a 
community.  For example, when Beatrix confronts Miss Scales about the disapproving 
looks she receives in the village, Miss Scales is unable to provide a substantive response, 
but rather asks Beatrix not to ask her.  Mr. Dulcimer, the erudite Vicar, defends Beatrix 
and calls the Little Yafford people “a set of venomous idiots” (II.114) for holding her in 
suspicion.  Mrs. Dulcimer blames the “unsatisfactory” (II.131) nature of the coroner’s 
verdict for the public suspicion of Beatrix.  A nineteenth-century reviewer of An Open 
Verdict is of the opinion that Cyril is “not a nice young man” (“An Open Verdict,” 
Examiner 246).  Cyril leaves Yafford, abandoning his betrothed for the sake of “duty and 
honour” (II.82).  In following the duties of his office, Cyril neglects his duties as a man 
who has made his intentions to marry Beatrix known.  As Kenrick suggests, Cyril’s 
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blindness is a product of public opinion: “Do you mean that you, a reasonable man, with 
eyes of your own and a mind of your own to see and judge with, are going to be led and 
ruled by the petty slanderers of Little Yafford?” (II.92). In Cyril’s absence, Kenrick 
proposes to Beatrix, who continues to hold faith in Cyril’s love despite his departure.  
According to Beatrix, “It was not his suspicion, but the evil thoughts of others” (II.130) 
that caused Cyril’s doubt.  Another danger of the tide of public opinion is realized, as 
Beatrix is condemned by public opinion and then allows public opinion to excuse her 
beloved’s actions.  Kenrick labels Cyril “a coward” (II.130), before his own death in 
battle in India.     
If Cyril “hardly escapes the charge of being a bloodless prig,” (Cornell and Law 
155) Braddon’s redemption of Cyril demonstrates the triumph of empirical evidence over 
public opinion.  When Cyril returns to Yafford to attend the wedding of Beatrix and his 
cousin Kenrick, the lovers meet accidentally in a churchyard.  Cyril denies having 
believed Beatrix to be a poisoner, which Beatrix quickly refutes: “You did not believe me 
innocent, or you would not have forsaken me” (II.76).  In the face-to-face meeting, Cyril 
can see past the doubts of the community to the importance of making judgments based 
on physical observations: “But now that he stood face to face with her, now that he saw 
that noble countenance, the splendid indignation of those eyes, he was as convinced of 
her innocence as if he had never doubted her. His past doubts seemed madness, or worse 
than madness, diabolical possession” (II.77).  This line of thinking resonates with some 
early forms of the jury, wherein those with personal knowledge of the defendant served 
as the tribunal.   Direct observation is again emphasized at the end of the novel, when 
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Cyril pursues Beatrix to beg her forgiveness.  According to Cyril, “I needed but to see 
you to know that you were innocent” (III. 267).  While An Open Verdict demonstrates the 
ways in which law’s solutions are often inelegant and devastating to the affected parties, 
Braddon also aligns herself with the empiricist tradition.  Peter Garratt, in Victorian 
Empiricism discusses how mid-Victorian writers “were committed to the classic 
experiential doctrine—that ‘experience is the sole origin of knowledge,’ to use Herbert 
Spencer’s phrase—while being increasingly aware of the problematic nature of 
observation itself” (16).  As discussed in chapter three, a tension exists in Victorian 
novels between philosophies of law—empiricism or positive law and communal 
processes or natural law.  Thus, Braddon’s narrative focuses on an uncertainty created by 
the law not only for the purposes of plot but also to examine cultural anxiety surrounding 
the nonempirical nature of communal processes. 
 
BEYOND THE JURY: MR. MEESON’S WILL 
If Collins and Braddon represent ambiguous verdicts from juries, Haggard’s Mr. 
Meeson’s Will includes a juryless trial.  Collins models his case off of the Madeleine 
Smith trial, while Haggard’s fact pattern is firmly rooted in the world of fiction.  Despite 
these differences, Haggard connects to Collins and Braddon in his engagement in 
questions about the role of legal advocacy and communal processes.  On the subject of 
the “law” of fictional legal narratives, Mr. Meeson’s Will is self-conscious about the ways 
in which the lines separating law and literature are blurred.  
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Like An Open Verdict, Henry Rider Haggard’s Mr. Meeson’s Will (1888) is a 
legal narrative that operates entirely outside of the canon; only a handful of articles have 
been published on this text.  Best known for King Solomon’s Mines (1885), which has 
been described as Treasure Island set in Africa, Haggard wrote novels set in Jerusalem, 
Egypt, Greece and Iceland.  Set in England, Mr. Meeson’s Will was seen as a departure 
from Haggard’s usual subject matter.  In the estimation of one contemporary reviewer, 
Haggard “has abandoned the fairyland of myth and marvel to give us here a clever, 
though slightly improbably, tale of real life” (“Mr. Meeson’s Will,” The Dublin Review 
175).  Despite a plot involving a will tattooed on a lady’s back, Mr. Meeson’s Will is 
perceived by nineteenth-century reviewers as a portrayal of common life when viewed 
through the lens of Haggard’s exotic oeuvre.   
In Mr. Meeson’s Will, a shipwreck leaves the heroine Miss Augusta Smithers and 
her publisher Mr. Meeson on a deserted island awaiting rescue.  Augusta and Meeson 
have previously quarreled over the meager sum she was paid for the rights to her novel, 
which is now a bestseller.  When Meeson refuses to offer Augusta further compensation, 
Meeson’s nephew Eustace confronts his uncle regarding the unjust terms of Augusta’s 
contract.  This confrontation leads not only to Eustace’s dismissal from the publishing 
house but also to his disinheritance by Meeson.  Once Meeson is on his deathbed 
following the shipwreck, he wishes to amend his will to reinstate Eustace as the 
beneficiary.  Due to the lack of paper or linens, Augusta agrees to have Meeson’s new 
will tattooed on her back.  Two sailors witness Meeson’s will, only to perish before a ship 
rescues the remaining survivors.  Even following a sensational disaster in which most 
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passengers of the ship perish, and the survivors have little hope for rescue, they look to 
the law, not religion for salvation:  
Mr. Meeson was more or less acquainted with the formalities that are 
necessary in the execution of a will, namely: that the testator and the two 
witnesses should all sign in the presence of each other. He also knew that 
it was sufficient, if, in cases of illness, some third person held the pen 
between the testator's fingers and assisted him to write his name, or even if 
someone signed for the testator in his presence and by his direction. (53) 
To his last breath, Mr. Meeson’s life is governed by concern for legal propriety and 
adherence to legal procedure; therefore, one could easily dismiss Mr. Meeson’s Will as a 
ridiculous satire on legal procedure.  Haggard’s satire is more in line with the Victorian 
canon; Jan-Melissa Schramm finds legal satire such as that in Thackeray's The History of 
Pendennis to acknowledge "a sensitivity to the nuances of the discursive struggle 
between legal and literary discourses” (281). Indeed, Haggard’s novel is a meditation on 
the tensions between law and literature and the role of legal realism in forging literary 
identity.    
Appearing in the summer number of the Illustrated London News in 1888, 
Haggard’s sensation novel has been described as “exciting, if not altogether pleasing” 
(“New Books and Reprints,” 27) and “partly a robinsonade; mostly mundane melodrama” 
(Mullen 287). Like Augusta, Haggard’s work was popular with mass audiences; yet, his 
style was criticized for a lack of polish and limited vocabulary.  A reviewer for The 
Academy discusses the “quite absurd condemnation” of the novel, finding Haggard’s tale 
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“brightly written” while “inartistically improbable” (“Mr. Meeson’s Will,” The Academy 
350).  The tattooing of the will on Augusta is considered “bizarre”; however, a reviewer 
for The Dublin Review concedes that the tattooed will would, in actual practice, likely be 
admitted by the Court of Probate (“Mr. Meeson’s Will,” The Dublin Review 175).  Along 
these lines, the reviewer also suggests that Eustace’s barrister James Short’s advocacy 
against a team of lawyers “is a curious anticipation of a striking feature in a recent 
sensational trial, subsequent, we should imagine, to the date at which the tale must have 
been written” (175).  This statement winkingly points to the ways in which literature may 
influence legal culture, while at the same time emphasizing the legal realism in 
Haggard’s novel.  Reviewers evaluate the legal realism of Haggard’s narrative, with 
assessments diverging wildly from the factual pattern being outside the realm of the 
possibility to even anticipating the law.   
Though trained as a lawyer, Haggard devoted the majority of his time to writing 
novels; when he did practice law, it was in the probate and divorce courts.  The 
inspiration for Mr. Meeson’s Will may have derived from Haggard’s work as a lawyer 
and interactions with other lawyers.  Writing in an 1888 edition of the London Globe, a 
barrister identified only as J.L.A.M. alleges that the idea of a woman tattooed with a will 
and being treated as a legal instrument arose in the context of lawyers exchanging 
anecdotes regarding legal practice.  J.L.A.M. alleges that one such anecdote concerned a 
Chancery lawyer tricked into writing an opinion on whether a will tattooed on a person’s 
back could be admitted to probate.  In this anecdote, the Chancery attorney wrote an 
elaborate opinion, setting forth why the will could be admitted into probate before 
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realizing that the assignment to write the opinion was a hoax.  The assumption is that 
Haggard borrowed his plot from this experience (J.L.A.M 6).  Haggard, the lawyer, crafts 
his fiction from a fiction created by legal professionals.  In this way, his story originates 
in a space where the lines between law and literature are blurred.  In addition, his 
fictional legal narrative comes under the scrutiny of the legal system following 
accusations of plagiarism.  In the preface to the bound edition of Mr. Meeson’s Will that 
was published after the Summer Number in the Illustrated London News, Haggard 
affirms that his plot had its origin in this trick played on the Chancery lawyer.  This 
explanation arises in the context of accusations of Mr. Meeson’s Will being plagiarized 
from a French tale, which Haggard reports that he has never even seen.  According to 
Haggard, “tattooing stories, like most other tales, have for ages been the common 
property of the world” (xi).  Altogether, the publication history of Mr. Meeson’s Will 
represents the tensions between the literary and legal professions that are mirrored in the 
courtroom scene.   
Upon their engagement, Eustace and Augusta share the goal of enforcing Mr. 
Meeson’s will.  Eustace retains the counsel of the Short brothers—James, a barrister, and 
John, a solicitor. Eustace’s lawyers resemble Braddon’s Robert Audley; indeed, Haggard 
chooses to craft detailed representations of lawyers lacking clients and legal briefs in his 
fiction.  Significantly, a common occupation of a Victorian novelist was “called to the 
Bar; but never practiced.”  In this way, Haggard’s legal fictional narrative performs the 
potential law career of the novelist, carving out a space for competing “law.”  James is 
depicted as being wedded to legal custom despite only having one client; he will only 
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meet with Eustace if his brother John, the solicitor, accompanies him, as barristers are not 
accustomed to meeting with clients.  In addition, James is represented as unskilled in the 
actual practice of law, for when Eustace leaves to engage the solicitor, the barrister 
begins his earnest study of a book on wills borrowed from the counsel on the next floor.  
Haggard labels James and John as Tweedledum and Tweedledee.  James’s professional 
stature is so low that it becomes a “blessed sight” (84) to see his first client and first 
solicitor enter his chambers, even though they are his friend and brother.   
Haggard’s use of professionally undeveloped lawyers only gives the literary 
narrative more force—the will as a tattoo on the lady’s back in Haggard's text astonishes 
the Short brothers, and they question whether or not she has “sufficient respect for the 
dignity of the law” (85).  While contemporary reviewers called the tattoo plot “absurd,” 
the few critical articles on Mr. Meeson’s Will position Augusta’s tattoo at the center of 
the text’s significance.  Feminist readings of the text alternately envision Augusta as a 
liberated and oppressed figure.  Patricia Murphy, in her analysis of Augusta’s tattoo, 
explores connections to “empire and otherness…sexuality and desexualization, as well as 
literal and figurative evidence of female commodification” (229).  Garrett Stewart also 
reads the tattoo as a commodification, wherein Augusta as corporeal text of Meeson’s 
will becomes a “farcical reduction” of the patriarchal standards of Victorian marriage 
(Dear Reader 159).  If Murphy and Stewart read the tattoo as a destructive force to 
female identity, Kellie Holzer sees the tattoo as identity-building, arguing that if “we 
understand tattooing as an unstable technology of self-fashioning, we can read Augusta’s 
tattoo as a generative condition” (Holzer).  Augusta’s tattoo, when read together with the 
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positioning of Lady Holmhurst as amateur lawyer, and the placement of the women in the 
jury box, allows for the self-fashioning that Holzer suggests. 
Although the sketching of Haggard’s legal plot may be based on the imaginings 
of another legal professional, his plot challenges the notion that common law can resolve 
all legal problems.  For example, upon filing the will at the probate court, there is a 
discussion of the logistics of filing Augusta as a document and how she will “live in a 
cupboard, or in an iron safe with a lot of wills” (88).  The satire performs the tensions 
between the literary and legal professions, as these legal imaginings force the legal 
professionals to act as outsiders in their own profession, unable to imagine possibilities 
beyond the common law.  Haggard’s literary plot fictionalizes the law, forging factual 
patterns that the inexperienced legal professionals do not have the imagination to grasp.  
In support of this reading, Michelle Allen-Emerson reads Mr. Meeson’s Will as a novel 
about authorship.  Haggard’s biography includes conflict with Maxwell’s and Cassell’s 
publishing house, which Allen-Emerson finds reflected in the novel’s treatment of “the 
tension between authors and publishers, the changing conception of literary property, and 
the emergence of the author as celebrity” (497) Stewart sees the “generic oddity” of the 
novel—the shift from shipwreck saga to courtroom drama—to suggest a deliberate move 
“from story to authorial operation” (163).  Along similar lines, Cathrine Frank argues that 
“Mr. Meeson’s Will insists that literature might supplement law by endorsing, affirming, 
and even outdoing it” (337).  
In addition to using the law to forge a literary identity, Haggard engages with 
contemporary debates concerning the impartiality of the law.  Both Frank and S. Brooke 
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Cameron focus on the law in Mr. Meeson’s Will.  Frank considers how Haggard’s work 
engages with the debates surrounding the Victorian Wills Act of 1837, while Cameron 
argues that the novel is “a meditation upon contracts, both in terms of documents and also 
as a progressive force determining individuals’ identities and relationships” (179).  
Beyond wills and contracts, Mr. Meeson’s Will can be read as a meditation on the role of 
the jury.  For example, Mr. Meeson’s Will includes a discussion of how advocacy 
strategies are controlled by monetary concerns.  James hopes to hire additional counsel to 
represent Eustace; however, a “man of weight and experience” (97) is expensive, and 
they do not have the means to retain such a lawyer.  The narrative suggests the difficulty 
of this situation: “This was awkward, because success in law proceedings so very often 
leans towards the weightiest purse, and Judges however impartial, being but men after all, 
are more apt to listen to an argument which is urged upon their attention by an Attorney-
General than on one advanced by an unknown junior” (97).  In Mr. Meeson’s Will, a 
judge hears Meeson’s case in a bench trial, with no jury to hear the case.  According to 
John, the case is fact-heavy and there is not much law in the case.  Since the jury decides 
questions of fact not questions of law, its absence in this proceeding is felt with fuller 
force.  One of the dangers of such juryless proceedings is a lack of impartiality by the 
judge.  The concerns about judicial impartiality parallel those made in cases of libel; if 
the judge favors the government, then freedom of press is in jeopardy without the 
protections of the jury of common men.  In the absence of a jury, the jury box is filled 
with “various distinguished individuals, including several ladies, who had obtained 
orders” (99).   
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The composition of the people sitting in the jury box but not serving as juror 
differs markedly from a standard jury, as women were prohibited from serving on juries 
and distinguished individuals would excuse themselves from jury service.  In this way, 
Haggard encourages readers to consider how a jury might be improved with both of these 
categories of citizens.  Indeed, Lady Holmhurst is continuously engaging with the law in 
the novel.  For example, when Augusta returns to England, she must decide how to 
present Meeson’s new will.  Lady Holmhurst, who once had a cousin who she coached 
for his Bar examination, argues that if Augusta does not advertise the existence of the 
new will, she is “compounding a felony,” as she is both stealing the will and not showing 
it to Eustace.  In addition, Lady Holmhurst makes a pun on the term “mesne profits” 
(122) when Eustace’s attorneys are negotiating the settlement offer.  LeeAnne 
Richardson reads Mr. Meeson’s Will as a novel wherein “male anxiety about the New 
Woman, female authorship, and authority is literalized” (68).  Richardson sees the 
makings of a New Woman novel about an independent and successful author deteriorate 
into a sentimental romance, swashbuckling adventure and finally a courtroom drama 
(69).  According to Richardson, Haggard makes Augusta the writer in his novel only to 
then wage an attack on her in the narrative.  Arguing that “Haggard goes to great lengths 
to show that an independent woman cannot truly be happy,” (70) Richardson does not 
consider the potential for female agency within the genre of courtroom drama.   
  As is so often the case with Trollope, Haggard represents lawyers in the aggregate 
as generally being dangerous unknown forces, while the power of the individual attorney 
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is harnessed by a nuanced literary portrait.  At trial, the lawyers are indistinguishable 
from Dickens’s descriptions of blood-thirsty mobs flooding the courtrooms:  
Just at that moment there came a dull roar from the passage beyond. The 
doors of the court were being opened. Another second, and in rushed and 
struggled a hideous sea of barristers. Heavens, how they fought and 
kicked! A maddened herd of buffaloes could not have behaved more 
desperately. On rushed the white wave of wigs, bearing the strong men 
who hold the door before them like wreckage on a breaker. On they came 
and in forty seconds the court was crowded to its utmost capacity, and still 
there were hundreds of white wigged men behind. It was a fearful scene. 
(Mr. Meeson’s Will 102) 
Indeed, the “white wave of wigs” is an animal, not an intellectual force—we learn that 
the reason most of these barristers are here is because there isn’t work to do.  As in 
Braddon’s Lady Audley’s Secret, Haggard constantly emphasizes the underemployed 
barrister, which creates a sense of disorder within the profession and destabilization 
within the novel.  This representation of lawyers forming a stampeding herd reflects a 
cultural awareness of the lack of any code of professional responsibility for lawyers in the 
Victorian period.   
The rise of the professionalization of the Bar coincides with discussions of the 
ethics of legal advocacy in Victorian novels.  In keeping with the pattern of ridiculing the 
lawyer in the abstract and championing the individual attorney, Eustace’s lawyer gives a 
bravura performance.  James must argue against twenty three lawyers, because all of the 
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legatees under the former will require representation.  In his depiction of the twenty three 
lawyers arguing for the former will, Haggard includes “a long man with a big wig…who 
writes novels, like [Augusta], only not half such good ones” (104).  This merging of the 
legal and literary professional is significant, for Haggard’s text is not only a meditation 
on the publishing industry but also an exploration of the ways both lawyers and writers 
forge narratives.   At first paralyzed by nervousness, James is unable to address the court 
with an argument and rather begins by reading his pleadings.  Although the judge and 
lawyers may be asked to refer to the pleadings during a trial, it is not customary to read 
from the pleadings themselves.  The act of reading the pleadings aloud is a performance 
that does not move the trial forward or become part of the advocacy strategy; rather, it is 
more aligned with the literary act of reading for reading’s sake.  Through the act of 
reading aloud in a courtroom James seems to cross over into the world of literature; thus, 
it is no surprise that his initial opening remarks run nearly two hours and end on a literary 
note: “James ended his spirited opening by appealing to the Court not to allow its mind to 
be influenced by the fact that since these events the two chief actors had become engaged 
to be married, which struck him, he said, as a very fitting climax to so romantic a story” 
(107).  James wins a verdict for Eustace and the tattooed will is admitted to probate; 
however, it is James’s alignment with literary narrative that allows him to triumph, 
bringing this text back to its origins as a fiction about law dreamed up by lawyers.   It is 
unsurprising that Haggard’s novel closes with a scene of writing—Augusta at her ink 
table working on her next novel.  In the competition between literary and legal discourse, 
Haggard’s fictional legal narrative self-consciously positions literature as triumphant.  
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This dissertation has argued that it is important to identify the ways in which 
representations of the jury in literature accurately reflect the nuanced conversation about 
the jury occurring in legal treatises and the Victorian press.  By establishing the extent to 
which a fictional legal narrative is informed by current legal controversy, one can then 
move to considering how shifts in an author’s representations of the law reflect a shift in 
the legal culture.  Additionally, evidence of serious engagement with the issues pertaining 
to a specific legal debate provides a foundation for the argument that authors use features 
of the jury as a vehicle for providing their own juryman’s guidebook.  In effect, Victorian 
novelists write “law,” a fictional legal narrative that addresses ethical questions that 
common law or positive law has left ambiguous.  Braddon, Collins, and Haggard engage 
with the law and its human repercussions in complex ways; therefore, one can see the 
merits of a law and literature methodology for igniting interest in lesser read or out of 
print novels. I would argue that it is important to analyze law in non-canonical works, as 
it shows the scope of the intersections between law and literature in this period.  A non-
lawyer, Braddon’s engagement with the law cannot be explained through biography, 
opening interesting lines of future inquiry over the use of legal plots by other female 
authors such as George Eliot.  Like Trollope, Braddon was known for her productivity;   
Victorian critics assumed that authors who wrote quickly were not worthy of serious 
study.  I would argue that we see the conflicted nature of authors more clearly when they 
are prolific, for the texts themselves seem more of the moment, as opposed to carefully 
considered over time.  For this reason, further study of Braddon’s legal fiction, such as 
Aurora Floyd (1863) is warranted.  If sensation novels had a primarily female audience, 
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then in these texts, the female audience is given a juryman’s guidebook and asked to 
participate on the jury or even envision themselves in the jury box.  These sensation 
novels are works of resistance in the way gendered identity is called into question with 
Valeria as the amateur appellate attorney, Beatrix in her position of dominance over her 
solicitor, and Augusta in her refusal to be ruled by the law of her publishing contract or 
the law tattooed on her body.   
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Afterword: Future Lines of Study 
 
In Trial by Jury, Devlin argues that, “For all of the institutions that have been 
created by English law, there is none other [than the jury] that has a better claim to be 
called the privilege of the common people of the United Kingdom” (8).  In developing an 
integrated literary and legal history of the Victorian jury, this dissertation explores public 
representations of the jury through nineteenth-century legal treatises on the jury, the 
press, and fictional legal narratives.  The debate over the jury hinges upon questions of 
class and faith in communal processes; therefore, defining the jury’s role in the second 
half of the nineteenth century is indispensable to understanding the English national 
character.  By engaging in the legal controversy over the jury, Victorian authors write the 
law.  Beyond social questions, the consideration of the novel’s use of features of the jury, 
such as its role as “finder of fact” and its narrative silence, sheds light on the legal 
imagination of Victorian authors.  Representations of juries in Victorian literature are 
significant because they are more than just a social commentary regarding the deep 
cultural anxiety over the future of the jury; representations of the jury engage questions of 
literary authority and reveal an essential component of Victorian novelists’ literary 
artistry.  
Beyond representations of the jury in Victorian novels, this project could be 
expanded to explore the jury as treated in other narratives.  An 1859 article cites the 
following lines from William Pulteney's Ballad of "The Honest Jury" as one of the 
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versions oft-quoted when discussing the jury's power of overstepping the bounds of their 
duties: 
For Sir Philip well knows, 
  That his innuendos 
  Will serve him no longer in verse or in prose, 
  Since twelve honest men have decided the cause, 
Who are judges of fact and judges of Laws. (“Trial by Jury,” Law 
Magazine, 341) 
What is interesting about these lines is their instability; they are often quoted to elucidate 
the distinction between the role of judges and juries, with the last line altered to read, 
"Who are judges of fact, though not judges of laws" (345).  For example, Lord Mansfield 
cites this version of the ballad in the case of The King against William Davies Shipley, 
Dean of St. Asaph (1784) to decide whether the jury is a judge of both law and fact in 
libel cases (Cooper 147).  In 1850, C. H. Cooper examines the debate over the lines from 
Pulteney's Ballad.  A note from Howell's State Trials contradicts the memory of Lord 
Mansfield and identifies the line as "judges alike of the facts and the laws" appearing in a 
1754 pamphlet.  In fact, Lord Campbell says that Lord Mansfield misquoted the lines "to 
suit his purpose, or from lapse of memory."  Lord Campbell's interpretation is questioned 
by Cooper who finds the song as given in the fifth volume of the Craftsman as aligning 
with Lord Mansfield's recollection of the ballad (148).  The history of what Lord 
Mansfield calls a "famous, witty, and ingenious ballad" demonstrates how ambiguities 
surrounding the law of the jury resonate not only in novels but also in ballads and plays. 
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Based on a humor magazine piece a failed barrister named W.S. Gilbert wrote in 
1868, the operetta Trial by Jury (1875) ran for a two years with three hundred 
performances.  A Gilbert and Sullivan production, Trial by Jury was staged as a jury trial 
of a breach of promise case. The first solo is by the usher, who urges the jurymen to "set 
aside...all kinds of vulgar prejudice"(23). Then the chorus echoes this proclamation, 
repeating several times "from bias free of every kind. This trial must be tried!" (24).  
Despite these instructions, as soon as the defendant enters the courtroom, the chorus of 
jurymen says, "Monster, dread our damages.  We're the jury. Dread our fury" (25).  The 
defendant protests that the jury has not yet heard the evidence, to which the jurymen 
respond by leaving the box and gathering around him to sing, "On the merits of his 
pleadings / We're entirely in the dark! Ha! ha! - ho! ho! (25).  The jury’s exiting of the 
box indicates a lack of control; in this case, the audience experiences the horror of the 
jury having decided against the defendant before the trial has begun.  This fear of being 
judged arbitrarily by an infuriated jury would be a universal one that the playwrights 
appeal to, and one that was being discussed in both treatises and fictional legal novels, 
recalling the fears reflected in A Tale of Two Cities, wherein the man in the crowd at 
Darnay’s English trial is ready to issue a guilty verdict without having heard the 
evidence.  We learn that the judge was once a barrister and married a rich attorney's 
"elderly, ugly daughter" to get assigned lucrative cases at the Bailey and Middlesex 
sessions.  Throughout Trial by Jury, the law is nothing but a commodity to be bought or 
sold; the barrister "threw over" his wife and still became a judge.  The jury's oath is not 
sacred but a source of ridicule: “Oh, will you swear by yonder skies, / Whatever question 
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may arise, / 'Twixt rich and poor — 'twixt low and high, / That you will well and truly 
try" (28).  The scene in which the jury takes its oath emphasizes the physicality of the 
jury; the visual gag is that the jury is crouched down in the box raising their hands, which 
alone are visible.   The judge grows impatient over the court proceedings, instructing the 
barristers to "put [their] briefs upon the shelf," as he will marry the plaintiff himself (29).  
The commercial success of the play emphasized the sense of the jury as incompetent in 
the Victorian popular culture. 
Although the cultural resonances of the jury can be found outside of novels, this 
project could also be expanded to consider other novels.  While A Tale of Two Cities and 
The Law and the Lady discuss foreign justice systems, this project could be further 
developed to consider representations of the jury in literature from non-English authors.  
Comparative analyses could be conducted through an examination of  representations of 
the jury in Sir Walter Scott’s Heart of Midlothian (1818) and Peveril of the Peak (1823), 
Alexandre Dumas’s The Count of Monte Cristo (1844), Victor Hugo’s Les Miserables 
(1866), and Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment (1866) and The Brothers 
Karamozov (1879-80), just to name a few.  My work on the afterlife of Trollope’s legal 
fiction studies how literature is read and taught in American law schools; consequently, 
the most natural direction to develop this project would be through American literature. 
The changing role of the jury in the nineteenth century could certainly be 
witnessed outside of England—the American jury also underwent transformation during 
this period.  The jury system in the United States shared the popularity of Blackstone’s 
jury; the lack of language protecting the civil right to jury trials was a sticking point in 
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drafting the federal Constitution.  American justifications for the jury tended to center on 
a faith in the common man over the knowledge of legal experts.  In fact, before 1850, 
there was broad support of the idea that in criminal jury trials, jurors should decide 
questions of law as well as questions of fact.  However, the second half of the nineteenth 
century saw a radical change in jury practices. Questions of law were no longer put to the 
jury, and the American trial system evolved to include special and directed verdicts that 
increased the judge’s discretionary role.  As in England, shifts in the trial system reflected 
a diminished faith in the jury’s competency.  For these reasons, the study of the jury by 
law and literature scholars should be expanded to discuss representations of the jury in 
American novels, such as those by James Fenimore Cooper, Mark Twain and Constance 
Fenimore Woolson.   
Cooper’s The Ways of the Hour (1850) is not simply a novel including jury scenes 
in a murder trial; Cooper’s narrative is obsessed with the deterioration of the American 
jury.  In the Preface, Cooper writes, 
A strange indifference exists as to the composition of the juries.  In our 
view, the institution itself, so admirable in a monarchy, is totally unsuited 
to a democracy.  The very principle that renders it so safe where there is a 
great central power to resist, renders it unsafe in a state of society in which 
few have sufficient resolution to attempt even to resist popular 
impulses….It is certain that the juries are falling into disrepute throughout 
the length and breadth of the land.  The difficulty is to find a substitute.  
As they are bodies holding the lives, property, and character of every 
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member of the community more or less in their power, it is not to be 
supposed that the masses will surrender this important means of exercising 
their authority voluntarily, or with good-will.  Time alone can bring 
reform through the extent of the abuses.  The writer has not the vanity to 
suppose that anything contained in this book will produce a very serious 
impression on the popularity of the jury.  Such is not its design.  All that is 
anticipated is to cause a portion of his readers to reflect on the subject; 
persons who probably have never yet given it a moment of thought.” (2) 
Why does Cooper believe that his concerns about the jury will not resonate with the 
American public?  The cultural power of American fictional legal narratives requires 
further study.  It would be interesting to study Cooper’s relationship with the law; he was 
not a legal professional, but rather a midshipman in the U.S. Navy.   Twain’s Pudd'nhead 
Wilson (1894) includes representations of the jury in the trial for the murder of Judge 
Driscoll, and the text raises the intersections of race and the criminal law.  In Woolson’s 
Anne (1880-81), Anne Douglas gives witness testimony in the Heathcote murder trial.  
After waiting six hours for a verdict from the “dreadful jury,” the jury remained divided, 
and a new trial was ordered.   Anne explores the jury’s relationship to gender issues, as 
evidenced in this comment from Dexter to Anne: “This very evening, on the train, I heard 
a mechanic say, 'If the jurymen were only fine ladies, now, that Heathcote would get off 
yet’” (Fenimore 373). 
 On the subject of female authors, another direction for the expansion of this 
project would be to include a chapter on the works of George Eliot, as Adam Bede (1859) 
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and Felix Holt (1866) both contain detailed courtroom scenes.  While there are books on 
Dickens and the law and Trollope and the law, there is not a book on Eliot and the law.  
Eliot is understudied by law and literature scholars; exceptions include Jan-Melissa 
Schramm’s Testimony and Advocacy in Victorian Law, Literature, and Theology (2000) 
containing extensive analyses of Adam Bede, Felix Holt and Romola (1862) and Lisa 
Rodensky’s treatment of Middlemarch (1874) and Daniel Deronda (1876) in The Crime 
in Mind: Criminal Responsibility in the Victorian Novel.  With this range of novels 
receiving consideration in law and literature scholarship, it is surprising that a book on 
Eliot and the law has not been published.  One of the challenges of including Eliot in this 
project is the difficulty of distinguishing her legal philosophy from her scientific, 
religious and political beliefs. 
 Another interest this project has ignited for me is the afterlife of fictional legal 
narratives in the legal community.  My review of law review articles through the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries has given me some insight as to how lawyers read 
literature, from Thomas Alexander Fyfe’s glorification of Dickens to Francis Newbolt’s 
re-writing of Trollope.  There are all sorts of modern applications for which analyzing 
how lawyers read literature matters.  For example, to claim judicial protection under the 
Fair Use Defense of the Copyright Act a secondary work must be transformative, not 
derivative.  To decide whether secondary work such as fan fiction is transformative, 
lawyer-judges must analyze the literature.  Unsurprisingly, there is no set standard for 
what causes a work to be “rise to the level of a transformative parody rather than an 
infringing and derivative unauthorized sequel,” as famous decisions on The Wind Done 
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Gone (a sequel to Gone with the Wind (1936)) in 2001 and a sequel to The Catcher in the 
Rye (1951) in 2009 indicate.  I believe a lot of great work remains to be done not only 
tracing the rhetoric of the law and literature movement but also using this analysis to 
comment on modern instances in which lawyer-judges are required to perform literary 
analyses. 
Recent scholarship has found modern applications for a historical analysis of the 
relationship between legal and literary discourse.  A fellow panelist’s conference paper 
given on the benefits of voir dire in the United States made me consider how the English 
legal system’s lack of voir dire magnifies the faith placed in every English citizen eligible 
to serve on a jury.  It also caused me to think about narrative silences in the English 
system, for in the United States the voir dire questions posed to the jury to measure 
partiality are never without narrative weight--you cannot simply ask the question of what 
is your occupation or marital status without inviting the potential juror to generate a 
narrative.  In these ways, I am able to envision how my work intersects with 
contemporary legal scholarship.  
In analyzing the literary and legal discourse on the future of the jury in the 
Victorian period, this project has advocated for expanded use of the law and literature 
methodology.  Using a law and literature methodology provides a unique lens through 
which to view an author’s social and literary vision; yet, a survey of scholarship on law 
and literature in the Victorian period indicates an overreliance on the works of Dickens.  
Law and literature specialists need to grow the movement by incorporating non-canonical 
authors and out of print texts by canonical authors into their analyses.  This dissertation 
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has focused on an area of law untreated by other law and literature scholarship.  Law and 
literature scholars argue for an integrated legal and literary history; however, critical 
studies cluster around a few popular topics such as marriage, divorce, and the evidence 
used in criminal trials.  Law and literature scholars must branch out to conduct studies on 
the analogous relationship between law and literature in other areas of the law.  An 
excellent recent example of such scholarship is Clare Pettitt’s study of intellectual 
property law, although more work is needed on the relationship of civil law and literature.     
 As part of the community of scholars working on law and the humanities, my 
pedagogical goal is to bring an interdisciplinary perspective to the undergraduate 
classroom.  An undergraduate course on Trial by Jury in Victorian Fiction could consider 
works by Trollope, Dickens, Eliot and Braddon together with legal treatises on 
ideological justifications of the jury as well as the dark side of jury.  Students would 
study representations of lawyers, judges, and juries in fiction and discuss how a trial 
raises questions of class, gender, education, democracy and identity formation.  We 
would also examine the relationship between law and literature.  I could also use my 
knowledge about jury trials to create courses on related topics such as capital punishment 
and the novel.  Although most law schools offer courses in law and literature, the stated 
intention has shifted.  Early courses discussed law and literature courses as a way to 
humanize future lawyers.  Today the sense is that literature can fill in the gaps in how a 
law is functioning in society when the law has left it unrepresented.   In this way, my 
scholarship on the jury aligns with the evolving appreciation of literature in the law 
school classroom. 
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